Economic trends in Latin America in 1959 by NU. CEPAL
Vol. V, No. 2 
Santiago, Chile, October 1960 
.1 .. / 
Í 
L Economic trends 
in Latin America in 1959 
2. Central America's post-war exports 
to the United States 
3. The coffee industry in S5o Paulo 
/ r 
i 
" r n r 
' • L l ^ j : , . . 
' " • r - Hr-
UNITED NATIONS 
The Economic Bulletin for Latin America, published by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America, appears 
twice yearly, in February and September. The essential purpose of this periodical is to provide a resume of the economic situation of 
the region designed to supplement and bring up to date the information published in the Commission's annual economic surveys. 
Apart from this summary, which is to appear in every issue, special articles on different subjects related to the economy of Latin 
America are also included. 
The ECLA Secretariat assumes entire responsibility for the Bulletin. Its content —intended for the information both of public 
officials and of the general reader— was not submitted to the Commission's member Governments before publication. 
EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS 
Three dots ( . . . ) indicate that data are not available or are not Separately reported. 
A dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible. 
A minus sign (—300) indicates a deficit or a decrease. 
A space is used to separate thousands and millions (3 123425). 
A stroke ( / ) indicates a crop year or a fiscal year, e.g., 1954/55. 
An asterisk ( * ) is used to indicate partially or totally estimated figures. 
"Tons" and "dollars" are metric tons and United States dollars, respectively, unless otherwise 
stated. 
Minor discrepancies in totals and percentages are due to rounding. 
Price of Vol . V No. 2 of the Economic Bulletin for Latin America 
U.S. $ 0 . 7 5 ; 5 / - sterling; Sw. fr. 3.00 
(or equivalent in other currencies) 
The Bulletin may be purchased from any United Nations sales agent (see back cover) in national 
currency 
Subscriptions should be placed either with these agents or with: 
Sales and Circulation Section Sales Section 
United Nations European Office of the United Nations 
New York Palais des Nations 
U.S.A. Geneva, Switzerland 
CORRIGENDA, Volume V, No. 1 (March 1960) 
Page Line For Read 
34 2 31 23 
28 2 4 securing scrutinizing 
42 2 8 currency economy 
55 18 country century 
57 3 6 obtained contained 
ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR U H N AMERICA 
Published by the secretariat of the 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
Vol. V, No. 2, October 1960 UNITED NATIONS 
ECONOMIC TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA IN 1959 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of the chronic difficulties confronting the primary-
producer countries in their attempt to secure a rapid rate 
of economic development were clearly revealed again in 
1959. For the fifth consecutive year the external economic 
situation confronting Latin America as a whole was not 
conducive to the achievement of a satisfactory rate of 
growth. During the first post-war decade, demand for 
primary commodities was buoyant owing to reconstruction 
requirements and, later, to the circumstances arising out 
of the hostilities in Korea. Since 1955, however, world 
markets for the main commodities sold abroad by Latin 
American countries have tended to weaken perceptibly.. 
In 1959, while gains were recorded in the marketing of a 
few major commodities, the balance of changes in world 
market conditions was such that Latin American exports 
failed to keep pace with the rising level of economic acti-
vity in the major industrial countries. 
The deterioration in Latin American export trade, when 
viewed in relation to the rapid rate of population growth 
in the region, is the major factor underlying the low 
rate of increase recorded for per capita income in 1959. 
This development calls attention to the need to intensify 
the process of industrialization. But numerous obstacles, 
such as the structural inelasticities of supply, the low 
propensity to save and institutional deficiencies, which 
prevent the effective implementation of economic policies, 
make it difficult to secure an increase in domestic demand 
without price instability. In those countries where, despite a 
deterioration in the capacity to import, expansive economic 
policies continued to be pursued, there was mounting in- ' 
flationary pressure. In other countries, affected in the 
past by acute inflation, stabilization policies continued to 
be executed and even intensified, with the result that the 
rate of increase in price levels slackened to a marked 
extent. The anti-inflationary measures, however, tended to 
act as a brake on economic activity, since they were in-
tended ahnost exclusively to curb expenditure. The recon-
ciliation between price stability and economic growth was 
most difficult to achieve in those countries which had 
experienced both a deterioration in their terms of trade 
and a decline in per capita agricultural output for domestic 
consumption. 
The economic problems which confront Latin America 
can be rendered less acute but cannot easily be solved in 
the short-run. Various measures have already been taken 
or are being planned at both the national and interna-
tional levels with the object of gradually overcoming some 
of the obstacles to economic growth without inflation. The 
liberalization of trade within the region and the common 
market project are mainly designed to accelerate the 
process of industrialization through their beneficial impact 
on competition and resource allocation. More recently the 
prospects of an increase in the volume of external financial 
aid and co-operation in the implementation of develop-
ment programmes have improved. What is perhaps of 
paramount importance, however, is the fact that there is a 
growing recognition among Latin American countries of 
the need to alter the institutional environment so as to 
enhance the flexibility of internal supply. 
I. CHANGES IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN 1959 
The volume of gross domestic product for Latin America 
as a whole expanded in 1959 to almost 60,000 million 
dollars at 1950 prices—the highest level of output yet 
recorded. At the same time, however, the increase in out-
put in 1959 over its level of the previous year (2.6 per 
cent) represented a rharked slackening in the pace of 
economic growth. Thus, the course of events in 1959 per-
petuated a trend which had become evident after 1954. 
Since that year, the annual rate of expansion in the volume 
of the gross domestic product has, with one exception, 
declined steadily (see figure I ) . The exceptional year was 
1957, when circumstances associated with the Suez crisis 
gave a transitory fillip to economic activity in some of the 
major trading countries of the region. 
The rate of growth of output in 1959 was the lowest 
annual rate recorded in recent years, and should be com-
pared with the average annual growth rate of about 6 per 
cent for the region as a whole over the period 1945-54. 
Furthermore, if the growth of domestic output in 1959 is 
considered alongside the annual population growth of 2.5 
FIGURE I 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN DOLLARS AT 1950 
MARKET PRICES 









T O T A L 
P E R CAPITA 
- L J_ JL _L 
) 
J_ 
I 9 S 4 )99S I9S6 1957 1958 1959 
SOURCE: ECLA estimates based on official national statistics. 
per cent, the margin of progress achieved in terms of 
per capita output is shown to have been negligible. 
This description of the evolution of gross domestic pro-
duct for Latin America as a whole in 1959 applies equally 
well to almost all the individual countries (see figure I I ) . 
In Argentina for instance, there was an absolute de-
crease in the volume of the gross domestic product in 
1959, which fell almost 5 per cent below the output level 
of the previous year. El Salvador also experienced an 
absolute decline in real output. The weight carried by 
Argentina in the regional aggregate is relatively large, and 
to that extent that country's experience influenced the 
falling rate of growth of output recorded for the region 
as a whole in 1959. In Venezuela output recovered in 
1959, after a slight absolute decline in the domestic pro-
duct in 1958, and reached a level slightly higher dian 
that of 1957. Since 1957, abrupt changes in the volume 
of petroleum output—one of the most important sectors 
in Venezuela—have been largely associated with the in-
stability of the international market for petroleum and its 
products. Among the other Latin American countries for 
which data are available, Colombia and Ecuador also 
showed a higher level of output in 1959, which rose at a 
significantly faster rate than during the previous year. In 
the former, the principal stimulus came from the rapidly 
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growing industrial sector, while in the latter an expan-
sion in the volume of investment in public works was 
influential. 
Of all the Latin American countries, Brazil recorded the 
highest rate of growth of output in 1959, which exceeded 
its 1958 level by approximately 7 per cent. The 1959 
trend, however, represents a slackening in the vigorous 
rate of growth which has characterized the Brazilian eco-
nomy in recent years. From the standpoint of the region, 
the relatively high rate of growth attained by Brazil in 
that year contributed substantially to the rate for Latin 
America as a whole, since Brazil accounts for roughly 30 
per cent of the total regional output. 
Data on the sectoral origin of output in 1959 are avail-
able for five of the major countries—Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela—which together account for 
almost 80 per cent of the gross domestic output for the 
region as a whole. These data are shown in table 1 for 
three readily identifiable sectors—agriculture, mining, and 
industry (combining manufacturing and construction). 
It is clear from table 1 that the mining and industrial 
sectors together contributed almost 60 per cent to the 
increase in output in 1959—proportionally much more 
than their combined weight in total output. On the same 
basis of calculation, agricultural output lagged behind the 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: SECTORAL ORIGIN OF GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR FIVE COUNTRIES," 
1958 and 1959 
(Millions of dollars at 1950 prices) 
Agriculture Mining Industry Totat' 
1958 8 629 2 597 11286 45 158 
1959 8 878 2 817 11771 46 459 
Percentage increase 
1958-59 2.9 8.5 4.3 2.7 
Weighted percent-
age increase 1958-
59 20.7 18.3 40.4 100.0 
SOURCE: ECLA estimates based on official national statistics. 
• Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. 
' The sum of the individual items does not correspond to the 
total given, since it has not been possible to separate other 
sectors such as transport, energy and services. 
Other sectors, thus perpetuating what appears to have be-
come a chronic state of affairs not only for the group of 
countries under discussion but for Latin America in gen-
eral. Supplementary data suggest that the increase in 
agricultural output in 1959 for the region as a whole was 
less than that for the five-country group, being approxi-
mately 2 per cent above the level recorded in 1958. With-
in the total, production for export increased by 2.2 per 
cent, whereas production for internal consumption rose 
1.7 per cent above the previous year's level. 
The contrast between the development of output since 
1954 in the agricultural sector, on the one hand, and in 
the mining and industrial sectors, on the other, is clearly 
revealed in figure III. The pattern of sectoral output 
growth for the five Latin American countries—indivi-
dually and combined—are presented there for the period 
1954-59. Most of the countries recorded increases in min-
ing and industrial output in 1959, whereas agricultural 
production rose significantly in Brazil and Venezuela only. 
In the former country, a larger coffee crop contributed to 
the expansion in total agricultural output; elsewhere, the 
lag in output in the agricultural sector was due largely to a 
decline in livestock production, particularly in Argentina. 
After experiencing a teipporary setback in 1958, output 
in the mining sector made a notable recovery in the fol-
lowing year. Petroleum extraction in Venezuela revived, 
although 1959 output fell just short of the record attained 
in 1957. An appreciable expansion in the output of petro-
leum was recorded in the minor producer countries as 
well. In Argentina, the increase was partly a result of the 
petroleum policy introduced in 1958, which extended con-
tracts for prospecting and extraction to private companies. 
The output of iron ore and non-ferrous metals, stimulated 
in part by rising levels of economic activity in Western 
Europe and North America, expanded considerably in 
Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. 
The relatively high rate of growth of industrial output 
in 1959 was common to four of the countries appearing in 
figure III, and, to judge from available evidence, was 
characteristic of a number of other Latin American coun-
tries as well, including Colombia and Cuba. In Argentina, 
however, partly because of a prolonged period of labour 
unrest in numerous industries, the volume of industrial 
output in 1959 contracted by almost 13 per cent. In gen-
eral, increases in output were fairly widespread among the 
FIGURE HI 
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various branches of manufacturing, notable gains being 
recorded in petroleum refining, steel, pulp and paper, 
metal transforming and, in Argentina, and Brazil, in 
motor vehicle production. On the other hand, the 1959 
level of construction activity—one of the components of 
industrial output—^fell below or matched that of 1958 in 
three of the countries under discussion. The exceptions 
were Chile, where'a substantial increment in the volume 
of construction was recorded in 1959, and Mexico, where 
the increase was nearly 6 per cent. 
One of the disturbing features of recent economic de-
velopments in Latin America is that the relatively slower 
pace of growth in output has coincided with an appre-
ciable increase in economic activity in the industrial 
countries of Western Europe and North America. It is 
true that the upswing in the industrial countries has 
favourably influenced a number of traditional Latin Ameri-
can exports, but its general influence has been limited. 
The economic relationship between these two groups of 
countries has been analysed in a previous survey.^ From 
that study, it appears that the root of the problem con-
Economic Survey of Latin America 1958, Part 1. 
fronting the Latin American countries is not the peri-
odic fluctuations in economic activity in the industrial 
countries but rather the chronic weakness of primary 
commodity markets. Events in 1959, which were charac-
terized by a divergence in the rate of economic - gowth 
between the two group of countries, serve to bear out the 
conclusions reached in the 1958 Survey. These develop-
ments, which in the first instance affect the external trade 
and payments of the Latin American countries, are ex-
amined in some detail in the following section. 
II. THE E X T E R N A L SITUATION OF LATIN A M E R I C A : THE BALANCE OF P A Y M E N T S 
1 . T H E EXTERNAL MARKET 
Over-production and its aftermath—a drop in prices and 
an accumulation of surpluses—was the principal problem 
confronting the Latin American economies in 1959, and 
first few months of 1960, not so much because of the 
number of commodities affected (petroleum, coffee and 
sugar) as because these three alone supply more than 50 
per cent of the total foreign exchange earned by Latin 
American exports. The recovery of economic activity in 
the big industrial centres and, in some of them, a fresh 
move to expand after the 1957-58 recession, undoubtedly 
led to a relative improvement in the external market for 
a certain number of products, particularly non-ferrous 
metals and textile fibres. But even in this case some 
adverse elements remained, such as the maintenance of 
quantitative restrictions on lead and zinc imports and the 
larger subsidies authorized in favour of cotton exports in 
the United States, both measures acting as a direct or 
indirect deterrent to Latin America's possibilities of ex-
panding its exports in those branches. 
One of the positive features in the over-all picture of 
primary commodity markets was the gradual and now 
almost complete abolition of the discriminatory controls 
imposed on imports from the dollar area by the Western 
European countries. But this movement towards full trade 
liberalization in the European countries was offset by the 
extension of the United States Trade Agreements Act 
which strengthened the escape clause authorizing the adop-
tion of quantitative restrictions and/or a rise in customs 
tariffs whenever the imports of a specific product reached 
a volume sufficiently large as to endanger the stability 
of the corresponding domestic industry. Although the 
United States Government has so far made little use of this 
protectionist instrument,^ there was a noticeable increase 
in the last two years in the number of requests addressed 
to the Tariff Commission for the application of similar 
restrictions to a variety of imports, ranging from certain 
kinds of meat to typewriters. 
In order to enable a proper appreciation to be made 
of the circumstances in which Latin America's export trade 
was carried on in 1959, it is useful to give a brief account 
of the international market situation in respect of some of 
the region's major export items. 
Because of the share represented by petroleum in the 
total value of Latin American exports (approximately 26 
per cent of the total in 1956-57) , over-production of this 
commodity posed very serious problems in 1959. The 
rapid expansion of output in the Middle East, although 
briefly interrupted by the Suez crisis, was the salient 
feature of the petroleum industry in the post-war years. 
Middle Eastern production in 1959 exceeded its figure 
for 1958 by 8 per cent.' Although it is believed in reliable 
sources that, the growth of production in the Middle East, 
in the next few years will be less than the yearly average 
of 11 per cent registered during the fifties,^ the problem of 
how the markets are to absorb the extra quantity has 
been complicated by some recent events: the beginning 
of petroleum exploitation in North Africa and the rising 
rate of exports from the Soviet Union. Even in Latin 
America, the powerful impetus given to production in 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile means that a larger propor-
tion of their requirements can be met locally and that less 
heed be imported. 
The pressure exercised by world surpluses led to a fall 
in prices. In February and April 1959, the different types 
of Venezuelan crude dropped in price and settled at about 
7 or 8 per cent below their 1958 level (see table 2).® 
Simi arly, coffee market prices slumped as a result of 
the glut in production. The bumper harvests in Brazil 
raised exportable surpluses to unprecedented levels. World 
output for export increased from 34.6 million bags in 
1 9 5 6 / 5 7 to 51.4 million in 1958 /59 and 65.2 million 
in 1959/60.® Although, from the end of 1957 onwards, 
Latin American producers applied a number of regulations 
to co-ordinate their exports in order to stave off a disas-
trous slump in prices, the surpluses were so large that prices 
moved down irresistibly. The annual average quoted for 
Brazilian Santos coffee on the New York market in 1958 
was thus 15 per cent lower than in 1957 and it dropped 
by a further 23 per cent in 1959 in spite of the fact that, 
ever since the end of 1958, a system of withholding part 
of the exportable surplus was applied by all Latin Ameri-
can producers (see again table 2 and figure I V ) . A 
new Internátional Agreement, which entered into force in 
October 1959, established a system of export quotas in 
which the Latin American countries were joined by some 
' The growth in world production, by main areas, in millions of 
tons was as follows: 
1950 1958 Í959' Total percentage increment 
Annual 
rate 
United States 266.7 330.1 346.5 29.9 3.0 
Venezuela . . 80.0 138.6 147.0 83.8 7.0 
Middle East . 88.7 214.7 231.3 160.0 11.2 
Soviet Union . 37.9 112.9 129.0 240.4 14.6 
World total . 522.9 908.0 977.0 86.8 7.2 
® The two important cases in which it was applied were the 
fixing of import quotas for lead and zinc, at the end of 1958, and 
for petroleum and petroleum products at the beginning of 1959. 
SOURCES: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1958; and Petro-
leum Press Service, London, January 1960. 
• Provisional figures. 
' See Petroleum Press Service, op. cit. 
° In mid-August 1960, the price of Middle Eastern crude fell 
again. Although up to the end of August it was not known whether 
the Venezuelan producers would follow suit, a publication special-
izing in petroleum considered that Venezuela would have either 
to readjust its prices or to grant larger discounts (on fixed prices) 
if its participation in the world market was not to be reduced. 
See Petroleum Press Service, London, September 1960. 
° Estimates of exportable production for the respective trade 
years by the United States Department of Agriculture (see com-
plete Coffee Coverage, G. Gordon Paton, New York, 1 April 1960). 
Table 5 
PRICES OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
Indices: 1955 = 100 














Bananas" (Dollars per stem) 1.41 100.7 100.1 100.1 105.0 94.3 101.4 97.9 
Sugar" (Cents per pound) 5.00 108.2 107.0 102.6 105.4 110.6 109.7 101.0 104.2 
Sugar"" ( „ „ „ ) 3.24 108.0 91.7 96.9 88.9 87.7 93.2 92.9 93.2 
Coffee" ( „ „ „ ) 57.10 84.8 64.8 68.9 64.6 62.7 62.9 64.4 64.9 
Coffee' ( „ „ „ ) 64.60 81.0 70.0 71.2 69.5 70.0 69.2 70.6 69.2 
Cacao' ( „ „ „ ) 36.20 119.6 97.8 99.7 102.8 97.2 91.2 77.3 72.1 
Cotton^ ( „ „ „ ) 37.10 86.5 76.5 76.3 76.3 75.2 78.2 78.2 78.4 
Cotton" ( „ „ „ ) 35.40 77.1 70.9 . . . 72.6 69.8 73.2 73.7 
Cotton' ( „ „ ) 49.70 84.1 73.8 68.4 71.0 75.3 80.5 95.2 
Meat (Pence per pound) 28.90 91.7 99.7 102.8 102.4 103.8 89.6 99.7 104.2 
Wheat (£ per long ton) 26.90 92.2 90.3 90.7 88.5 90.7 92.6 91.1 90.7 
Maize („ „ „ „ ) 26.10 81.2 81.2 82.8 80.5 80.8 80.4 82.0 82.8 
Quebracho (Cents per pound) 11.70 84.6 84.0 84.6 84.0 83.8 83.8 83.8 83.8 
Wool ( „ „ „ ) 82.00 80.5 91.5 74.4 92.7 102.4 95.9 98.8 101.2 
Linseed oil ( „ „ „ ) 90.00 107.8 98.9 88.9 95.6 102.8 109.7 101.1 107.8 
Copper ( Í per long ton) 352.00 56.0 67.6 67.6 66.8 64.8 70.7 73.6 72.2 
Tin („ „ „ „ ) 740.00 99.3 106.1 104.1 106.1 107.2 107.2 106.8 106.6 
Lead (,. „ „ ) 106.00 68.9 67.0 67.0 66.0 67.0 67.9 70.8 71.7 
Zinc („ „ „ ) 91.00 72.5 90.1 82.4 83.5 92.3 103.3 100.0 101.0 
Nitrate , . (Dollars per short ton) 51.20 97.3 91.2 88.3 88.9 93.8 93.8 93.8 93.8 
Petroleum , . (Dollars per barrel) 2.87 106.3 99.0 103.1 97.6 97.6 97.6 97.6 97.6 
General index' 92.5 84.7 86.4 84.1 84.1 84.3 85.0 85.0 
Index, excluding petroleum . . . . 86.2 78.3 78.9 78.0 78.0 78.3 78.0 78.0 
SOURCES: The indices were calculated on the basis of the price series published by the United Nations, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, and the International Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Statistics. The weighting for the general index and the figures for previous years may be seen in the bi-annual issues of the ECLA Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America. 
° Unit value of United States imports. 
'' fob price Cuban port, centrifugal sugar, unrefined, 96%, for export to United States. 
" fob price Cuban port, centrifugal sugar, unrefined, 96%, for export to the free market. 
Domestic/import price, ex-dock at New York,, immediate delivery, Santos No. 4 in bulk. 
° Domestic/import price, ex-dock at New York, immediate delivery, Manizales type, in bulk. 
' Domestic/import price, ex-warehouse at New York, immediate delivery, Bahia cacao. 
^ Domestic/import price, cif Liverpool, United Kingdom, immediate delivery, Mexican Matamoros cotton SM 1-1/32". 
" Domestic/import price, cif Liverpool, United Kingdom, immediate delivery, Sao Paulo (Brazil), type 5. 
' Domestic/import price, cif Liverpool, United Kingdom, Weekly quotations, for shipments during the next three months, Peruvian cotton Pima No. 1. 
J Indices: base 1955 = 100. 
Meat: Domestic/import price, cif London, Argentine beef, frozen hind quarters. 
Wheat: Domestic/import price, cif United Kingdom, Argentine wheat from up-river, sales outside the International Agreement. 
Maize: Import price, cif London, La Plata maize. 
Quebracho: United States, ex-dock at New York, duties extra. 
Wool: United States, import price at Boston, clean wool, Buenos Aires 5/6's (40-36's). 
Linseed oil: United Kingdom and Continent of Europe, cif import price. European ports, in bulk, Argentine and Uruguayan. 
Copper: United Kingdom, domestic/import price, standard electrolytic copper. 
Tin: United Kingdom, domestic/import price, standard tin. 
Lead: United Kingdom, domestic/import price, ex-warehouse London, 99.97 per cent fine. 
Zinc: United Kingdom, domestic/import price, ex-warehouse London, 98.75 per cent fine. 
Nitrate: United States, crude Chilean nitrate, fob price, loaded on trucks at port warehouses. 
Crude petroleum: Venezuela, fob export price, Puerto La Cruz-Office, API gravity 35.0 — 35.9. 
of the African producers, thereby ensuring a better bal-
ance between world supply and demand. In any event, 
and partly as a result of the drop in prices, there was a 
marked upsurge of demand in importer countries during 
1959. Total world imports reached 41.5 million bags, as 
against an annual maximum of 37 million in 1956-58. The 
United States took the major share of the increment, but 
the upward trend could also be perceived in most Euro-
pean countries.^ 
The problems of the international sugar market pres-
ented a different picture. World output in 1 9 5 8 / 5 9 in-
creased approximately 10 per cent as compared with the 
previous year, but the most important point is that the in-
crement did not take place in the export areas only but 
also in those which depend on imports to a greater or 
lesser extent, mainly Western Europe. The weakening of 
the sugar market was therefore confined to the free-market 
area, i.e. sugar trade outside the preferential areas of the 
United Kingdom and United States. Prices on the free 
market fell with increasing rapidity during the first half 
of 1959 and by mid-July were lower than at any time in 
the last 18 years.® TTiey revived somewhat in the next 
few months, but were unable to reach even the level 
specified in the International Sugar Agreement far less 
that prevaiUng at the beginning of the year, despite the 
fact that the Council administering the International Agree-
ment applied the maximum restrictions on exports.® In the 
other market sector—the United States preferential area— 
the decline in prices was relatively moderate in 1959, but 
was accentuated in the early months of 1960, particularly 
in relation to the levels prevailing in the second half of 
1959 (see again table 2 and figure I V ) . Moreover, the 
fact that Cuban exports to the United States were smaller 
in 1959 than in 1958, simply indicated that other suppliers' 
(Hawaii and Puerto Rico) had regained their position 
after the contraction that their production underwent in 
1 9 5 8 . " • 
In 1959, Latin America's principal problems as regards 
its export trade were centred round the three commodities 
under discussion—petroleum, coffee and sugar. In the 
' From the standpoint of world exports, the increment registered 
in 1959 over the 1958 figure was 15.8 per cent, while the corres-
ponding rise in Latin America was 18.6 per cent. According to 
Complete Coffee Coverage (op. cit.), of 31 March 1960, the figures 
for 1957-59 were as follows in millions of bags: 
1957 1958 1959 
36.6 36.8 42.6 




SOURCE: Complete Coffee Coverage, G. Gordon Paton, New York, 
31 March 1960. 
' On 16 July 1959, free-market sugar prices reached 2.62 cents 
per pound (f.o.b. Cuba), the lowest price since 29 November 
1941. The minimum fixed by the International Sugar Agreement 
is 3.15 cents per pound (f.o.b. Cuba). 
° Partly owing to these restrictions, total sugar exports from 
Cuba and other countries in 1959 were less than in 1958, in 
contrast to the situation in the external market for coffee, in 
which the drop in prices was to some extent offset by the ex-
pansion in the volume exported. 
Cuba's sugar exports to the United States market are not 
covered by the provisions of the International Agreement. The 
decline in the price they commanded on that market therefore 
reflects the contraction in other areas' import requirements. The 
following figures (taken from the New York Coffee and Sugar 
Exchange, December 1959) show the initial quotas fixed for 
imports from Cuba, and the actual volume of those imports in the 
last two years: 
FIGURE IV 
COFFEE, CACAO AND SUGAR PRICES 
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case of the other commodities the trends were mixed. After 
losses sustained in 1958, wool prices recovered some-
what owing to the resurgence of demand and of activity 
in the textile industry (see figure V ) . An estimate of 
world wool consumption in 1959 indicates that it was 
12 per cent higher than in 1958. This revival of demand 
enabled the exportable surpluses, which had piled up in 
Argentina and Uruguay by the end of 1958, to be sold 
in the course of 195^9, although certain incentives—prin-
cipally á more favourable exchange treatment—agreed 
upon by the producer countries were a contributory factor. 
. In contrast to the recovery in the price and volume of 
wool exports, a further decline took place in cotton prices 
in 1959 (see again figure V ) , largely as a result of the 
25-per-cent increment in total output and the larger sub-
United States sugar imports 
(Thousands of tons) 
1958 1959 
Initial Actual Initial Actual 
quota imports quota imports 
Hawaii . . . 967 635 1011 887. 
Puerto Rico . 1011 739 1058 880 
Philippines . 889 889 889 889 
Cuba 2 669 3119 2 777 2 917 
FIGURE V 
COTTON AND WOOL PRICES 
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sidies authorized in favour of cotton exports in the United 
States.''^ This price deterioration affected not only short-
and medium-staple but also extra-long-staple cotton^^ in. 
which the United States is not a serious competitor. Never-
theless, the market for extra-long-staple cotton (mainly 
important for Peru) showed signs of recovering in the 
second half of 1959 ; this did not, however, prevent the 
annual average price from falling 12 per cent lower than 
in 1958. With this decline the prices for extra-long-staple 
cotton sank to the nadir of the entire post-war period and 
at certain times even the premium for quality, which 
normally distinguishes this type of cotton from the short-
staple type, disappeared. In the first few months of 1960 
the recovery of prices for this type of cotton was conso-
lidated, while prices for short-and medium-staple cotton 
remained at the same levels as in 1959. 
The non-ferrous metals group generally showed signs of 
a frank recovery in both price and volume. Lead was the 
only one among the four staple non-ferrous metals ex-
ported by Latin America (tin, copper, lead and zinc), 
^^  In the trade year August 1958-July 1959, the United States 
subsidized its cotton exports to the extent of 6.5 cents per pound, 
subsequently raised to 8.0 cents per pound for exports in the trade 
year 1959/60. In the 1960/61 trade year, the subsidy was reduced 
to 6 cents per pound. 
" In relation to certain technical advances which reduce the 
use of this type of staple in cotton textile manufacture. 
whose prices, in 1959, showed a further although small 
decline in striking contrast to the increments recorded for 
the other three (see again table 2 ) . 
The most important change took place in the case of 
tin, the price of which followed a steady upward trend, 
settling after the first half of 1959 at a higher level than 
the floor price established by the International Agreement 
for this commodity (see figure V I ) . The expansion of 
world consumption, together with the price recovery, paved 
the way for a slight relaxation of the export restrictions 
which the signatories of the Agreement had applied in 1958. 
Hence, the export quotas, which were fixed at 20,300 tons 
in the first quarter of 1959, were successively raised to 
30,500 tons in the last quarter, and to 38,000 tons by 
mid-1960. This improvement in the market originated, as 
has just been stated, in the expansion of world consump-
tion,^^ but a contributory factor was the agreement signed 
early in the year between the International Tin Council 
and the Soviet Union to limit USSR exports to markets 
outside the group of countries with centrally-planned eco-
nomies to approximately 13 500 tons a year.^^ The activa-
tion of demand in consumer countries was reflected not 
only in better prices and less stringent export restrictions 
but also in a substantial reduction of the large reserves 
which the Buffer Stock, set up by the International Agree-
ment,^® had accumulated. 
The recovery of copper prices, which, in 1958, had 
sunk to the lowest level recorded in recent years, was attri-
butable in the main to two factors: heavier world consump-
tion and smaller output in the United States which was 
obliged to import a much larger volume than in 1958. 
Taken as a whole, world production of refined copper in 
1959 was slightly larger than in 1958, but even so failed 
to regain the levels of 1956 and 1957. Similarly, while 
total inventories of refined copper were bigger in 1959 
than at the end of 1958, world inventories were substan-
tially smaller at the end of 1959 than in 1956 and 1957 
when the market was in the midst of a depression.^® In 
short, the international copper market was in a much 
more stable position in 1959 than in the two preceding 
years, although its buoyancy was largely a result of the 
decline of United States output following prolonged strikes. 
World consumption, in the first half of 1958, was estimated 
at some 68 000 tons and, in the first half of 1959, at about 80 000 
tons, according to the Statistical Bulletin of the International Tin 
Council. 
" In 1958, they had exceeded 18 000 tons. 
The inventories amassed by the Buffer Stock amounted to 
more than 25 000 tons in September 1958, and, in order to enable 
it to continue intervening in the market, the States members of 
the Agreement had to be asked to set up an additional fund for 
the purchase of a further 5 000 tons. Because of the recovery of the 
market from the end of 1958 onwards, the supplementary reserve of 
5 000 tons was sold in the first two months of 1959 and part of the 
main reserve was put on the market in the following months. By the 
end of 1959, the Buffer Stock's reserves had already shrunk to 10 200 
tons, less than half their total at the beginning of the year. 
According to a press release of 18 March 1960, issued by the 
New York Copper Institute, production and inventories of refined 
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Excluding the production of China (mainland) and the USSR. 
FIGURE VI 
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Although it is customary to study the lead and zinc 
markets together because of the close relationship between 
the production and price of the two metals, their respec-
tive market trends followed widely divergent courses in 
1959. While zinc prices moved steadily upwards, thereby 
partially making up for the losses sustained in 1958, lead 
prices dropped below their depressed levels of the preced-
ing year. Both movements—the recovery of the zinc and 
deterioration of the lead market—reflected the opposing 
tendencies in the consumption of the two metals. At the 
beginning of 1959, during the third session of the United 
Nations Lead and Zinc Committee, the ratio of output to 
consumption was taken to indicate a probable surplus of 
150 000 tons of lead and 120 000jtons of zinc in 1959, 
i.e. 8 and 5 per cent respectively of world production in 
1 9 5 8 . " Early in the second half of 1959, estimates of lead 
and zinc surpluses had been reduced to 16 000 tons for 
the latter and 59 000 tons for the former. This reflected a 
revision of the monthly consumption figures in the case 
of zinc (while world production maintained a slightly 
higher level than that of the previous year) and, in the 
case of lead, a more moderate rise in consumption and a 
decrease in output.^® 
Developments in 1959 as regards Latin America's other 
exports may be summed up more concisely. Cacao prices 
World lead and zinc output in 1959, compared with that in 
1958, was as follows (in thousands of tons): 
FIGURE VII 
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fell 18 per cent below their 1958 level (see again figure I V ) , 
primarily because of the revival of African production, 
the decline in which had led to the price rises recorded 
in the 1 9 5 7 / 5 8 farm year. The decline in prices became 
more marked in the first half of 1960, when preliminary 
estimates could be made of world production in the 1960 /61 
farm year, which is substantially higher than in the pre-
vious year. This means -that, in 1960, cacao prices will 
revert to the low levels prevailing in 1956. 
Meat prices rose again, as a result of vigorous demand 
on the world market and the rather critical situation of 
Latin America's exportable surpluses, especially in Argen-
tina (see figure V I I ) . The United States placed a ban on 
imports of certain meats from Latin America from May 
1959 onwards and in December the United Kingdom 
applied some administrative restrictions, both measures 
being intended, according to statements made by the re-
spective authorities, to prevent the possible spread of foot-
1958 1959 
Zinc: January-March 606 603 
April-June 595 625 
July-September 573 600 
October-December 595 .597 
Lead: January-March 488 472 
April-June 484 477 
July-September 438 405 
October-December 491 426 
SOURCE: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
and-mouth disease. But the action taken by the United 
States did not cut down purchases from Latin America; 
it led instead to a change in the kinds of meat imported. 
No important events occurred in the grain market. The 
prices of wheat and maize fluctuated very slightly, remain-
ing at virtually the same levels as in 1958, while the 
volume of exports surpassed the previous year's figure 
(see again figure V I I ) . The reincorporation of the United 
Kingdom into the International Wheat Agreement, which 
was renewed in August 1959, and the inclusion in the new 
Agreement of certain provisions as a safeguard against the 
possibility of non-member countries' expanding their ex-
ports to the detriment of member countries' trade, offered 
some assurance that the minimum price level specified 
would at least be upheld. The provisions in question are 
primarily intended to ensure that sales of wheat by the 
Soviet Union, whose exports have increased in recent 
years, do not weaken the wheat market in the same way 
as happened in the tin market in 1958.^® 
An over-all assessment of international price fluctua-
tions, as given in table 2, reveals that the decline affected 
more than half Latin America's staple exports and—what 
See p. 7 above and footnote 14. 
is even more important—was particularly marked in the 
case of commodities which were the major sources of 
foreign exchange earnings for specific countries such as 
those that mainly depend on their sales of coffee, sugar, 
cotton and petroleum. On the other hand, as will be seen 
later, the decline of 8.5 per cent in the general price index 
for the export commodities of Latin America as a whole 
was partly offset by an expansion in the volume exported, 
above all in the case of coffee, cotton, petroleum and other 
items of minor importance, although, from another point 
of view, the deterioration in the terms of trade which has 
existed in recent years is becoming more serious. 
2 . EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND T H E TRADE BALANCE 
The aggregate value of Latin American exports in 1959 
declined 2 per cent in respect to the 1958 figure. External 
market developments, as indicated in the preceding section, 
had a distinctly unfavourable impact on the prices of a 
number of staple exports; nevertheless a recrudescence of 
external demand for some of these commodities helped to 
a certain extent to counterbalance the effect of the drop 
in prices through an increase in the volume of sales. This 
generalization is, of course, more applicable to the coun-
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE 
(Millions of dollars) 
Main exporters of 
Exports Imports Trade balance 
1958 1959" 1958 1959" 1958 1959" 
Coffee 
Brazil 1 244.0 1282.0 1 325.0 1348.0 - 81.0 — 66.0 
Colombia 539.1 548.6 430.5 445.0 108.6 103.6 
Costa Rica : . 93.1 80.0 98.7 103.0 - 5.6 — 23.0 
El Salvador 118.0 111.8 108.3 99.6 9.7 12.2 
Guatemala 107.2 108.0 155.9 134.0 - 48.7 — 26.0 
Haiti 42.1 23.9 44.2 31.4 - 2.1 7.5 
Nicaragua 70,4 75.0 85.2 71.1 - 14.8 3.9 
Sugar 
Cuba 763.2 638.0 888.0 736.0 - 124.8 — 98.0 
Dominican Republic . . 134.7 130.1 147.1 135.0 - 12.7 — 4.9 
Bananas 
Ecuador 137.6 143.4 122.2 113.2 15.4 30.2 
Honduras 71.4 72.0 76.5 71.0 - 5.1 1.0 
Panama*" 74.4 76.0 137.8 140.0 - 63.4 — 64.0 
JFheat and agricultural com-
modities 
Argentina 993.9 1000.6 1 232.6 983.6 - 238.7 17.0 
Uruguay 138.6 97.8 151.3 159.7 - 12.7 — 61.9 
Non-ferrous metals 
Bolivia . . . . 7 . . . 53.5 61.5 87.1 73.4 - 33.6 _ 11.9 
Chile 364.4 485.0 427.1 435.0 - 62.7 50.0 
Miscellaneous commodities 
Mexico 751.7 752.7 1128.6 1 006.6 - 376.9 253.9 
Paraguay 34.2 36.7 46.3 38.6 - 12.1 1.9 
Peru 291.8 311.8 387.6 330.0 - 95.8 — 18.2 
Total: 19 countries . ,. 6 023.3 6 034.9 7 080.0 6 454.2 - 1 056.7 — 419.3 
Venezuela 2 510.3 2 314.5 1 744.2 1 667.0 766.1 647.5 
Grand total 8 533.6 8 349.4 8 824.2 8 121.2 - 290.6 228.2 
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vols. 11 and 12, and 
International Financial Statistics. 
" Provisional figures. 
Including the Free Zone of Colón. 
NOTE: The figures given here differ in some cases from those in customs registers of foreign 
trade in that they include the readjustments made in balance-of-payment statistics. 
tries which supply the bulk of Latin American coffee and 
petroleum exports, i.e., Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. 
In other cases, the fluctuation in prices and volume ex-
ported had a cumulative effect on a few countries foreign 
exchange earnings. As regards sugar, for example, the two 
factors combined to lessen the value of exports from Cuba 
and the Dominican Republic, while the rise in the prices of 
tin and copper and the larger volume exported were jointly 
responsible for the increase in the total value of these 
exports from Bolivia and Chile respectively. It should also 
be noted that in the two countries—Haiti and Uruguay— 
where the fall in the value of exports was steepest, the 
primary causes were adverse weather conditions, and were 
reflected in a drastic contraction of exportable surpluses. 
Although the decline in Latin America's foreign ex-
change earnings was fairly moderate, most of the Latin 
American countries were obliged to cut down the value 
of their imports, owing to the magnitude of the deficit 
in their trade balance for 1958 and to the shrinkage in the 
international holdings of many of those countries in 1959. 
As pointed out in table 3, the total value of Latin Ameri-
can imports in 1959 fell about 8 per cent below its 1958 
level, involving 14 out of the 20 countries in the region. 
Following the reduction in purchases abroad effected by 
most of the Latin American countries in 1959 there was a 
substantial lessening of the deficit in the trade balance of 
Latin America as a whole, excluding Venezuela (see again 
table 3 ) . If Venezuela is included, the trade balance pic-
ture changes: in contrast to the deficit of 290 million 
dollars in 1958 the balance became positive in 1959 to 
the tune of some 230 million. But, as is common know-
ledge, the large surplus in Venezuela's trade balance was 
offset by a big deficit in the services account of the balance 
of payments. 
Consideration will now be given to each country in 
turn, in order to show the characteristics of its trade 
situation in 1959.^» 
Brazil succeeded in raising the total value of its exports 
by 3 per cent, despite falling prices for the commodities 
(coffee, cacao, sugar and cotton) which made up more 
than two-thirds of that total. The improvement was pri-
marily due to the remarkable recovery in the volume of 
coffee sales abroad, which rose from 12.9 million bags in 
1958 to 17.4 million in 1959, the highest peak reached 
since 1949. Cotton exports also underwent a substantial 
expansion in volume (from 40 000 tons in 1958 to 80 000 
tons in 1 9 5 9 ) , although their level is still low in compari-
son with those reached in 1953-56. The effect of the fall 
in external market prices for these two commodities was 
offset by the increment in the volume of sales, but cacao 
and sugar exports fared differently and dropped in volume 
as well as in price. 
The decline in external prices for Brazil's staple exports 
led the Government to make successive devaluations in the 
official exchange rate of the cruzeiro and to authorize the 
sale on the free market of foreign exchange earned by a 
number of exports. The exchange rate applied to coffee 
exports, fixed at 37.06 cruzeiros per dollar in October 
1958, was raised to 60 cruzeiros in January and 76 cru-
zeiros from 1 July 1959. Other products, which at the end 
of 1958, were quoted at 70 cruzeiros to the dollar, were 
revalued at the rate of 100 cruzeiros per dollar, while a 
The countries have been listed in accordance with the system 
adopted in table 3, instead of alphabetically as is the normal 
practice. 
third group, including sugar and cotton, was transferred 
to the free-exchange market, payment for them in terms 
of local currency thereby increasing from an average of 
138 cruzeiros per dollar in the last quarter of 1958 to an 
average of 190 cruzeiros in the last quarter of 1959. Al-
most at the end of the year, a new change in the exchange 
system extended the free-market rate to all exports^^ with 
the exception of coffee and cacao, for which the fixed 
rates of 76 and 100 cruzeiros per dollar respectively were 
retained. 
As regards imports, Brazil was one of the few countries 
in which a modest increment was registered, although 
there had been no relaxation or liberalization of the import 
regulations in force. On the contrary, at the beginning of 
the year, the rate of exchange for preferential imports 
(wheat, petroleum and petroleum derivatives. Government 
imports, etc.) was raised from 80 to 100 cruzeiros per 
dollar, while the average quotation at auctions of foreign 
exchange for imports in the general category passed from 
an average of 119 cruzeiros per dollar at the end of 1958 
to one of 208 cruzeiros at the end of 1959. Moreover, since 
the beginning of the year, it was stipulated that payment 
of freight and insurance for imports would be transacted 
through the free-exchange market, which was, in practice, 
a way of raising import costs even higher, since dollar 
quotations on that market moved steadily upwards during 
1959. The effect of the devaluation of the cruzeiro in the 
exchange market on import costs may be appreciated from 
their price index (in unit values in terms of cruzeiros). 
This registered. an increment of 47.6 per cent over the 
1958 figure, while the price index in dollars showed a 
drop of 22 per cent in comparison with the previous yeai."^ 
The expansion, of imports was mainly reflected in the 
machinery and motor vehicle groups and in that of food-
stuffs. As regards the latter, an increment of 20 per cent 
was registered in .wheat purchases. In the fuels and lubri-
cants group, which in the last few years has absorbed a 
growing proportion of the country's exchange resources, a 
small decline was observed, as a result of the lower prices 
for these commodities on the world market and of a qual-
itative change in their composition when purchases of 
refined products were cut in favour of more crude, the 
unit value of which is lower than of refined products.^' 
In 1959 Brazil's trade balance, which had shown a 
deficit of 81 million dollars in 1958, was again negative, 
this time to the extent of 66 million dollars. The magni-
tude of these debit balances and the increasing accumul-
ation of coffee surpluses (despite the expansion in coffee 
exports) led the Government to make a determined effort 
to broaden external markets, especially those for coffee. A 
trade agreement was signed with the Soviet Union at the 
end of 1959 which provided for the expansion of trade 
between the two countries during the three years 1960-
" The system operates in the following way: exporters receive 
130 cruzeiros per dollar in cash and promissory notes from the 
Banco do Brasil (falling due in 6 months and bearing an annual 
rate of interest of 6 per cent) in respect of the difference between 
that sum and the free-market quotation. Dollar quotations on this 
market during the last quarter of 1959 fluctuated between 180 
and 200 cruzeiros. 
According to data published in Desenvolvimento e Conjun-
tura, Río de Janeiro, February 1960. 
National production of crude was 27 per cent more in 1959 
than in 1958. For technical reasons, however, not all the crude 
produced in the country could be processed in Brazilian refineries 
and therefore had to be sold abroad. The value of such exports 
rose to 24.0 and 28.9 million dollars in 1958 and 1959 resnectively. 
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1962 up to a total amount of 25, 35, and 4 4 million 
dollars on either side, in each of the years covered. Under 
the terms of that agreement, Brazil hopes to step up its 
coffee sales to the Soviet Union to a total of 450 000 bags 
in 1960 and to more than a million in 1962. In addition 
to coffee, Brazilian exports will include cacao, hides and 
skins and vegetable oils, while its imports from the Soviet 
Union will consist chiefly of crude, petroleum derivatives 
and equipment for the petroleum industry.^* 
Colombia's total exports in 1959 showed a small in-
crease of about 2 per cent in comparison with their level 
in 1958. Although the two staple exports—coffee and pet-
roleum—commanded lower prices on the external market 
than in the previous year, in both cases the volume ex-
ported showed a substantial increment, thereby adequately 
offsetting the fall in prices. Between 1958 and 1959, coffee 
exports rose from 5.4 to 6 .4 million bags, while crude 
petroleum sales climbed from 3.4 to 4.0 million tons. 
Among minor export commodities, bananas and raw to-
bacco may likewise be mentioned as showing increases. 
Imports went up 3 per cent in 1959 over their total in 
1958, although in May 1959 a new customs tariff entered 
into force and in July prior deposits for imports were 
increased from 100 to 130 per cent. The new tariff raised 
ad-valorem duties on imports all round, although in actual 
fact part of the increment represented the incorporation 
into the tariff of taxes which had hitherto been made on 
the transfer of funds abroad. One of the innovations in the 
tariff was the reduction of elimination of import charges 
on agricultural machinery, fertilizers and insecticides. 
Colombia's trade balance revealed a surplus of 104 mil-
lion dollars in 1959, as compared with one of 109 million 
in the previous year. In the last two years, much of the 
surplus—obtained by the application of strict controls on 
imports—has been used to amortize trade debts accumu-
lated in 1955-57. Another portion, however, was earmar-
ked, as is customary, for payments against the services 
account which traditionally shows a debit balance. 
Costa Rica recorded a contraction of 14 per cent in the 
value of its exports in 1959, chiefly owing to the drop in 
coffee prices plus a decrease of almost 10 per cent in the 
volume exported. Cacao, another of the country's export 
staples, which also underwent a drop in its external price 
in 1959, was exported in larger quantities than in 1958, 
which compensated for the fall in prices. Both the volume 
and value of banana exports were reduced as a result of 
the losses caused by hurricanes. 
Despite the contraction in export earnings, imports ex-
panded approximately 4 per cent in 1959 in relation to 
1958. In consequence, the trade deficit, which had been 
5.6 million dollars in 1958 rose to 23.0 million in 1959. 
Nonetheless, no new restrictions were placed on imports, 
and the system of multiple exchange rates which had been 
in force since the middle of 1958 was maintained intact. 
El Salvador exported 5 per cent less in 1959 than in 
1958, owing to the fall in coffee prices. The volume of 
coffee sales abroad was slightly bigger than in the prece-
ding year, but the increase did not suffice to offset the de-
cline in prices. In the-case of cotton, which has been sold 
According to export statistics, no coffee was shipped from 
Brazil to the Soviet Union in 1958 whereas 69 000 bags were sent 
in 1959. Nevertheless, Brazil's aggregate coffee exports to the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Eastern Ger-
many increased from 150000 bags in 1958 to 504 000 in 1959, 
according to figures published in the Boletim Mensual de Estatis-
tica of Brazil, March 1960. 
abroad in increasingly larger quantities in recent years, a 
further increment was recorded in 1959, thereby helping, 
despite the fact that its price also "dropped, to soften the 
impact of lower coffee prices. 
Total imports declined more than exports: 8 per cent 
between 1958 and 1959. The trade balance, which had 
registered a surplus of aproximately 10 million dollars in 
1958, showed a credit of 12 million dollars in 1959. 
In 1959, Guatemala raised the total value of its exports 
by almost 1 per cent. The drop in coffee prices was offset by 
an increase in the volume of coffee sales. Both the volume 
and the value of banana exports represented an improve-
ment on the preceding year's figures, whereas the reverse 
was true of cotton. Heavier customs duties on a certain 
number of items and the levying of additional charges of up 
to 100 per cent on imports from countries with which Gua-
temala's trade balance had been negative in 1958, helped 
to discourage imports in 1959, which, as a result, were 
14 per cent less than in 1958. The measures indicated 
were effective in reducing the deficit in the 1959 trade 
balance to 26 million dollars. The deficit had amounted 
to 49 million dollars in 1958. 
Haiti!s total exports in 1959 were greatly affected by a 
severe drought which reduced exportable surpluses of 
coffee and sugar. Their total value was 43 per cent less 
than in 1958, not only because of the drop in external 
coffee and sugar prices but also as a result of a contrac-
tion of 34 per cent in the volume of coffee sales abroad 
and another of almost 50 per cent in the volume of sugar 
exports, which had already declined substantially in 1958. 
In contrast to the critical situation of Haitian agriculture, 
bauxite production took a more active turn towards the 
end of 1959 as a result of an agreement with a United 
States enterprise to expand bauxite mining. The shrinkage 
in foreign exchange holdings was reflected in a 29-per-
cent cut in total imports, yet Haiti's trade balance in 1959 
showed a deficit of about 7 million dollars, as against only 
2 million the year before. 
Although coffee continued to account for a significant 
proportion of Nicaragua's foreign exchange earnings, lower 
external prices and a smaller volume of sales relegated it 
to second place among the country's exports. In 1959 the 
value of coffee sales abroad decreased considerably, for 
the reasons mentioned; the volume of cotton exports, on the 
other hand, maintained the rising trend shown in previous 
years. To this increase in the volume of sales of cotton and 
other secondary commodities must be attributed the 6-per-
cent increment in the total value of exports in 1959, in 
relation to the 1958 figure. Total imports, on the other 
hand, shrank by 10 per cent in 1959, principally because 
of the rise of 5 to 20 per cent in duties on some 600 
imported items. The trade balance, which had been 15 
million dollars on the debit side in 1958, showed a surplus 
of 4 million in 1959. 
The total value of Cuba's exports diminished 16 per 
cent owing to the joint effect of lower external prices and 
a smaller volume of sugar sales. As indicated in the first 
section of this chapter, the drop ii; sugar prices was par-
ticularly heavy in the free-market area (15 per cent) ; 
similarly, the volume of exports to that market decreased 
16 per cent. Although the volume of sales to the United 
States preferential market contracted by 10 per cent, the 
price of sugar commanded was hardly 1 per cent lower. 
The volume of total sugar exports in 1959 was 12 per 
cent less than in 1958. As sugar production in that year 
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was greater than in 19,58, by the end of 1959 total inven-
tories had risen more than 100 per cent in respect to their 
level at the end of 1958.^^ The slump on the world sugar 
market and the consequent contraction of export income 
led the Government to apply some exchange controls in 
order to ensure that foreign exchange earned by exports 
returned to the country. Apart from stopping the flight of 
capital, thése measures were designed to maintain parity 
between the Cuban peso and the dollar. 
The contraction in income from exports and from the 
tourist industry made it necessary to apply import re-
strictions. Goods were divided into five schedules, exchange 
charges ranging from 30 to 100 per cent being levied on 
the c.i.f. value for the different groups. This was efi'ective 
in reducing imports 17 per cent below their 1958 level, 
thus holding the trade deficit to 98 million dollars, as 
compared with 125 million in the previous year. Inter-
national reserves nevertheless declined by a relatively 
large proportion in 1959, reaching by the end of the year 
their owest level since 1950. 
The exports of the Dominican Republic shrank aproxi-
mately 3 per cent in 1959 in relation to their 1958 level, 
as a result of lower prices for sugar, coffee and cacao on 
the external market. In addition, a small contraction took 
jlace in the volume of coffee and cacao exports, mainly 
jecausc of smaller output. The resultant decrease in in-
come was partly offset by the emergence of a new export 
commodity—bauxite—of which the sales volume in 1959 
amounted to about 500 000 tons, with a value of 5 million 
dollars. Export earnings from tropical fruits also increased. 
Again, total imports underwent an 8-per-cent contraction, 
partly because certain import restrictions were imposed, 
and partly owing to the weakening of the country's eco-
nomic activity. The measures which the Government took 
to control imports comprised the complete suspension of 
sales to the Republic's free zone, the increase in customs 
duties on some commodities and the obligation to obtain 
a licence prior to importing, in the case of others. By 
these means, it succeeded in considerably reducing the 
trade deficit, which dropped from 13 million dollars in 
1958 to scarcely 5 million in 1959. 
Ecuador experienced a 4-per-cent increment in the total 
value of its exports, chiefly owing to a larger volume of 
banana and cacao sales. The increase in the amount 
of cacao exported (26 per cent) fully compensated for the 
drop in the world market price. By contrast, coffee ex-
ports were affected both by the fall in external prices and 
by a contracting volume of sales following a decline in 
production. Total imports fell off approximately 7 per 
cent, although this was not due to the intensification of 
the restrictions in force. On the contrary, at the end 
of August 1959, the goods included on Schedule II (non-
essential or luxury), for which prior deposits had been 
required amounting to 100, 75 and 50 per cent of the 
value of the respective articles, continued to be subject 
to a standard prior deposit of 50 per cent, whereas the 
According to the Revista del Banco Nacional.de Cuba, and 
Institute for Sugar Stabilization (Instituto de Estabilización del 
Azúcar), sugar production, exports and inventories in Cuba during 
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25-per-cent deposit needed for certain goods on the same 
schedule was abolished. A prior deposit is not necessary 
for the articles on Schedule I (essential or semi-essential), 
covering approximately three-quarters of all imports. An-
other measure adopted was the abolition of customs duties 
which had been levied since 1956 on imports from Japan, 
with which country Ecuador had a trade deficit. 
Ecuador's trade balance showed a surplus of 30 million 
dollars in 1959. (In 1958 it also had a credit balance, of 
15 million dollars.) 
In Honduras, the total value of exports showed a small 
increment of about 1 per cent. The volume of banana ex-
ports contracted by aproximately 10 per cent, but those of 
coffee and timber, on the other hand, increased by 35 per 
cent. Imports, on the contrary, shrank by 7 per cent with-
out the application of any special import restrictions. 
Owing to this decrease, the country's trade balance, which 
had shown a deficit of 5 million dollars in 1958, registered 
a surplus of 1 million dollars in 1959. 
Panama exported rather more bananas and cacao in 1959 
than in 1958. In the aggregate, this expansion amounted 
to 2 per cent, while total imports also showed an approxi-
mately equivalent increase. This country's trade balance 
traditionally displays a heavy deficit (about 64 million 
dollars in each of the years 1958 and 1959) , but this is 
offset by the surplus normally achieved in the tourist in-
dustry account and the income deriving from the Canal 
Zone. 
At the beginning of 1959, Argentina introduced a radi-
cal exchange reform which replaced the system of multiple 
exchange rates hitherto in force by a single variable rate. 
In order to absorb part of the additional income which 
would accrue to exporters as a result of the difference 
between the old official rates and the free-market rate, 
withholding percentages (duties) of 10, 15 and 20 per 
cent were applied to the principal export commodities. 
Towards the end of the year, some of these duties had 
been reduced or withdrawn. Another measure taken to 
encourage exports consisted in an authorization for the 
jurchaser and seller to decide upon the period of payment 
Detween themselves.^® Although the total value of exports 
showed a relatively trifling increase of a little less than 
,1 per cent, there were substantial changes in the volume 
of sales of certain commodities. Exports of meat and live-
stock products fell off appreciably, ostensibly because of 
the recently-established policy of replacing live stock. 
Grain exports—chiefly of wheat and maize^—and wool 
sales were bigger in volume than in the previous year. 
The exchange reform had a far-reaching effect on the 
import regime. Goods were classified according to various 
schedules, with percentage surcharges ranging from 20 
to 300 per cent of the c.i.f. value. In addition, a prior 
deposit of from 50 to 300 per cent of the same value was 
required. Merchandise not included on the schedules was 
subject to a surcharge of 300 per cent and a prior deposit 
of 500 per cent. In the course of 1959, various modifica-
tions were made in both the contents of the schedules and 
the percentage surcharges and prior deposits, until, in 
November, it was decided to abolish all prior deposits as 
exchange charges were sufficiently high to prevent demand 
from constituting too heavy a drain on Argentina's foreign 
exchange holdings. Moreover, the amount of the prior de-
It had been previously necessary to pay for exports within a 
maximum of 30 days from the date of shipment or to provide 
documentary credit at the time of dispatch. 
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posits and the time limit for returning them (6 months) 
had seriously jeopardized the liquidity of import trade, 
already affected by heavy credit restrictions. The severity 
of the restrictions adopted led to a substantial cut in 
imports, which were 20 per cent less in 1959 than in 
1958. Those most involved in the reduction were iron and 
steel products, and machinery and vehicles. Fuel imports 
also dropped in 1959, although in their case the determin-
ing factor was the noteworthy increment in domestic petro-
leum production which increased Argentina's self-suffi-
ciency in fuels. 
Owing to the substantial contraction in imports, Argen-
tina's trade balance was able to show a surplus of 17 mil-
lion dollars, as against a deficit of 239 million in 1958. 
For the third year in succession, Uruguay was faced 
with a grave crisis in its export trade. In 1957 and 1958, 
the difficulties derived mainly from exchange policy, which, 
by keeping the Uruguayan peso heavily overvalued, pro-
voked the opposition of exporters and, in some cases, stop-
ped the flow of goods to foreign markets. Although higher 
exchange rates for staple exports were authorized in 1959, 
export activity failed to revive. But the basic problem at 
that time was the sharp decrease in exportable surpluses 
as a result of the floods which took place at the beginning 
of 1959 and caused heavy losses in cattle and sheep and in 
the wheat, maize and sunflower crops. In the case of 
commodities such as wheat and oilseed, the losses were so 
large that no exportable surpluses were left. Wool exports, 
however, were increased through the sale of the fairly 
sizable inventories accumulated in the previous season. 
Moreover, the favourable turn taken by wool prices on the 
external market during the major part of the year was 
helped—in the case of Uruguayan exporters—by the abo-
lition of the compensatory duty which the United States 
levied on imports of tops from Uruguay. Similarly at the 
beginning of 1959, a tariff concession was negotiated with 
the United States Government, by virtue of which the 
duties levied by that country on imports of meat extract 
and preserved meat were lowered. In spite of this measure, 
total exports in 1959 were 29 per cent less than in 1958, 
for the reasons already indicated, and reached their lowest 
level of the last 15 years. 
The contraction of export earnings made it necessary to 
tighten restrictions on purchases from abroad. Although 
no important change was- made in the exchange system 
until the end of 1959, higher surcharges were levied on 
two out of the three categories into which imports are 
classified as early as the beginning of the year. Never-
theless, total imports in 1959 exceeded the 1958 figure by 
almost 6 per cent, since stocks of imported goods had 
dropped to critical levels owing to the severe restrictions 
imposed on external purchases in the latter year. The trade 
balance deficit rose from 13 million dollars in 1958 to 62 
million in 1959. 
By the end of 1959, Congress had already completely 
reformed the exchange system. Official parity between the 
Uruguayan peso and the dollar was changed from 1.52 to 
6.50 pesos, the provisions authorizing the fixing of official 
exchange rates were repealed, the purchase and sale of 
foreign currencies being governed in future by the free 
play of supply and demand, and, lastly, the Government 
was empowered to fix withholding percentages on exports 
ranging from 5 to 50 per cent and surcharges not exceed-
ing 300 per cent on imports of luxury goods or products 
that would compete with domestic industry. In addition, 
the Government was empowered to place a total or partial 
ban, renewable for six-monthly periods, on imports of non-
essential and luxury goods and/or articles that would com-
pete with local industry. Finally, a certain number of 
goods considered to be essential were temporarily ex-
empted from payment of customs duties and other charges. 
Such goods included machinery, tools and other articles 
required for agriculture. 
As a result of the improved international tin market 
Bolivia's total exports in 1959 exceeded the previous year's 
figures by 15 per cent. The gradual rise in prices during 
the year reflected, on the one hand, heavier demand in the 
United States and the main European countries and, on 
the other hand, the fact that the Soviet Union's exports 
were kept to the levels provided for in the informal agree-
ment between that country and the International Tin 
Council arrived at early in 1959.^^ As for the volume 
of exports of the States members of the International Tin 
Agreement, including Bolivia, the total authorized quotas 
for 1959 were not very much higher than the previous 
year's figures,^® although Bolivia's actual exports amounted 
to slightly over 24 000 tons in 1959 because of a barter 
agreement involving the exchange of 5 000 tons of tin for 
United States surplus agricultural commodities.^® Exports 
of other non-ferrous metals (lead, zinc and silver) were 
lower in 1959 than in 1958 because óf a drop in the vol-
ume of exports for which a decrease in production was 
responsible. Similarly, crude petroleum production, which 
had risen sharply between 1954 and 1957, creating a new 
source of exports, dropped in the past two years because 
of the State enterprise's inability to expand its activities 
for lack of funds. 
Total imports also declined by 16 per cent in 1959, 
although this cannot be attributed to changes in the ex-
change system applicable to imports. The trade balance, 
which had shown a deficit of 33 million dollars in 1958, 
was once again adverse, the deficit this time being 12 
million dollars. 
Chile completed the simplification of its exchange sys-
tem January 1959 by unifying the rate applied to com-
mercial transactions (visible trade) and to invisible trans-
fers (tourist industry, services, etc.). The new single rate, 
fluctuating in principle, remained stable during 1959. The 
improved foreign market for Chilean copper no doubt 
contributed to this, in addition to the measures adopted to 
curb excessive foreign exchange demand. The total value 
of exports was 33 per cent higher than in 1958, and this 
reflected both an improvement in external copper prices 
and an expansion in export volume. Moreover, saes of 
copper manufactures, paper and iron ore also rose. 
Total imports increased by about 2 per cent, as a result 
of the gradual liberalization during the year of the sys-
tem of severe import restrictions. The ten schedules into 
which imported goods were classified, and which were 
subject to prior deposits ranging from 5 to 5 000 per cent 
of the c.i.f. value, were reduced to seven, and the maxi-
mum prior deposit to 3 500 per cent. Furthermore, some 
goods on the schedule of prohibited imports were trans-
ferred to the schedule of authorized imports even though 
See Economic Survey of Latin America 1958, op. cit., p. 34. 
The total of quarterly quotas authorized for Bolivia amounted 
to 19 080 tons in 1958 and 19 543 tons in 1959. See International 
Tin Council, Statistical Bulletin. 
" The 5 ODD tons of tin acquired by the United States were for 
the country's strategic reserves and therefore did not affect the 
export quota fixed by the International Tin Council. 
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they were subject to the maximum prior deposit percent-
age rate. 
Chile's trade in 1959 showed a favourable balance of 50 
million dollars, as against an adverse balance of some 63 
million in 1958. 
Mexico slightly increased the total value of its exports 
en 1959, despite the fact that unfavourable conditions 
affected some of its products on the external market. In 
fact, while copper and zinc prices rose, the prices of cotton 
and coffee, the two leading export items, fell steeply. More-
over, while the effect of the drop in cotton prices could be 
counteracted by an increase in export volume, this could 
not be done in the case of coffee exports, which declined 
in volume as a result of smaller output in 1 9 5 8 / 5 9 . The 
greater volume of cotton exports (19 per cent above the 
1958 figure) was made possible by the use of relatively 
substantial reserves accumulated by the end of 1958 and 
by the cut in taxes authorized by the Government for cot-
ton exports between July 1959 and May 1960. As a result 
of larger sales, cotton inventories shrank from 203 000 
tons at the end of 1958 to 67 000 tons at the end of 1959. 
The non-ferrous metal position improved in 1959, al-
though prices and export volumes followed different pat-
terns in the case of each metal. The rise in copper prices 
was partly offset by a drop in export volume, whereas 
both lead prices and sales volumes decreased. On the other 
hand, zinc prices and. exports were higher than in 1958. 
The expansion in exports of meat and beef cattle, stimu-
lated by growing demand in the United States, has been 
substantial in recent years. The value of these exports rose 
from around 8 million dollars in 1956 to 53.5 million in 
1958. This expansion was interrupted in 1959—and the 
value of exports fell to 48 million dollars—following the 
application of export restrictions as a means of curbing 
the rise in domestic meat prices. 
Total imports in 1959 were 11 per cent lower than in 
1958, partly as a result of the pohcy adopted by the 
Government to reduce pressure on international reserves 
and to promote domestic production, and partly because 
of expanded production of some staple foodstuffs, such as 
maize, which had to be imported in substantial quantities 
during the previous year. One of the measures designed to 
promote domestic production and to encourage import 
substitution was the establishment of the Public Sector 
Imports Committee {Comité de Importaciones del Sector 
Público) to authorize the purchase of foreign products 
by public bodies only if no domestic substitutes are avail-
able. This measure led to a cut in imports by public and 
State enterprises, which amounted to only 127 million 
dollars in 1959 compared with 220 million in 1958. The 
smaller imports of maize (45 million dollars) and of petro-
leum derivatives (11 million dollars) contributed to this 
reduction. In additon, both the State petroleum company 
and the national railways cut down on their imports of 
equipment and capital goods. It should be pointed out, 
however, that the reduction in total imports was largely 
the result of smaller purchases by the public sector and 
did not imply any major change in exchange policy. More-
over, the monetary authorities had ample backing to cope 
with foreign exchange demand, having entered into a 
credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
and the Export-Import Bank for 190 million dollars, which 
were not used.^° 
"" Of the 100 million dollar credit contracted with the Export-
Import Bank of Washington, 10 million dollars had been used by 
Metxico's trade balance, adverse to the extent of 377 
million dollars in 1958, was again unfavourable in 1959, 
this time by 254 million. However, as is well known, this 
unfavourable balance is not as important for Mexico as 
it is for other Latin American countries because the tourist 
industry and border trade with the United Statse usually 
produce a sizeable credit balance. 
Paraguay's total exports in 1959 were 7 per cent higher 
than in 1958, largely because of increased sales of maté, 
quebracho extract, leather and hides and meat and olea-
ginous products. There was a reduction in exports of other 
commodities, such as timber and cotton. In order to en-
courage sales abroad the Government decided to lower the 
15-per-cent tax on exports, introduced in mid-1957, to 10 
per cent as from February 1959. 
Imports fell off by 17 per cent in 1959, largely as a 
result of the effect of the more restrictive measures applied 
to imports during most of the year. The prior deposit 
percentages (from 10 to 400 per cent) imposed since 1958 
were supplemented as of February 1959 by an additional 
5-per-cent tax on the c.i.f. value of goods, except for 
imports from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Further 
changes in import regulations were introduced around the 
middle of the year increasing the deposit percentages on 
some items. But, in September the deposit percentages 
previously applied to various categories of imports were 
again reduced and the maximum percentages were fixed at 
300 per cent. 
Paraguay's balance of trade, unfavourable to the extent 
of 12 million dollars in 1958, showed a deficit of slightly 
above 2 million in 1959. 
Peru's total 'exports were 7 per cent higher than in 
1958. While the prices of two major commodities—sugar 
and cotton—fell on the world market, the drop was partly 
offset by an increase in the volume of sales. As regards 
non-ferrous metal exports, the increased value of zinc, 
attributable both to higher prices and to larger exports, 
was significant. The start of iron ore mining at the Acari 
deposits provided a further impetus to exports from the 
middle of 1959. Iron ore exports were thus considerably 
higher than in 1958. Copper exports did not expand in 
spite of substantially improved world market conditions. 
However, towards the end of the year the first shipments 
were made of ore from Toquepala, the output of which 
is expected to triple copper exports in the not too distant 
future. Lead mining continued to be depressed and the 
volume of lead exports declined in 1959. 
An export activity that has expanded considerably in 
Peru over the past few years has been that of fisheries 
products. Exports amounted to 16 million dollars in 1956 
and increased since to about 50 million in 1959. Coffee 
exports have also climbed steeply during the past three 
years, although the increase in sales volume was offset by 
the drop in prices abroad. 
Total imports registered a drop of 15 per cent in rela-
tion to 1958. Among the factors contributing to this 
decline were the increase in the free-market exchange rate, 
the higher ad valorem duties and charges (10 to 25 per 
cent) imposed on a large number of products deemed to 
be non-essential, and the smaller imports of mining mach-
inery and equipment following the completion of the 
Toquepala insta lations; On the other hand, Peru's eco-
nomic activity during the first half of the year was charac-
the middle of the year, an amount which was paid up by the end 
of 1959. 
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terized by an atmosphere of depression caused by the 
unfavourable turn taken by the external prices of some 
staple exports. Around the middle of 1959 the Government 
adopted credit and monetary measures designed to stimu-
late economic activity, abolishing price controls previous-
ly applied to some activities and withdrawing the subsidies 
granted in respect of a few basic consumer items. In 
particular, the elimination of price controls on petroleum 
products improved prospects of the resumption of foreign 
investment in the petroleum industry which has been vir-
tually stationary for several years. 
The cut in imports substantially reduced Peru's adverse 
trade balance, which shrank from 96 million dollars in 
1958 to 18 million in 1959. 
Venezuela was faced with difficult conditions on the 
world market owing to the fall in the prices of crude petro-
leum and derivatives and to severe competition from other 
producer areas. Provisional estimates indicate that the 
total value of exports decreased by about 8 per cent, not-
withstanding a 3-per-cent increment in the volume of crude 
petroleum sales over the preceding year's figures.'^ The 
drop in petroleum prices was accompanied by a consider-
able falling-off in coffee and cacao exports, which were 
also affected by lower prices. Although the system of 
compulsory quotas instituted by the United States since 
March 1959 on imports of petroleum and its derivates 
might well have brought about a substantial change in 
that country's purchases from Venezuela, United States 
imports of crude from Venezuela in 1959 were slightly 
higher than in 1958.®^ Total exports of refined petroleum 
)roducts also increased, although to a lesser extent. A 
arger volume of exports of iron ore was registered in 
1959. 
Total imports fell off by 4 per cent, partly, it would 
seem, as the result of the institution of a licence system 
for a number of goods considered as non-essential or 
luxury items: alcoholic beverages, passenger cars, televi-
sion sets, furniture, jewellery, perfume, cameras, films, etc. 
This system was replaced towards the end of 1959 by an 
increase in customs duties and charges on most of these 
items. While there has been no significant change in the 
system of imports, the measures adopted in 1959 reflected 
a change in official import policy calculated to discourage 
luxury spending. The shift in policy may also be attributed 
in part to the unusual pressure to which Venezuela's inter-
national, reserves have been subjected in recent years, 
despite the fact that the decrease in these holdings which 
took place in 1958 and 1959 was caused largely by the 
honouring of private financial commitments with other 
countries. 
Venezuela's normally favourable trade balance fell from 
766 million dollars in 1958 to 647 million in 1959. But it 
should be borne in mind that this surplus was offset by a 
No official statistics on the value of Venezuela's exports are 
as yet available. The figures included in table 3 were taken from 
the Balance of Payments Yearbook, op. cit., but unofficial statistics 
from other sources suggest that the decrease in the value of 
exports in 1959 may be smaller. 
According to the American Petroleum Institute, Statistical 
Bulletin, 19 April, 1960, total United States crude petroleum im-
ports and the volume imported from Venezuela were as follows, 












heavy deficit in the services account because of f ore ign 
investment earnings. 
3 . TRADE POLICY 
Before an examination is made of the services account 
and the other elements in the balance of payments, it is 
useful to outline certain trends in Latin American trade 
policy. Some of the measures adopted by the different 
countries in 1959 as regards imports and exports have al-
ready been described in fair amount of detail. The follow-
ing paragraphs will be devoted to the more general finra 
of trade policy. 
The introduction of far-reaching exchange reforms in 
Argentina at the beginning of 1959 and in Uruguay at 
the end of that year has brought out still more clearly the 
tendency for multiple and fixed exchange rates to be re-
placed by a single fluctuating rate. Due attention should 
be paid to this trend because it brings to light two im-
portant facts: firstly, the highly complex problems posed 
by the maintainance of a system of multiple fixed rates in 
countries beset by acute inflation, and, secondly, the flexi-
bility of the policy adopted byjthe Internationai Monetary 
Fund vis-a-vis the system of fluctuating rates, as an in-
terim measure at least. 
In table the Latin American countries have been 
classified into six categories in accordance with their ex-
change system. Category 1 consists of countries with a 
single fixed rate, in which no change was made during 
the entire post-war period up to the recent application of 
exchange surcharges on what is still a small part of Cuban 
imports.^^ This tendency is apparent from the number of 
countries in categories 2 and 3 which, during the period 
in question, were transferred to categories 5 and 6. At 
the end of 1947, nine Latin American countries were using 
systems of multiple fixed rates (categories 2 and 3) but 
by the end of 1959 their number had been reduced to two. 
On the other hand, the system of fluctuating rates (cate-
gories 5 and 6 ) was not in force in any country in 1947, 
whereas by 1959 six countries were already applying it. 
Category 4 may be regarded as a transitional system to 
bridge the gap between multiple fixed rates and a single 
fluctuating rate; nearly all the countries that adopted the 
latter system in the last two years, had previously used a 
mixed system of fixed and fluctuating rates. 
The Latin American countries which have recently 
switched from the system of multiple fixed rates to the 
single fluctuating exchange rate have thereby sought to 
eliminate the implicit subsidy favouring goods in the 
preferential imports groups. At the same time, the new 
system has simplified the problems of administering ex-
change controls by facilitating the total abolition or reduc-
tion to the lowest possible level of direct quantitative 
controls on imports. Nevertheless, the chronic inadequacy 
of exchange reserves has made it necessary to retain or 
set up some selective mechanisms for imports. For this 
purpose, certain definite percentages have been fixed for 
This table includes all the Latin American countries with the 
exception of Panama, which has been omitted because much of 
the currency in circulation there consists of United States dollars. 
As is usual, the classification is necessarily somewhat arbi-
trary. Otherwise as many categories as there are countries would 
have to be established. Since the fixed-rate system still applies to 
most of Cuba's trade transactions, that country obviously belongs 
to category 1. 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICAN: EXCHANGE SYSTEMS IN FORCE AT THE END OF THE 
YEARS SPECIFIED 
System 1947 1952 1957 1959 
1. Single exchange rate Cuba Cuba Cuba Cuba' 
El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador 
Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala 
Haiti Haiti Haiti Haiti 
Honduras Honduras Honduras Honduras 
Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico 
Dominican Dominican Dominican Dominican 
Republic Republic Republic Republic 






3. Multiple fixed rates Argentina Bolivia Nicaragua Nicaragua 
for trade transac- Chile Nicaragua Uruguay 
tions; fluctuating 
rate for financial 
Costa Rica Paraguay 
Nicaragua Uruguay 
transactions 
4. Mixed system ol Ecuador Argentina Argentina Brazil 
multiple fixed rates Paraguay Chile Brazil Colombia 
and a fluctuating Peru Colombia Colombia Costa Rica 
rate for trade trans- Costa Rica Costa Rica Ecuador 
actions: fluctuating Ecuador Ecuador 
rate for financial 
transactions 
5. Single fluctuating Peru Chile Peru 
rate for trade trans- Peru 
actions; fluctuating 
rate for financial 
transactions 
6. Single fluctuating Bolivia Argentina*" 




SOURCE: This table is an expansion, brought up date to the end of 1959, of the table prepared 
by F. H. Schott in "The Evolution of Latin American Exchange Rates Policies since World 
War 11", in University of Princeton, Essays in International Finance, No. 32, January 1959. 
* Exchange surcharges (ranging from 30 to 100 per cent) are levied on a list of imports repre-
senting approximately 15 per cent of total imports. 
Various exchange surcharge percentages are imposed on imports (in accordance with a classi-
fication by groups) and withholding percentages on certain exports. 
prior deposits in relation to the value of the goods, classi-
fied according to their importance for the economy and 
the extent to which their importation should be discour-
aged. This system of prior deposits, which is applied by a 
large number of countries in Latin America (both those 
using a single fluctuating exchange rate and those with a 
system of multiple rates), as well as being a means of 
selecting imports, also helps to lessen the pressure of 
demand on foreign exchange holdings by freezing im-
porters' financial resources for certain periods (generally 
of one to six months). In some cases, the system has also 
stimulated the inflow of floating foreign capital or the 
repatriation of national capital which was held in bank 
accounts abroad in order to circumvent the loss of purchas-
ing power caused by inflation. 
As indicated in the sub-section on foreign trade,®® some 
of the countries which apply the prior deposit system have 
modified the percentages established. In the majority of 
cases, the percentages have been reduced, either because 
this requirement—at a time when bank credit was becom-
Sub-section 2 above. 
ing tighter—tended to raise interest rates unduly and to 
hamper normal trade activities that were already limited 
by the monetary scarcity (as in Argentina), or because 
the increase in foreign exchange income allowed import 
restrictions to be relaxed a little (as in Chile). 
Much of Latin America's trade policy in 1959 hinged 
on the possibility of expanding traditional markets and 
opening up new markets for their exports. Brazil and 
Colombia, in particular, made intensive efl'orts to expand 
the world cofl'ee market, efl'orts which culminated in the 
conclusion of various trade agreements with countries in 
the group of centrally-planned economies. One of these 
agreements—between Brazil and the Soviet Union—^pro-
vides for an increase in trade between these two countries 
in the next three years and, if forecasts on the volume of 
trade are fulfilled, may lead to the opening t»f a new and 
important market for coffee. Generally speaking, both on 
the part of the countries with centrally-planned economies 
and on that of the Latin American countries, a decided 
movement towards the expansion of reciprocal trade could 
be observed in 1959: Argentina, Brazil and Colombia 
signed or extended trade agreements with the former 
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group of countries, while other States, such as Chile, sent 
trade missions to explore trade possibilities.^® 
The signature of a new International Coffee Agreement, 
in which Latin American exporter countries and a few 
African countries participated, constituted one of the im-
portant achievements of Latin American trade policy in 
1959. The new Agreement fixed exports quotas for each 
of the acceding countries, based on 90 per cent of the 
highest volume of exports attained in any calendar year 
of the period 1949-58. The relative stability of the coffee 
market in the second half of 1959 was largely attributable 
to the conclusion of that Agreement, in which some Afri-
can producers agreed to participate for the first time, and 
also partly to the fact tíiat the price level had already 
dropped appreciably and had therefore led to a substantial 
increment in consumption. 
The founding of the Inter-American Cotton Federation 
{Federación Interamericana del Algodón) at the begin-
ning of 1959, in which the leading producers of Latin 
America took part, constituted another common front in 
Latin American trade policy vis-a-vis external markets. 
Although the proposal for the conclusion of an inter-
national cotton agreement was not accepted by cotton-
growers outside Latin America, the meeting sponsored by 
the Federation in the course of 1959 served to outline the 
bases for a common cotton market policy. 
4 . T H E SERVICES ACCOUNT 
The two main elements in the services account of Latin 
America's balance of payments consist of tourist income 
and expenditure and remittances in respect of foreign 
investment eamings.^^ The net balance of the tourist ac-
count is favourable for Latin America as a whole, this 
being due chiefly to the high revenue from the tourist 
industry obtained by Mexico. While a favourable balance 
in the tourist account was also registered by Cuba, Pana-
ma and Uruguay^® and to a very minor extent by some 
°° For information on recent developments in Latin American 
trade with the countries with centrally-planned economies, see 
the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1958, op. cit., pp. 61 et seq. 
" "Freight and insurance", which is also part of the services 
account, is included in the goods account, as imports are presented 
on a c.i.f. basis in this Survey. 
However, Uruguay's tourist earnings are derived chiefly from 
neighbouring Látin American countries. 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: NET BALANCES IN THE TOURIST 
INDUSTRY ACCOUNT 
^Millions of dollars) 
1957 1958 1959" 
Brazil . . - 40.0 — 26.0 - 31.0 
Cuba 25.9 19.4 10.0 
Mexico . . . . . 349.3 304.0 341.0 
Panama 26.7 24.9 25.0 
Uruguay 10.1 13.8 16.0 
Venezuela . . . . , -137.5 - 99.1 - 90.0 
Other countries . . . - 35.2 — 22.2 - 30.0 
Total 199.3 214.8 241.0 
Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: NET BALANCES IN THE FOREIGN 
YIELD ACCOUNT 
(Millions of dollars) 
1957 1958 1959" 
Argentina . . . . — 15.8 .— 31.0 — 40.3 
Brazil — 128.0 — 107.0 — 112.0 
Chile — 56.8 — 62.4 - 88.9 
Colombia . . . . - 25.9 — 62.1 - 65.0 
- 65.6 — 47.9 - 50.0 
Ecuador . . . . - 21.6 — 21.8 - 21.5 
Mexico - 134.4 144.3 - 154.6 
Peru - 33.1 — 32.3 - 50.0 
Venezuela . . . . - 1 0 1 0 . 3 — 633.6 - 521.4 
Other countries . . . - 52.3 — 52.1 - 50.0 
Total - 1 543.8 - 1 1 9 4 . 5 - 1 1 5 3 . 7 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Year-
book, Vol. 11 and 12; International Financial Statistics. 
' Provisional estimates. 
of the Central American countries, the balance was un-
favourable for the rest of Latin America (see table 5 ) . 
Although preliminary data for 1959 are still very in-
complete, it would appear that the surplus in the tourist 
account increased for Mexico and Uruguay. The favour-
able balance for Cuba, on the other hand, became smaller 
during the past two years, no doubt because of the political 
tension which prevailed there during that period. 
The second account mentioned—the return on foreign 
investment—generally shows a large deficit (see table 6 ) . 
Venezuela is chiefly responsible for changes in the net 
balance of that account. It was precisely because of a 
sharp drop in net remittances under that head from 
Venezuela in 1957 and 1958 that the net remittances for 
the whole area fell by 30 per cent during those two years. 
Preliminary data for 1959 indicate that there was a fur-
ther decrease in remittances from Venezuela under the 
head of the return on foreign investment, whereas those 
from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico increased. 
5 . T H E CURRENT CAPACITY TO IMPORT^® 
In Latin America as a whole the current capacity to im-
port in 1959 was practically at the level of the previous 
year (see table 7 ) . The value of exports fell by 184 mil-
lion dollars, but as there was also a reduction of. the 
deficit on service account, the decrease in the current 
capacity to import was only 14 million dollars. 
Viewed on a country basis, the current capacity to im-
port improved substantially in Chile, thanks chiefly to the 
rise in the value of its exports. For the same reason, but 
to a lesser extent, there was an improvement in the capa-
city to import of Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nica-
ragua, Paraguay and Peru, whereas the improvement in 
Argentina was attributable largely to a sma ler deficit in 
its services account. Mexico's capacity to import expanded 
during the year as a result of the surplus in the services 
account. In Venezuela a decline in the value of exports 
was counterbalanced by an approximately equal reduction 
in the deficit in the services account. In Cuba, Haiti and 
SOURCE : International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Year-
book, Vols 11 and 12; International Financial Statistics. 
• Provisional estimates. 
The current capacity to import is equal to the value of exports 
plus (or minus) the net balance in the services account. 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: CURRENT CAPACITY TO IMPORT 












Colombia . . . 539.1 
Costa Rica . . . 93.1 
El Salvador . . . 118.0 
Guatemala . . . 107.2 
Haiti 42.1 
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Honduras . . . 
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livestock products 
Argentina . . . 






























Hexico . . . . 



















Total 6 023.3 6 034.9 - 161.6 — 191.6 5 861.7 5 843.3 
Venezuela . . . 2 510.3 2 314.5 — 846.8 — 646.1 1 663.5 1 668.4 
Grand total . . 8 533.6 8 349.4 - 1 008.4 - 837.7 7 525.2 7 511.7 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vols. 11 and 12; Inter-
national Financial Statistics. 
" Provisional figures. 
Uruguay there was a decline in the capacity to import 
due to a sharp drop in the value of imports, and the same 
was true, although not to an equal extent, of Costa Rica, 
the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. 
The relative stability of the price index of world im-
ports of manufactured goods*" between 1958 and 1959 
suggests that the current capacity to pay was not affected 
by this factor. 
The net balance in the services account, generally ad-
verse for Latin America as a whole, was lower in 1959 
than in 1958, because of the smaller outflow from Vene-
zuela. The total net balance of current transactions (goods 
and services) fell to 610 millions dollars in 1959 from the 
figure of 1 299 million to which it had risen in 1958. The 
reduction in the deficit was mainly a reflection of the 
radical change in Latin America's balance of trade. 
6 . BALANCE OF TRADE AND NET BALANCE OF CURRENT 
TRANSACTIONS 
Latin America's balance of trade in 1959 showed a sur-
plus of some 230 million dollars, compared with a deficit 
of 290 million in 1958 (see table 8 ) . Venézuela's position 
—with a large surplus in its balance of trade—had a 
major effect on the totals for the region as a whole. But 
even if Venezuela is excluded, it will be seen that the 
deficit in Latin America's balance of trade for 1959 was 
smaller than in 1858 because most countries of the region 
cut their imports in 1959. 
According to the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statis-
tics, in 1958 and 1959 this index was 107 (base 1953 = 100). 
7 . M O V E M E N T S IN T H E CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
The net inflow of foreign capital into Latin America 
seems to have diminished in 1959 as compared with 1958. 
While the available figures relate exclusively to capital 
movements from the United States and international fin-
ance agencies, it should be borne in mind that these 
sources provide the bulk of the private and official capital 
that enters Latin America. 
The net inflow of private capital from the United States 
in the form of direct investment declineil, partly reflecting 
the virtual termination of the large-scale investments made 
in the Venezuelan petroleum industry during the three 
previous years. As regards the movements of other private 
capital, it should be noted that the inflow of long-term 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: NET BALANCE IN THE CURRENT TRANSACTIONS ACCOUNT 











Colombia . . . . 
Costa Rica . . . 
EI Salvador . . . 
Guatemala . . . 
Haiti 






Ecuador . . . . 
Honduras . . . 
Panama . . . . 
Wheat and crop and 
livestock products 
Argentina . . . 






Mexico . . . 
Paraguay 
Peru . . . . 
Total . . 
Venezuela . 
Grand total 
1958 1959^ 1958 1959* 1958 1959' 
_ 81.0 — 66.0 _ 182.0 -238 .0 - 263.0 -304 .0 
108.6 103.6 63.8 — 60.0 44.8 43.6 
5.6 - 23.0 3.5 - 4.0 - 9.1 - 27.0 
9.7 12.2 8.6 - 12.1 1.1 0.1 
48.7 - 26.0 — 1.3 - 2.0 - 50.0 - 28.0 
2.1 - 7.5 4.6 7.1 2.5 — 0.4 
— 14.8 3.9 1.1 1.7 - 13.7 5.6 
— 124.8 - 98.0 — 13.8 - 15.0 - 138.6 —113.0 
— 12.7 - 4.9 1.4 1.0 - 11.3 - 3.9 
15.4 30.2 _ 30.4 - 31.1 - 15.0 - 0.9 
5.1 1.0 4.3 - 4.0 - 9.4 - 3.0 
— 63.4 - 64.0 50.3 50.0 - 13.1 - 14.0 
238.7 17.0 25.0 — 0.8 — 213.7 16.2 
— 12.7 - 61.9 9.0 10.0 - 3.7 - 51.9 
_ 33.6 - 11.9 _ 1.4 - 4.6 - 35.0 - 16.5 
— 62.7 50,0 — 45.2 - 94.9 - 107.9 - 44.9 
376.9 -253 .9 174.2 230.1 - 202.7 — 23.8 
12.1 1.9 0.5 - 11.6 — 1.9 
— 95.8 - 18.2 — 23.4 - 25.0 - 119.2 - 43.2 
—1056.7 —419.3 — 161.6 —191.6 - 1 218.3 -610 .9 
766.1 647.5 — 846.8 -646 .1 - 80.7 1.4 
— 290.6 228.2 - 1 0 0 8 . 4 -837 .7 - 1 299.0 -609 .5 
SotmcES: Tables 3 and 7. 
" Provisional figures. 
private capital was more substantial in 1959, unlike 1958 
when the flow of short-term capital exceeded that of long-
term capital (see table 9 ) . The sharpest drop was regis-
tered in the ofiicial capital account and was caused chiefly 
by the reduced scale of loan operations carried on by the 
Export-Import Bank with Latin America in 1959. The 
aggregate net inflow of official and private capital from 
the United States shrank from 945 million dollars in 1958 
to 644 million in 1959 .« 
With reference to the capital account, a distinction must 
be made between movements designed to finance specific 
development projects—generally long-term—and those in-
tended to bolster temporarily a country's capacity to im-
port or to increase its international financial resources 
during a specific period in order to enable the monetary 
authorities to cope with the demand for external means 
of payment. While the former type of movement is similar 
to direct foreign investment, the latter is of a compen-
satory nature and should be considered as reflecting the 
deficit in the balance of payments of the country con-
Table 9 
UNITED STATES: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH LATIN 
AMERICA. MOVEMENTS IN THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT* 
(Millions of dollars) 
1958 1959 
A. Private capital . . —474 —383 
(i) Direct investment . . . . . . —325 —193 
(ii) Other private capital: 
long term — 47 —160 
short-term . . 112 — 40 
(iii) Amortizations . , 10 10 
B. Official capital . . —471 —261 
(i) Long-term . . 595 -^06 
(ii) Short-term 27 — 36 
(iii) Amortizations . . 151 181 
C. Total (A + B) . . 945 —644 
These figures do not include unilateral transfers (mainly 
grants-in-aid) from the United States to Latin America, which 
amounted 172 million dollars in 1958 and 160 million in 1959. 
Transfers in the form of military aid are also excluded. 
SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Cur-
rent Business, June 1959-March 1960. 
' Since, the figures here are taken from the United States balance 
of payments, the movement of funds towards Latin America 
constitutes an outflow of capital and is indicated by a minus 
sign. Conversely amortizations by Latin America represent a 
source of income for the United States. 
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cerned. Thus, loans from the International Monetary Fund, 
some from the Export-Import Bank and other short-term 
official and private foreign credit are compensatory in 
character. The net inflow of capital from the United States 
and international institutions is dealt with in greater detail 
below, due account being taken of the aforesaid dis-
tinction. 
(a) Loans from the Export-Import Bank 
The operations of this institution constitute the bulk 
of the inflow of official United States capital into Latin 
America. The Bank's total disbursements to Latin Ameri-
can countries amounted to 310 million dollars in 1959 
as against 485 million in 1958. Of these amounts, com-
pensatory loans represented 152 million in 1958 and 92 
million in 1959. The break-down of these total disburse-
ments among the Latin American countries in those two 
years is shown in table 10, from which it will be seen 
that the reduced outlay in 1959 as compared with 1958 
is chiefly attributable to the smaller loans granted in the 
first place to Brazil and secondly to Mexico. But it should 
. also be pointed out that the reduction was due in some mea-
sure not to a restriction of credit facilities^^ but to the fact 
that some of the loans granted to certain, countries were 
not used. Another point that should be mentioned is that 
the Export-Import Bank's credit policy provides more 
liberal financing regulations for the United States exporter 
than for the Latin American importer, this being the 
result of a new measure adopted in September 1959. Until 
Two examples can be given in this connexion. Mexico was 
granted a 100 million dollars loan early in 1959 but used only 10 
million which were repaid by the end of the year. Peru arranged 
for a 40 million loan but used only 16 million. 
Table 10 
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON: CREDITS 
GRANTED TO LATIN AMERICA 








Costa Rica . 11.1 
Cuba : 32.9 

































SOURCE: Export-Import Bank of Washington, Statement on Loans 
and Authorized Credits, Washington, 31 December 1958, 31 De-
rpmbpT lO.W 
Table 14 
UNITED STATES: CREDITS GRANTED TO LATIN 
AMERICA BY THE DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND 
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SOURCES: International Financial News Survey; and information 
from official sources. 
Table 12 
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT: CREDITS GRANTED TO 
LATIN AMERICA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Country 1957 1958 1959 




Costa Rica . . . . 21.80 
Ecuador . . . . . 20.10 
El Salvador . . . . — 
Honduras — 
Mexico . . . . . . — 
















B. Actual disbursements 
Brazil . . 






Haiti . . . 
Honduras . 




Peru . . . 
Uruguay . 

























































SOURCES: International Bank, Statement on- Loans; International 
Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics. 
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then, the Bank financed 60 per cent of purchases of goods 
manufactured in the United States, the remaining 40 per 
cent being divided equally between the United States ex-
porter and the Latin American importer. As from Sep-
tember the Bank agreed to finance up to 68 per cent of 
the total transaction, reducing the United States exporter's 
share of the financing to 12 per cent while maintaining 
the Latin American importer's share at 20 per cent. The 
purpose of the measure was obviously to provide further 
facilities for exports from the United States in the form 
of official loans to exporters, a system similar to that which 
has benefited exporters in several European countries. 
(b) Loans from the Development Loan Fund 
The Fund, like the Export-Import Bank, is an official 
United States agency.^^ In 1959, its second full year of 
operation, it authorized loans to eleven Latin American 
countries amounting to a total of 59 million dollars of 
which 24.8 were earmarked for Argentina. Actual dis-
bursements in 1959 came to about 20 million (see table 
11). The Fund's loans are granted for the financing of 
specific development projects. 
(c) Loans from the International Bank for Reconstructian 
and Development 
Further loans authorized by the International Bank in 
1959 for Latin America amounted to 80.7 million dollars, 
less than the credit authorized in 1958 (see table 12) . As 
in previous years, most of the loans were intended for 
the development of sources of energy. Loans for this pur-
pose were granted to Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador 
and Honduras, representing in total 81 per cent of all 
the loans granted by the Bank to Latin America as a 
whole. Actual disbursements in 1959 amounted to 68.6 
million dollars as against 72 million in 1958. The net 
inflow of capital from the International Bank totalled 33.1 
million dollars in 1959 and 39.7 million in 1958. 
(d) Investments by the International Finance Corporation 
The operations of this Corporation, which does not 
grant loans but invests in private enterprises requiring 
capital for expansion, were more intensive in Latin Ameri-
ca during 1959. The amount of authorized investments 
rose to 11.5 million dollars, as compared with 5.5 million 
in 1958 (see table 13). Its total investment in 1959 
covered 13 projects in eight countries and involved a wide 
variety of activities; manufacture of foodstuffs, construc-
tion materials, fertilizers, pulp, cement, textiles and copper 
refining. While the Corporation's investments are not large, 
it should be borne in mind that its purpose is not to 
finance projects involving the development of basic re-
sources but to supplement private investment in associa-
tion with domestic or foreign private capital. 
(e) Loans from the International Monetary Fund 
The International Monetary Fund's loans are mainly 
compensatory. During 1959, nine Latin American coun-
tries—^Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Repub-
lic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru— 
Table 14 
INTERNATIONAL HNANCE CORPORATION: AUTHORIZED 
INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Country 1957 1958 1959 
Brazil 1.00 5.06 3.00 
Chile — — 1.50 
Colombia 2.20 — 3.40 
El Salvador . . . . — — 0.14 
Guatemala — 0.20 — 
Mexico 1.12 0.20 — 
Peru _ — 2.23 
Venezuela — 1.25 
Total 4.32 5.46 11.52 
For details on the operations of the Development Loan Fund, 
see Economic Survey of Latin America 1958, op. cit., p. 45. 
SOURCES: International Finance Corporation, Third Annual Report, 
1958-1959, and International Financial News Survey. 
signed stand-by agreements with the Fund in respect of 
various amounts, but only two of them—Argentina and 
El Salvador—used part of the authorized loans; the 
other merely amortized credit received in the previous 
year (see table 14 for a break-down by countries, of the 
International Monetary Fund's loans and other compen-
satory credit). The transactions of Latin America as a 
whole with the International Monetary Fund in 1959 
represented a net outflow of 44 million dollars as against 
a net inflow of 67 million in 1958. 
( f ) Other official and private short-term capital 
The information available on the flow of other official 
and private short-term capital is confined to capital from 
the United States and is also included in table 14. Most of 
this flow of short-term capital may be considered to be of 
the compensatory type and, in so far as it has been 
possible to identify it, has been included in the table 
on compensatory accounts. Of course, the movements of 
short-term capital with countries other than the United 
States, on the one hand, and part of the commercial loans 
contracted directly with foreign sources, on the other, have 
not been included. These movements are included to a 
large extent under "errors and omissions", which is part 
of every country's balance of payments. 
(g) Summary of the balance of payments 
Table 15 contains a summary of Latin America's bal-
ance of payments. While the figures are provisional, they 
indicate that both in 1958 and 1959 there was a relatively 
substantial outflow of Latin American capital. 
(h) New international financial institutions 
The founding of the Inter-American Development Bank, 
embracing virtually every Latin American country and 
the United States, was legally approved by the end of 
1959. The Bank's operations, confined to Latin America, 
will consist of the granting of direct loans out of its own 
capital or with funds acquired on the private capital mar-
ket, and of guaranteeing, either in whole or in part, loans 
made by private investors. The loans granted or guar-
anteed by this new institution will be used to finance 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SITUATION AND 
COMPENSATORY FINANCING 




















1958 1959" 1958 1959'' 1958 J959' 1958 J959' 1958 1959' 
Argentina . . . . 211.9 - f 22.0 -154 .1 -f217.0 0.0 - 4 0 . 0 0.0 - 2 5 . 0 — 57.8 -130 .0 
Bolivia 5.3 - f 6.8 - f 0.6 - f 6.0 — 2.0 + 0.8 0.0 0.0 - 3.9 0.0 
Brazil 207.0 - 1 7 7 . 0 - 11.0 - 17.0 - 3 8 . 0 -1-20.0 -100 .0 0.0 — 58.0 —180.0 
Chile 29.0 - f 34.0 + 15.0 - f 52.0 - 5.0 +21.0 - 39.0 - 3 9 . 0 0.0 0.0 
Colombia - f 7.7 - 6.2 + 7.7 - 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Costa Rica . . . . 68.0 —116.0 - 68.0 -116 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cuba 31.3 + 51.8 - f 13.3 + 71.6 - 1 0 . 6 + 6.2 - 13.0 - 4.0 - 21.0 • — 22.0 
Ecuador 3.8 + 5.9 — 3.8 - f 4.6 0.0 + 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
El Salvador . . . . 4.0 - 4.5 - 2.0 + 0.1 0.0 - 4.6 0.0 0.0 — 2.0 0.0 
Guatemala . . . . 26.0 — 4.9 — 26.0 - 7.5 0.0 + 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Haiti 5.2 - 2.0 - 2.7 - 1.0 - 2.5 - 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Honduras 4.4 - f 4.4 - 8.0 - f 4.4 - f 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
81.0 - f 64.0 - 81.0 - f 41.0 0.0 +23.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nicaragua . . . .' 1.8 - f 2.5 — 3.7 + 1.5 + 1.9 + 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Panama + 18.8 - 7.8 + 18.8 - 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Paraguay 2.2 - 2.6 - f 1.3 - 4.4 - 0.8 + 1.8 0.0 0.Ó - 2.7 0.0 
Peru _ 12.4 + 15.9 — 2.4 - f 21.2 - 1 0 . 0 +10.7 0.0 - 1 6 . 0 0.0 0.0 
Dominican Republic — 0.7 — 5.7 - 0.7 - 7.0 0.0 + 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Uruguay — 29.0 — 48.0 - 24.0 - 18.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 5.0 - 30.0 
Venezuela . . . . — 396.0 -345 .0 . —396.0 -345 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total" - 1 1 0 6 . 9 - 512 .4 —737.5 —110.5 - 6 7 . 0 +44.1 -152 .0 - 8 4 . 0 -150 .4 -362 .0 
SOURCES: Prepared from basic data on net variations in international reserves, the net position vis-a-vis the International Monetary Fund 
and compensatory credits from other sources, according to figures published in International Financial Statistics, annual balance- • 
sheets of the Eximbank and other direct sources. 
° Provisional figures. 
The difference between these balances and those current transactions given in table 8 reflects the net movement of autonomous 
(non-compensatory) capital, and errors and omissions. 
Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1958-59* 
(Millions of dollars) 
1958 1959 
A. Good and services 
Exports, fob 8 534 8 349 
Imports, cif —8 824 —8 121 
Trade balance — 290 228 
Net services —1008 — 838 
Total: goods and services —1298 — 610 
B. Capitcd and gold 
From the United States: 
(i) Direct investment 325 193 
(ii) Other private and public capital . 620 451 
From the International Bank . . . . 36 32 
From the International Finance Cor-
poration 5 11 
From the International Monetary Fund 67 — 44 
Other short-term credits 150 362 
Net shift in international reserves (In-
crease —) 738 107 
Total: capital and gold 1941 1112 
C. Other movements of capital, and errors 
and omissions — 643 — 502 
SOURCE: Prepared from the basic data included in the previous 
tables. 
• Provisional figures. 
specific projects, including those which are part of a 
national or regional development programme. Out of its 
authorized capital of 1 000 million dollars, 80 million will 
be paid out during the first year of operations and 160 
million in each of the two following years. 
The proposal to establish the International Development 
Association, a new institution affiliated with the Interna-
tional Bank, is now being considered by the States mem-
bers of the Bank. The chief purpose of the new institution, 
apart from channelling additional funds for the economic 
development of backward areas, is to cover a field of 
activity in which the International Bank cannot act, such 
as the granting of loans without Government security. In 
accordance with its proposed statutes, the Association will 
grant loans on more flexible terms which will not have 
as marked an effect on the balance of payments of under-
developed countries. An unusuali feature of this new ins-
titution is that member countries will be divided into two 
groups; the industrialized countries, which will make 
their contribution in gold or freely-convertible currency, 
and the under-developed countries which will make 10 
per cent of their contribution in gold and free currency 
and the remaining 90 per cent in their own currency. The 
agreement creating this institution will remain, open for 
the signature of member countries until December 1960. 
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8 . BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND CXJMPENSATORY 
' FINANCING 
Latin America's balance of payments in 1959 showed a 
deficit of 509 million dollars, an improvement over the 
figure of 1 107 million in 1958^^ (see again table 14). This 
reduced deficit basically reflects the change in the Latin 
American trade balance, which showed a surplus of some 
228 million dollars in 1959 compared with a deficit of 
some 290 million in 1958. Not counting Venezuela, whose 
trade surplus was offset by the large deficit in its services 
account, it will be seen that the balance-of-trade deficit 
of the remaining countries dropped from 1 057 million 
dollars in 1958 to 419 million in 1959. In other words, 
whether Venezuela is excluded or not, the smaller deficit 
in the total balance of payments was a result of the re-
strictive policy applied by most of the countries to imports 
in order to bring their trade into better balance. 
Table 14 also includes a break-down, by countries, of 
the estimated trade balance and the movement of the 
various compensatory accounts. It will be noted, in par-
particular, that the movements in the "gold and foreign 
exchange" account underwent a radical change which is 
particularly marked if Venezuela is excluded from the 
total for Latin America. 
The drain on international reserves during 1958 was 
severe in some countries—Argentina, Cuba, Mexico and 
Venezuela. Only two of them—Argentina and Mexico— 
were able to stem the tide in 1959 and, in fact, only 
Mexico succeeded in doing so without resorting to foreign 
compensatory loans. The restoration of Argentina's inter-
national reserves necessitated a firm policy of import 
restrictions, on the one hand, and the use of foreign loans 
on a larger scale than in 1958. In Cuba and Venezuela, 
on the other hand, financing of an adverse balance of 
payments meant a further substantial reduction in inter-
national reserves in spite of the fact that in both countries 
the traditional policy of free imports was replaced, at least 
in part, by the introduction of restrictions on purchases 
abroad of non-essential or luxury items. 
Moreover, neither Cuba nor Venezuela resorted to for-
eign loans as a means of relieving the pressure of demand 
on their international reserves. In fact, the use of foreign 
compensatory loans in 1959 was confined to fewer coun-
tries than in 1958 (particularly in the case of loans con-
tracted with the International Monetary Fund), although 
this smaller group of countries used compensatory loans 
from sources other than the Fund on a larger scale than 
in 1958." 
" B y definition, the balance of payments is equal to the net 
change in international reserves plus compensatory foreign credit. 
This does not necessarily reflect more difficult access to the 
resources of the International Monetary Fund in 1959. Some coun-
tries—Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—did not use in 1959 the 
loans authorized by the Fund. In another case—Brazil—loan ne-
gotiations were broken off because of failure to agree on specific 
monetary and fiscal policy measures. 
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CENTRAt AMERICA'S POST-WAR EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
INTRODUCTION 
At the present stage of Central America's economic deve-
lopment, it is very important that the region maintain 
access to an expanding volume of international resources. 
Given its high rate of population growth on the one hand, 
and as yet inadequate levels of income and production on 
the other, this region relies heavily upon imports to 
supplement and complement its own domestic supplies 
of many consumer goods and industrial raw materials 
and, in particular, to enlarge its existing capital stock. 
In generating its aggregate capacity to import. Central 
America depends fundamentally upon the trade account of 
its balance of payments rather than upon services or capi-
tal transactions. And, in turn, the region has long sought 
its major source of external demand within the large arid 
nearby United States market. Because of its traditional 
importance, therefore, the following sections give primary 
emphasis to post-war developments in Central America's 
export trade to that market. Brief coverage, however, will 
also be given to some of the main trends shown by 
Central American exports to the world as a whole since 
the end of the Second World War. 
Two overriding characteristics stand out from an exami-
nation of Central America's exports to the United States 
during the period 1946-58: the declining trend that has 
recently been taking place in siich trade; arid the extre-
mely narrow range of commodities involved. In both 
respects the region is in a comparable situation with many 
other primary producing areas which also depend upon á 
few export crops and which have been so adversely affected 
by the current weaknesses prevailing in international 
commodity markets generally. For Central America, in 
any event, these problems are becoming increasingly acute 
and since its internal economic development is so closely 
affected by movements in the external sector, it has been 
considered particularly timely to examine some of the 
developments taking place in its post-war export trade, 
especially so far as the large United States market is 
concerned. Today, probably more than at any other period 
since the end of the Second World War, Central America 
must concern itself with the problems that face its export 
trade, namely, a deterioration in the growth potential and 
a further narrowing of the range of commodities. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN TRADE FOR CENTRAL AMERICA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
ECLA has long devoted considerable attention to the role 
that a dynamic foreign trade sector can play in furthering 
Latin America's economic development, attention that is 
particularly pertinent in the case of the Central American 
republics, considered individually or as a whole. Indeed, 
this region offers a very clear-cut illustration of how close-
ly the external and internal sectors are linked in some 
countries characterized by low per capita income levels, 
and which are just beginning to embark upon the initial 
phases of creating a small industrial nucleus.^ 
1. T H E RATIO OF EXTERNALLY-DERIVED TO AGGREGATE 
NATIONAL INCOME 
It is a general characteristic of lesser developed coun-
tries that their ratios of externally-derived income to total 
domestic income are higher than in the more mature 
economies. In 1957, for example, the proportion of ex-
ports to national income ranged between 7 and 18 per 
cent for the United States, France, Italy and Japan; 19 
and 20 per cent for Mexico and Chile; and 25 and 32 
per cent for the various Central American republics.^ 
^ See, for example, El desarrollo económico de El Salvador 
(E/CN.12/495/Rev. l ) , Vol. VII of the series "Analyses and pro-
jections of economic development" (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. 60.II.G.2). Part One, chapter I. 
' As tabulated from the Yearbook of National Account Statis-
tics, 1958 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 59.XVII.3). For 
virtually all countries mentioned above, the data comprise national 
income at factory cost, on the one hand, and exports of goods and 
services on the other, both measured in terms of current Drices. 
Hence where incomes generated by exports are so large 
in relation to those originating from almost all other 
productive sectors, it follows that variations in export 
returns—directly and through their multiplier action— 
have magnified repercussions upon the levels of income, 
employment and demand throughout the rest of the mone-
tary economy. As just one illustration of how close this 
income interaction can be in essentially agricultural eco-
nomies, it has been estimated that a 25 per cent fall in the 
export values of a single commodity—coffee—could in-
duce a 10 per cent decline in the national, income of 
Guatemala.^ Thus, the growth or decline in domestic 
purchasing power and hence the level of internal consump-
tion and investment outlays are substantially influenced 
by trends in export earnings. For Central America, this 
functional relationship has, if anything, become even more 
pronounced since the end of tíie Second World War.^ 
2. IMPORT AND EXPORT TAXES AS A PROPORTION OF 
TOTAL PUBLIC TAX REVENUES 
As shown in table 1, one of the outstanding charac-
teristics of Central America's fiscal regime is the unusual-
ly large proportion of governmental revenue derived from 
° As quoted in FAO, Commodity Series, Coffee, Bulletin 31, 
August 1959, from the Pan American Union study "The economic 
impact of fluctuating coffee prices on the economies of the Ameri-
can Republics", 1955. 
^ In the case of El Salvador, the proportion of domestic income 
originating from the external sector almost doubled between 1945 
and 1957 (see El Desarrollo Económico de El Salvador, op. cit., 
Dase 14) . 
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activities connected with foreign trade, mainly from im-
port and export taxes, but also from royalties, production 
and income taxes levied upon industries that are primarily 
directed towards the export trade. Many historical circum-
stances have contributed to this situation: for example 
such taxes tend to be relatively reliable; they are not 
too administratively complex; and furthermore Central 
America's inadequate industrial diversification limits the 
extent to which alternative tax sources can be tapped.® 
The final effect has been to link the region's public re-
venue potential very closely with movements in imports 
and exports. In turn, the ability of the fiscal authorities 
to forecast their current budgetary resources and to pro-
gramme long-term investment has, in the last analysis, 
rested essentially upon trends in the value of only a few 
export commodities. So long as this situation continues, 
international price and demand fluctuations for these few 
products will greatly influence the degree of budgetary 
stability and effectiveness in Central America. 
3. THE CARDINAL IMPORTANCE OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
IN GENERATING THE CAPACITY TO IMPORT 
A third and very important indication of the link be-
tween Central America's export sector and its internal 
economic development is the fact that the creation of 
import substitution industries has long been limited be-
cause the various national markets operate on a small 
scale and in watertight compartments. Historically, there-
fore, since so many key raw materials and intermediate 
products and virtually all capital goods have been either 
only partially obtainable or non-obtainable from domes-
tically-produced supplies, there has been no alternative to 
securing such goods except through imports. This point 
assumes special importance in the case of Central America, 
where merchandise exports play such a predominant part 
in generating the region's total capacity to import. For 
instance, table 2 shows that service account transactions 
in Central America's post-war net balance of payments 
have consistently been negative, and capital account trans-
® See La Política Tributaria y el desarrollo Económico en Cen-
troamérica (E/CN. 12/486), United Nations publication, Sales No. 
1957.11.9, and Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955, United 
Nations publication Sales No. 1956.II.G.1, Part Two. 
actions have been small during most of the post-war 
period and at times negative as well. Such circumstances 
in turn emphasize the role that merchandise exports play 
in shaping the region's total import capacity, and hence 
its ability to finance the purchase of so many items cri-
tical for its over-all growth. 
4 . THE INSTABILITY OF CENTRAL AMERICA'S 
EXPORT SECTOR 
As is well known, Central America's export trade is 
characterized by a very narrow range of primary agri-
cultural commodities, by a heavy dependence upon a few 
large overseas markets, and by a marginal position among 
world suppliers for many of the items that it produces 
for export. Given this precarious lack of diversification, 
relatively small shifts in international demand, supply 
and price schedules for one or two products, or within 
one or two key markets, can induce disproportionately 
large swings in Central America's aggregate export re-
turns. Furthermore, since service and capital account trans-
.actions have typically not been able to compensate for 
such swings, it follows that the region has had to rely 
fundamentally upon volume and price increases for coffee, 
bananas and cotton to facilitate its internal income and 
budgetary growth and to expand its import capacity. 
It should, however, be added that throughout most of 
the post-war period. Central America benefited to an 
extraordinary extent from precisely such a narrow com-
modity base. On the one hand, although by different 
degrees, substantial increases took place for approximately 
a decade in the export quantum of most the commodities 
concerned, and simultaneously Central America derived 
unusually favourable gains from movements in their terms 
of trade over the same period. During the brief period 
1948-54, for instance, the terms of trade improved very 
markedly for all the republics (see table 3) . More recently, 
however, quite the reverse situation has been developing. 
As stated in chapter II, section 2 (b) the quantity of 
bananas shipped only a few years ago has not subse-
quently been exceeded. Of even more importance, the 
prices of cotton and especially of coffee have declined so 
substantially in the recent past that by 1959 the terms of 
trade of each country had returned to the much lower 
Table 1 
CENTRAL AMERICA: RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF FISCAL 
REVENUE 
Percentage of total govern- Percentage of total govern-
mental revenues provided by mental tax receipts provided by 
Country Taxes Other revenues'^ 
Import plus f i 
export taxe^^l^,'^,. 
Costa Rica: 1958 88.9 11.1 67.5 32.5 
El Salvador: 1958 92.1 7.9 63.6 36.4 
Guatemala: 1957-58 92.6 8.4 49.2 50.8 
Honduras: 1957 97.3 2.7 49.9 50.1 
Nicaragua: 1957-58 87.9 12.1 68.0 32.0 
SOURCES : United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1959; and Boletín de Estadística 1958 of Nicaragua. 
The data for El Salvador and Honduras are provisional. 
" Primarily receipts from government loans. 
Export taxes accounted for 4 to 6 per cent of the figures for Costa Rica and Honduras, and 
14 to 20 per cent of those for the remaining countries. 
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Table 14 
CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN COMPONENTS OF POST-WAR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
WITH THE WORLD 




Exports'^ Imports^ ¡ ^ t e 
1947-50 256 —196 60 
1951-54 378 —300 78 
1955-58 449 —431 18 
Services Capital Errors 
and dona- transactions and omis-
tions sions 
Net Net Long' Net 
totaV total term total 
—64 3 2 1 
—71 —1 7 —6 
—51 34 28 —1 
SOURCE; Internationa] Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbooks, selected issues. The 1958 
data include some preliminary estimates. 
' Exports and imports f.o.b. 
Private and public donations were both minor until 1954. During 1955-58, conversely, they 
averaged about 25 million dollars annually, almost exclusively from official United States 
donations to Guatemala for Mutual Security Aid and for the Inter-American Highway. 
" Including both private and official transactions. The balance comprises short-term capital and 
net movements of monetary gold. 
levels of almost a full decade ago. Taken together, these 
various quantum and price developments led to a very 
rapid rate of growth in Central America's export returns 
during the initial post-war decade, followed after 1954 
by a much slower growth trend, which finally culminated 
in 1958, when for the first time since the end of the war 
Table 3 
CENTRAL AMERICA: POST-WAR TERMS OF TRADE 
(1953 = 100) 
Pais 1948 1950 1954 1958 1959'-
Costa Rica . . . . . . 65 98 115 86 88 
El Salvador . . 55 128 86 66 
Guatemala . . . 63 '94 120 84 67 
Honduras. . . . 81 99 108 90 88 
Nicaragua . . . . . . 64 87 128 82 73 
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Sta-
tistics, selected issues. 
" Preliminary estimates, based on six months' data for Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua, and nine months' data for El Salva-
dor and Honduras. 
the export values did not exceed their level of the prece-
ding year. 
From what has already been said concerning the impor-
tant role of exports as a leading sector in the Central Ameri-
can economies it is clear that a continuation of these re-
cent and unfavourable tendencies could create serious 
problems for the region. It is also clear that, given the 
predominant position occupied by the United States among 
Central America's customers, future demand and price 
developments within this single market can uniquely affect 
the level of Central America's total export earnings. Hence, 
one of the main purposes of this article is to examine the 
pattern of Central America's merchandise exports to the 
United States since the end of the Second World War. 
From such a study of the past it is hoped that lessons will 
be obtained that will help in restoring the forward mo-
mentum of Central America's export sector in the future, 
thereby strengthening the internal growth prospects for 
Central America's next phase of economic development. 
In order to place Central America's export trade in 
some over-all perspective and before considering the United 
States market, a brief review will now be made of the 
main developments shown by Central American exports 
to the world as a whole during the post-war period. 
II. CENTRAL AMERICA'S EXPORT TRADE IN ITS INTERNATIONAL SETTING: FOUR MAIN POST-WAR 
DEVELOPMENTS 
1. THE SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH IN CENTRAL AMERICA'S 
EXPORTS TO THE WORLD AS A WHOLE 
During the post-war period, Central . ^ e r i c a n export 
values increased at an exceptionally favourable pace: from 
about 173 million dollars in 1947, they rose steadily in 
each subsequent year to 464 million dollars in 1957 by 
far the highest level ever recorded in the history of the 
five republics. In 1958, for the first time since the end 
of the Second World War, such exports ceased their 
hitherto uninterrupted expansion, declining to 451 milhon 
dollars. None the less, between 1947 and 1958, Central 
American exports had increased by more than 160 per 
cent. As a point of comparison it may be noted that this 
was well in excess of the growth recorded for world ex-
ports as a whole, which approximately doubled during 
this period of slightly more than a decade. 
Since world exports are so heavily weighted by manu-
factured goods originating in industrial countries,® it 
would be more practical to compare Central America's 
post-war trade expansion with that of countries whose ex-
port composition is also based on the sale of commodities 
in primary form. This is done in table 4, by taking the 
' Exports from industrial countries have accounted for appro-
ximately two thirds of total world exports in recent years (see 
GATT, Trends in International Trade, 1958, table 2, p. 20). 
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twenty Latin American republics and deducting Central 
America from this total. As will be seen, exports from 
the fifteen remaining countries rose from about 5 700 mil-
lion dollars in 1947 to 7 800 million in 1958, i.e. at 
a compound rate of 2.7 per cent per annum. This stands 
out in sharp contrast with the rate of 9.1 per cent com-
pounded annually that was recorded for exports from 
Central America during the same interval. 
This comparison becomes even more interesting when 
presented on a per capita basis (see table 4 ) . Thus, from 
1947 to 1958, Central America's exports per person have 
come very close to doubling, whereas for the rest of Latin 
America a virtually stagnant trend was recorded between 
the years selected. It is indeed a striking fact to note that 
a decade ago each i)erson in Central America was ex-
porting only about 55 per cent as much as his counterpart 
in the other fifteen republics: today, conversely. Central 
America exports slightly more on a per capita basis than 
these other countries. 
2. SHIFTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA'S POST-WAR 
COMMODITY COMPOSITION 
Another salient characteristic of Central America's ex-
port trade is its exceptionally narrow range of commodity 
diversification. Although available statistical data make 
it difficult to measure the region's annual trade on a strict-
ly comparable basis,' it is nonetheless well known that only 
two primary agricultural crops—coffee and bananas— 
stand far ahead of all other Central American exports. 
For example, even after making allowance for statistical 
shortcomings, it can be estimated that during most of the 
post-war period coffee and bananas have tended to provide 
about 80 per cent of the region's aggregate exports. In 
recent years their combined share has declined somewhat, 
but it was still in excess of 70 per cent by 1958 (see 
Among the remaining products, the proportion repre-
sented by cacao has remained virtually stagnant at be-
tween 1 and 2 per cent. Cotton, on the other hand, which 
was of negligible importance up to 1948, has subsequent-
ly followed an extremely dynamic growth trend and today 
accounts for about 10 per cent of the total. All the re-
maining exports—encompassing a wide variety of lower-
valued items, mainly of agricultural origin, but including 
Table 14 
POST-WAR TRENDS IN POPULATION, EXPORTS AND PER 
CAPITA EXPORTS:» CENTRAL AMERICA COMPARED WITH 






Population 7.4 10.2 37.8 
Exports 173 451 160.7 
Per capita exports . . . 23.4 44.2 88.8 
Rest of Latin America 
Population 136.7 178.1 30.2 
Exports 5 745 7 766 35.0 
Per capita exports . . . 42.0 43.6 3.8 
SOURCE: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, October 
1959; and International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, selected issues. 
• Population in millions of persons; exports f.o.b. in millions of 
current dollars; per capita exports in dollars per person per year. 
' See the note on banana valuation adjustments in the statis-
tical annex, tables II and V. 
some metals and a few light manufactures—have tended 
to provide between 15 and 20 per cent. 
At first glance, table 5 would appear to indicate that 
Central America has made healthy strides in broadening 
the range of its exports during the post-war period. Two 
decades ago, for instance, items other than coffee and 
bananas accounted for only 14 per cent of Central Ameri-
ca's total exports whereas in 1958 they had risen to 28 per 
cent, i.e. doubling in relative importance. Despite this en-
couraging trend, however, four cautionary points should 
be kept in mind. First of all, whereas the ratio of coffee 
to total exports in the late 1930's was approximately 40 
per cent, the proportion steadily increased to the stage 
where it has recently been within the range of 55 to 60 per 
cent. The danger of relying upon a single primary com-
modity for more than half of the region's export trade is 
self-evident, especially for a product whose price instability 
has been so clearly demonstrated since 1945 and whose in-
ternational market prospects are now so seriously threatened 
by a major problem of global oversupply. Secondly, al-
though the share of bananas has fallen from 46 per cent at 
the end of the inter-war period to 17 to 26 per cent in recent 
years, it is still the region's second largest export item, and 
it must be remembered that exchange earnings generated 
by this fruit do not necessarily represent identical increases 
Table 5 
CENTRAL AMERICA: BROAD BREAK-DOWN OF EXPORTS BY COMMODITIES 




Total Cotton Balance 
40 46 14 — 14 
39 40 21 1 20 
55 26 19 4 15 





SOURCE: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics and Direction of International 
Trade, selected issues. 
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in Central America's access to overseas resources.® Thirdly, 
among all the exports, other than coffee and bananas, an-
other single commodity—cotton—occupies an outstanding 
position. As stated earlier, cotton has fo lowed an especially 
dynamic growth trend over the past decade. But it is uncer-
tain whether this can be expected to continue at a compara-
bly favourable pace over the foreseeable future, given both 
the softening of world cotton prices that has taken place 
over the past few years in the face of large-scale exports 
from other traditional producers, and the continued in-
roads being made by competing synthetics. Finally, the 
increased degree of commodity diversification mentioned 
for the region as a whole masks the commodity trends 
that have been taking place on a country-by-country basis. 
It might be pointed out that in several countries of the 
region the historically rigid commodity pattern has chan-
ged only to an insignificant extent during the past two 
decades. 
Given all these circumstances, the fact remains that 
coffee and bananas continue to constitute a disproportionate 
share within Central America's export trade, and hence the 
region's over-all balance of payments moves fundamen-
tally in response to international price and volume deve-
lopments affecting only these two commodities. In short, 
despite the post-war improvement in its product range. 
Central America to all intents and purposes still retains 
the characteristics of an export economy essentially based 
on two commodities. 
3. CHANGES IN THE RATES OF EXPORT GROWTH 
BEFORE AND AFTER 1954 
The third important characteristic is the disparate growth 
phases that have taken place since the war in the trade 
under discussion. Reference has already been made to 
the very substantial expansion that took place in Central 
America's exports during the post-war period considered 
as a whole. What is significant, however, is the fact that 
this over-all growth trend was not uniformly sustained. 
On the contrary, whereas Central American export values 
showed an average annual rate of increase that was close 
to 13 per cent between 1947 and 1954, the corresponding 
rise was only 2.7 per cent from 1955 to 1958. 
These sharply divergent rates of growth are in turn 
directly attributable to the exceptionally narrow commo-
dity range. Since coffee and bananas comprise such a 
large proportion of Central America's foreign trade, this 
trade by definition reflects many of the price and volume 
changes taking place in international markets for these 
two products. 
In the case of coffee, for example, it has clearly been 
the volatility of world prices rather than of volume that 
has had the major impact on Central American export 
returns. In fact, for Central America, as for the world as 
a whole, coffee exports in terms of volume have increased 
at a faster annual rate since 1954 than in the earlier post-
war years. Prices, conversely, have followed a contrary 
and far more unstable course. During the first ten post-
war years, for instance, there was such a heavy pressure 
of world demand upon supplies that, despite the access to 
existing coffee stocks, world prices" spiralled rapidly, 
though sporadically, from 12 cents per pound in 1945 to 
almost 80 cents in 1954—by far the highest level ever 
recorded in the history of the world coffee trade. Subse-
quently a complete reversal took place in this pattern of 
erratic but persistent price increases. As world exportable 
production approached, equalled and then expanded far 
in excess of exports,^" prices moved in a compensatory 
manner. By 1955, they had ceased their previously unin-
terrupted climb and remained more or less stable for 
a few years. In the face of the heaviest stock accumula-
tions since the 1930's, prices broke ^sharply in 1957 and 
by 1959 they had fallen to as low as 36 cents per pound.' 
In less than eighteen months coffee exporters had witnessed 
a price decline of over 40 per cent, and the cycle had 
swung around to the point where international coffee 
prices were back to the level of almost a full decade 
earlier. 
Thus the year 1954 marked a dividing line between the 
initial post-war decade of exceptionally rapid growth in 
world coffee prices and the second phase when fliey level-
led off and then declined abruptly. Such developments 
inevitably affected the value of Central America's rela-
tively small coffee export trade. When the latter rose from 
2.2 million bags in 1946 to 2.8 million in 1954, for in-
stance, this expansion was transformed into a much more 
substantial growth in value because of the spiralling price 
movements just described. Conversely, although Central 
America's exports rose subsequently at an even faster pace 
to 4.1 million bags by 1958, this volume increase was 
offset to a considerable degree by the lower price level 
characteristic of recent years. 
In the case of bananas,, and in direct contrast to coffee, 
volume rather than price has been the key variable deter-
mining changes in world export values since the end of 
the war. Indeed, if price movements in the world's largest • 
banana consuming market—the United States—are indi-
cative of those in the other main importing regions, a re-
latively steady price pattern has characterized much of 
the post-war period. The quantity of banana exports has 
not, however, rnoved in an identical manner. On the 
contrary, and beginning from the, very depressed level 
to which international banana trade had fallen as a result 
of disrupted wartime shipping facilities, it rose rapidly 
for approximately a decade: from 70 million stems in 
1946 to 135.4 million by 1954. During the next few years 
world banana exports moved only sluggishly, recupera-
ting again in 1957, and especially in 1958, to 160 million 
by the latter year. It should, of course, be added that 
Central American banana exports have not always paral-
leled the volume changes recorded for the world as a 
whole. For one thing, the latter were considerably influen-
' As has been pointed out in various studies, the value of 
banana exports ultimately accruing as foreign exchange to indi-
vidual Central American countries depends upon the offsetting 
outflows needed to service the foreign investments that control 
Central America's banana industry. See United States Department 
of Commerce, Investment in Central America, December 1956, 
p. 117. 
° Spot quotations for Santos 4 in New York are used here' as 
being indicative of price trends in the main world coffee mar-
kets. 
" Between the crop years 1954/55 and 1959/60, world expor-
table production rose from 34 million. to approximately 58 mil-
lion bags, From the calendar year 1955 up to and including 1959, 
world trade rose from 34 million to an estimated 38 million bags. 
As a result of these different growth rates, world stocks have 
climbed from 14 million bags in the marketing year 1954/55 to 
almost 40 million at present. Coffee inventories at the end of the 
Second World War amounted to less than 20 million bags. 
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ced by the rapid emergence of some new producing areas 
shortly after the war. Again, various supply problems 
mainly resulting from disease, storm damage, and at times 
from labour disputes as well) have caused Central Ame-
rican banana exports to fluctuate quite substantially du-
ring certain years. None the less the fact remains that 
no net growth in volume has been recorded in banana 
exports from Central America during the past half decade: 
as late as 1958 Central America had still not been able 
to exceed its 1953 export level of 43 million stems. 
Thus, a second factor explaining the pause in the rate 
of Central America's total export growth after 1954 lies 
in the recent stagnation in the volume of banana exports. 
This circumstance, together with the more dramatic in-
stability of post-war coffee prices, indicates how develop-
ments in these two commodities can affect Central Ame-
rica's ability to achieve a higher level of foreign exchange 
earnings. The point that merits repeated attention—espe-
cially at this critical stage of the post-war period for 
primary exporting countries generally—is that such a 
high degree of external sensitivity must be reduced during 
the years to come. Otherwise, given the serious oversupply 
disequilibrium currently depressing world coffee prices 
and the modest increases in volume anticipated for world 
banana exports, a third post-war phase might well begin 
in which Central America's export values would follow 
a growth trend even slower than the 2.7 per cent recorded 
between 1955 and 1958. Indeed, judging from what has 
already taken place from 1957 to 1958, the possibility 
of a declining trend cannot now be dismissed. 
4. CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF CENTRAL 
AMERICA'S PRINCIPAL EXPORT MARKETS 
The final important point regarding Central America's 
post-war trade in its international setting relates to recent 
shifts in the area destination of its exports. 
The United States and Western Europe have historically 
been the predominant foreign outlets for Central America's 
produce, absorbing almost all of its total exports during 
the past half century. X^o developments that have taken 
place since the Second World War may, however, be 
noted from table 6. The first is the fact that these two 
markets have declined somewhat in relative importance 
over the past twenty years. In 1937-38, for instance, their 
combined share of Central America's foreign trade was 
93 per cent, whereas by 1957-58 it had shrunk to 84 per 
cent. This favourable, although admittedly small, trend 
towards a wider degree of geographic diversification has 
in turn resulted from an expansion in the Central Ameri-
can countries' trade with each other and with Japan. 
Japan was of negligible importance as a customer in 
1937-38, whereas its share in trade had increased to 
almost 5 per cent by 1957-58, mainly as a result of the 
dynamic post-war developments in Central American ex-
ports of raw cotton. Intra-Central American trade has also 
followed an upward trend over the past two decades 
—from about 1 per cent in 1937-38 to 5 per cent at 
present—owing to growing traffic in many items, includ-
ing livestock and meat, grains, oils and fats, lumber and 
sugar, and some simple manufactures. Conversely, Central 
American exports to other regions of the world (mainly 
other Latin American countries and Canada) accounted 
for approximately 6 per cent of the total in 1937-38 and 
1957-58. 
The second development involves the shift over time 
in relative positions of the United States and Western 
Europe. Two decades ago, the United States was taking 
63 per cent of all Central American exports and Western 
Europe around 30 per cent. During the Second World 
War, however, the Atlantic blockade and the accessibility 
of the United States served to increase trade within the 
western hemisphere to a marked extent. By the end of the 
war the United States had gained in importance and 
Europe had virtually disappeared as a customer of Central 
America; even as late as 1948, for instance, the respective 
shares for the United States and Western Europe were 
81 and 6 per cent. During the subsequent decade, however, 
a reverse movement has been steadily coming into promi-
nence. By 1957-58 the respective proportions were 52 and 
32 per cent. Within Western Europe, the United Kingdom 
and members of the European Economic Community 
(especially the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Netherlands) have been Central America's principal cus-
tomers, cotton, bananas and especially coffee^^ being the 
main items shipped. 
Thus Central America has to a modest degree broad-
ened the range of its export commodities and of areas of 
destination during the post-war period. Whether this dual 
^^  The Federal Republic of Germany has been taking 15-20 per 
cent of Central America's total coffee exports in recent years, and 
the Netherlands as much as 10 per cent (see Katherine Wylie, 
"Central America as a market and coinpetitor for United States 
agriculture", United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign, 
Agriculture Report, December 1959). 
Table 6 
CENTRAL AMERICA: PRINCIPAL EXPORT MARKETS 
(Percentage of total values) 









1937-38 average 63 30 — 1 6 
1948 6 — 5 8 
1953 16 1 3 9 
1957-58 average . . 52 32 5 5 6 
SOURCE: United Nations, Direction of International Trade; and International Monetary Fund, In-
ternational Financial Statistics, selected issues. 
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and desirable trend will continue into the future would 
be a most worthwhile topic for study in itself. For ex-
ample, can Central America maintain access to the Japa-
nese market when faced with growing competition from 
other traditional cotton producers and from synthetic 
fibres what effect will the preferential treatment offer-
ed by members of the European Common Market ,to 
their associated overseas territories have on Central Ameri-
can tropical exports to Western Europe and—a ques-
See "Recent developments and prospects in trade between Latin 
America and Japan", in Economic Bulletin for Latin America. 
Vol., II, No. 1 (Santiap, Chile, February 1957) pp. 68 et seq. 
See "Latin America's trade with the Common Market coun-
tries of Europe", in Economic Bulletin for Latin America. Vol. Il l , 
No. 1 (Santiago, Chile, March 1958) pp. 9 et seq. 
tion of especial importance—how great will be the future 
stimuli provided by the Central American Economic In-
tegration Programme for the expansion of intra-regional 
trade At all events, the fact remains that the United 
States has long been the largest single outlet for Central 
American goods and, despite its recently declining share, 
it still provides the market for over half of the region's 
entire trade. This being the case, the United States market 
is discussed in the following section, primarily in con-
nexion with post-war trends in the quantities, prices and 
relative shares of Central American coifee, banana and re-
sidual exports to that market. 
See Central American Economic Integration: development 
and prospects (E/CN.12/422) United Nations publication, Sales 
No. 56.ILG.4, passim. 
III. SOME DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES: 1946-1958 
1. TRENDS IN THE AGGREGATE SERIES 
(a) Values 
Like its sales to the world as a whole. Central America's 
exports to the United States have grown very substantially 
since the end of the Second World War. From 1946 to 
1958, for example, the value of United States imports 
from that region followed a growth trend that was almost 
exactly the same as that recorded for United States im-
ports as a whole, even though manufactures have been 
the most dynamic components of total United States im-
ports and Central America is almost solely a supplier of 
unprocessed foodstuffs.^® Moreover, in comparison with 
other regions in whose commodity composition primary 
commodities are also predominante, it is worth mentioning 
that United States imports from Central America grew by 
about 8.1 per cent, compounded annually between 1946 
and 1958, whereas from the rest of Latin America and 
from Africa the annual rates were 5.8 and 5.2 per cent 
respectively (see figure I ) . 
When examining growth trends over selected periods, one 
important difference will be noted in the respective move-
ments of Central American exports to the world and to the 
United States. As will be remembered, the former rose with-
out interruption from the end of the war to 1957. Converse-
ly, in the case of the United States market. Central Ameri-
ca's peak level of exports was reached several year earlier 
—in 1953—after which an irregular downward trend 
prevailed. Thus, starting from 102 million dollars in 
1946, United States imports from Central America rose 
rapidly until by 1953 they had reached 275 million 
dollars, their highest total in the post-war period. On the 
other hand, during the succeeding years they fell back to 
a lower level between approximately 240 million and 260 
million dollars. By 1958 they amounted to 259 million 
dollars, a level which had been surpassed as far back as 
1951. 
noticeably ascendant until about 1954, the price movements 
being far more intense than those of the quantities ship-
ped; thus, from 1946 to 1953 the quantum rose by less 
than one third, whereas unit values increased two and a 
half times between 1946 and 1954. Thanks to the com-
bined effect of a rising volume and an extremely buoyant 
price trend, Central American export values experienced 
a very pronounced rise that lasted almost a full decade. 
Since then, however, quite a different sequence of events 
has been taking place. Because of a fall both in volume 
and in unit values, export earnings have entered upon a 
second post-war phase in which tiey have not been able 
to regain the momentum that was their major character-
istic during the preceding decade. 
Moreover, Central American import prices from the 
United States have been climbing steadily since the end 
of the Second World War (see again table 7 and figure 
III) . This situation, together with the decline in export 
prices since 1954, has caused the region's terms of trade 
with the United States to deteriorate considerably in re-
cent years. In turn, since Central America's capacity to 
import is primarily generated by its quantum of exports 
times the terms of trade, it will b© seen that this capacity 
followed three clearly defined post-war stages: rising rap-
idly from 1946 to 1950, remaining at a high and stable 
level between 1950 and 1954, and declining steadily from 
1954 to 1958. Thus, the key point that emerges from 
an examination of figures II and III is simply this: given 
the divergent movements recorded in Central America's 
volume and unit values, no net growth has taken place in 
the value of its exports to, or in its capacity to import 
from, the United States for a large part of the post-war 
period. And, what is of even greater importance, both 
of the latter series have been falling during the past half 
decade. 
2. COMMODITY TRENDS 
(b) Quantum, unit values and the capacity to import 
Central America's volume and unit value indices are 
shown in table 7 and figure II. Both of these indices were 
" From 1946 to 1958, total United States imports by broad 
economic categories showed the following value percentage in-
creases: raw materials (61) , unprocessed foodstuffs (137), semi-
It is readily apparent that the aggregate trends in the 
quantum and prices have resulted primarily from develop-
ments in United States imports of Central American coffee 
and bananas. Coffee has grown so steadily in importance 
manufactures (186), manufactured foodstuffs and beverages (201), 
and finished manufactures (362). 
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FIGURE I 
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Table 7 
CENTRAL AMERICA: DETERMINANTS OF THE CAPACITY TO IMPORT FROM THE 
UNITED STATES 
(Index: 1954 = 100) 
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1946 39 92 42 79 53 49 
1947 62 116 53 93 57 66 
1948 69 119 58 99 59 70 
1949 72 116 62 92 67 78 
1950 91 123 74 90 82 101 
1951 103 121 85 101 84 102 
1952 101 118 86 101 85 100 
1953 105 122 86 102 84 102 
1954 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1955 95 103 93 101 92 95 
1956 93 96 97 106 92 88 
1957 99 103 96 110 87 90 
1958 98 114 86 111 77 88 
SOURCES: Columns ( A ) , (B) , and ( C ) : Calculated by ECLA on the basis of data provided by the 
United States Department of Commerce. Column ( D ) : Taken from the unit ralue index of 
United States exports to Latin America, as published in the United States Department of 
Commerce, /ForW Trade Information Service, "Statistical Reports", selected issues. 
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FIGURE III 
DETERMINANTS OF CENTRAL AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO 
IMPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES 
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^ As measured by multiplying the quantum of Central American 
exports to the United States by its terms of trade with that 
country. 
that it alone accounted for 55 per cent of total United States 
imports from Central America during the post-war period 
(see table 8 ) . Bananas, while declining in relative terms 
over this period, average almost 34 per cent. Taken to-
gether, therefore, these two main export crops have consis-
tently comprised the great bulk of all Central American 
produce moving to the United States. As for other exports, 
their combined share has averaged only about 11 per 
cent of the total. In addition to being small, these residual 
products have fallen in relative importance: f r o m ' l ó per 
cent of the total in 1946 to 13 per cent in 1958. Thus, 
whereas it was shown in section II, sub-section 2, that 
some modest improvement took place in the post-war com-
modity diversification of Central America's exports to the 
world as a whole, the contrary has been true so far as its 
exports to the United States were concerned. In short, the 
primacy of coffee and bananas and the structural problems 
of a very narrow commodity base have been much more 
sharply evident in the flow of Central American goods 
to the United States than to the rest of the world since 
1946. 
(a) Co#ee 
The high and growing proportion of coffee in United 
States imports from Central America has been perhaps 
the most important single post-war commodity develop-
ment in the trade under examination. Firstly, unlike any 
other commercial crop, coffee is shipped to the United 
States from every republic in Central America. Secondly, 
coffee's share in this trade has risen from only 40 per 
cent in 1946 to as high as 65 per cent in certain years 
until, as just mentioned, it alone accounted for more than 
half of the total for the entire post-war period. In this 
context it is interesting to note that, based upon the volume 
of United States coffee imported from Central America in 
1958, each decline of 1 cent per pound would represent 
a three million dollar decline in dollar earnings. Expressed 
in another way, if the average price received by Central 
American coffee exporters in 1954 had prevailed in 1958, 
their sales to the United States would have exceeded the 
1958 level by 50 million dollars. As a point of comparison, 
the latter sum is almost exactly equal to all the loan 
disbursements made by the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development in Central America during the 
entire period 1954-58. 
Given its predominance, coffee is thus the most influen-
tial single commodity in the aggregate value, quantum, 
and price indices of United States imports from Central 
America. From figure IV it will be noted that the coffee 
quantum moved upwards with minor interruptions from 
the end of the war until 1953, subsequently returning irre-
gularly to a lower level. From a 279 million pound 
average during 1946-49, United States imports of Central 
American coffee rose to 314 million pounds in 1950-54, 
and then fell back again to the oiiginal 279 million level 
between 1955 and 1958 (see table 9 ) . This recent decline 
has been partly due to a shift by Central America to 
European markets. In part, too, it reflects the fall in total 
United States coffee imports after the initial post-war 
period when higher prices and various coffee-extender 
practices caused United States per capita consumption to 
decline from 18.2 pounds in 1947-49 to 15.7 pounds in 
Table 8 
BROAD BREAK-DOWN OF UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA, 
BY COMMODITIES 
{Values in million of dollars) 
Average 
for period 
Total Coffee Rnnnnna Rfi.tiAij.nl it.pm.ft 
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SOURCE: Annex, table II. 
1956-58.^« And, closely linked to the preceding point, it 
, also reflects the growing competition from Africa, whose 
coffee exports to the United States rose almost sevenfold 
between 1946-49 and 1955-58, while those from Central 
America remained stationary and those from the rest of 
Latin America declined both absolutely and relatively. 
The impact of comparative prices upon United States 
imports of mild as compared with the harsher tasting 
Robusta coffees might be illustrated at this point by 
referring to post-war trends in Central American and 
African shipments to the United States. As the traditional 
price differential widens between these two coffee qualities, 
the United States coffee manufacturers continue using the 
milder {suave) grades to satisfy the United States prefer-
ence for a sweet-tasting ground coffee, but resort on a 
steadily increasing scale to the cheaper Robustas so that 
the final retail price for regular vacuum and bag-packed 
coffee can be kept from exceeding some predetermined 
level. Simultaneously, as this differential increases, the 
manufacture of solubles is correspondingly boosted, a 
process in which the stronger-tasting coffees are used far 
more than the müds. The impact of such developments 
was especially evident between the periods 1950-54 and 
1955-58, when the gap between United States import prices 
United States Department of Agriculture, National Food Situ-
ation, NFS-90, 5 November 1959, table 3. Expressed in terms of 
green bean equivalent. 
for Central American and African coffees increased sub-
stantially.^^ During these two periods, the volume of United 
States imports from Central America fell, whereas the 
volume from Africa expanded substantially (see table 10). 
Two main points stand out from an examination of the 
quatum and unit values recorded for Central America's 
post-war coffee shipments to the United States. Firstly, 
Central America's relative position within that market re-
mained virtually unchanged during the post-war period 
as a whole, i.e. it provided 10 per cent of the total United 
States import volume in 1946-49 and 10 per cent of almost 
exactly the same volume in 1955-58. Thus, while African 
competition took place mainly at the expense of other 
Latin American countries, it also contributed to the failure 
of Central America's quantum to growth between these 
same two periods. Secondly, price movements have typi-
cally been the main cause of changes in the value of Cen-
tral America's cofi"ee sales, and coffee in turn has by 
itself accounted for a very substantial and growing share 
of Central America's aggregate exports' to the United 
States. This point is of particular importance to Central 
America in that its total earnings of United States dollars 
depend so fundamentally upon supply, demand and price 
In 1950-54, United States import unit values for Central 
American and African coffees averaged 49.3 cents per pound res-
pectively. In 1955-58 the respective averages vfere 53.1 and 39.1 
cents per pound. 
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FIGURE IV 
INDICES OF CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
(Index: 1954 = 100) 
NATDRAL SCALE 
— T O T A L C E N T R A L A M E R I C A N E X P O R T S TO THE UN ITED S T A T E S 
— C E N T R A L AMER ICAN EXPORTS OF COFFEE TO THE UNITED S T A T E S 
— C E N T R A L A M E R I C A N EXPORTS OF B A N A N A S TO THE UN ITED S T A T E S 
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Table 9 






















194649 . . . 69 279 24.4 42 106 40 
1950-54 . . . . 154 314 49.3 95 119 80 
1955-58 . . . . 147 279 53.1 91 106 87 • 
SOURCE: Annex, table III. 
developments in world cofifee markets; developments which 
Central America's marginal producers, taken singly or as 
a group, have relatively little power to influence. Unless 
therefore Central America's commodity composition chan-
ges in the future from what it has been since the end of 
the Second World War, the value of its exports to the 
United States must continue to be exceptionally vulnerable 
to international fluctuations in the price of this beverage. 
(b ) Bananas 
Post-war trends in United States imports of Central 
American bananas have differed from those of coffee in 
two main respects. First of all, whereas the coffee volume 
remained stagnant between 1946-49 and 1955-58, the 
banana volume fell by approximately 20 per cent over 
these same intervals.(see table I I ) . Indeed, after an initial 
post-war increase that lasted only two years, the banana 
quantum fell so steadily and substantially that by 1955 it 
was almost one third below the level of 1948 (see again 
figure I V ) . Moreover despite the partial recovery that 
has been under way in Central American banana exports 
to the United States in recent years, the 1958 volume was 
almost exactly the samé as it had been at the end of the 
Second World War. 
This declining quantum trend has not been limited 
solely to Central America (see table 12). On the contrary, 
it has also been generally characteristic of the rest of 
Latin America excluding Ecuador. In one respect, this 
phenomenon has been a result of the post-war shift on 
the part of United States consumers away from fresh 
fruits towards tinned and especially frozen fruits and 
juices. For example, between 1947-49 and 1956-58, United 
States per capita consumption of bananas fell by 10 per 
cent and that of all other fresh fruits fell by 30 per cent, 
whereas consumption of processed fruits and juices rose 
by 15 per cent on a per capita basis.^ ® What is of concern 
to Central America is the fact that its volume has declined 
so substantially in the face of a moderate increase in the 
total United States import volume, i.e. whereas it provided 
61 per cent of the total volume in 1946-49 its share was 
only 42 per cent in 1955-58.^® 
As was mentioned in section II, this decline in Central 
America's relative importance is attributable to a change 
in the destination of its produce away from the United 
States, and also to various domestic supply problems. At 
the same time, the exceptionally rapid growth of Ecua-
dorean sales to the United States has also seriously affected 
Central American exports. One problem confronting all 
banana producers is the fact that the post-war growth in 
total United States imports has been stunted because of a 
decline in per capita consumption. For Central America 
there is the added problem that it has not even been able 
to maintain a stable share of the available market, as it 
had at least been able to do in the case of coffee. 
The second difference between bananas and coffee re-
lates to movements in their respective prices. Not only 
have coffee prices been far more volatile over short 
periods, but in addition they have moved through a clearly 
defined post-war cycle (rising until 1954 and falling there-
after), whereas the banana trend has been almost consis-
tently upwards. Between 1946 and 1950, for instance, 
banana import prices rose from approximately 3 to 5 cents 
)er pound. Between 1950 and 1954, they remained virtual-
y unchanged, and after 1954, when coffee prices entered 
on their abrupt decline, banana prices continued showing 
United States Department of Apiculture, Agricultural Mar-
keting Service, National Fruit Situation, August 1959, p. 23. 
As pointed out in "The international banana market—its 
evolution and prospects", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
Vol. I l l No. 2 (Santiago, Chile, October 1958), p. 31, this decline 
would be moderated if Panama's banana exports were included in 
the Central American totals. 
Table 10 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF GREEN COFFEE FROM SELECTED AREAS 
(Volumes in millions of pounds) 
Average 
period 
From all areas From Central America 
From rest of 
Latin America From Africa 
Volume (%) Volume (%) Volume (%) Volume (%) 
1946-49 . . . . 2 730 (100) 279 (10) 2 392 (87) 53 ( 2 ) 
1950-54 . . . . 2 572 (100) 314 (12) 2 089 (81) 159 ( 6) 
1955-58 . . . . 2 711 (100) 279 (10) 2 055 (76) 359 (13) 
SOURCE: Annex, table IV. 
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. Table 11 





















1946-49 69 1792 3.8 93 125 74 
1950-54 84 1666 5.0 113 116 97 
1955-58 76 1407 5.4 102 98 104 
SOURCE: Annex, table V. 
a modest climb. As has been given detailed attention in 
other studies,''" this post-war rise in Central American 
banana prices appears to have reflected a conscious pricing 
policy, feasible when a few large producer-exporter com-
panies maintain close corporate ties with those predomi-
nating in the importing and distribution sectors. Regardless 
of this institutional influence, however, the pattern of 
continuously rising prices has served to offset the post-war 
decline in the quantum, i.e., although the latter fell by 20 
per cent from 1946-49 to 1955-58, the value nonetheless 
rose by 10 per cent. To this extent, therefore, the role 
played by banana prices has differed from that of coffee, 
whose price movements have typically served to accentuate 
the cyclical stages of growth and decline in coffee export 
values. 
To review only a few of the points covered, it has been 
shown that coffee and bananas together provided the 
overwhelming share of total United States imports from 
Central America during the post-war period. It has also 
been shown that prices—primarily of coffee—have been 
more important than quantum in determining the value of 
such imports. And finally, although rising prices enabled 
Central American export values to increase very substan-
tially during much of the period under review, a situa-
tion has recently developed in which coffee prices have 
deteriorated sharply and in which the coffee and banana 
quantums have been losing ground in the United States 
market, both absolutely and relative to other competing 
suppliers. These findings are of considerable importance 
for Central America's future if the following assumptions 
can be made: (a) that the United States will remain one 
of Central America's principal markets; (b) that exports 
" Ibid., pp. 14, 26 and 27. 
will continue acting as a leading sector in setting the 
pace of general economic activity in Central America; 
and (c ) that recent developments adversely affecting the 
quantum, unit value and competitive status of Central 
America's coffee and banana shipments of the United 
States not yet run their full course. Given a continuation 
of these three circumstances, it is clear that Central 
America's external and hence its internal growth prospects 
will reach a critical post-war juncture. 
Unfortunately, the third assumption seems to have con-
siderable validity at this time. According to recent ECLA 
studies regarding the short-term prospects facing United 
States banana imports, for example, it was concluded 
that their volume will not increase by much more than 
the rate of population growth and that prices will move 
in a more or less identical manner.''^ Central America's 
ability to maintain even this modest degree of growth will 
depen upon the future incidence of Panama and Sigatoka 
diseases, climatic conditions, and the continued competi-
tion from Ecuador. As for coffee, the situation seems even 
bleaker. On the one hand, there is little reason to anti-
cipate more than a 2-4 per cent increase in the volume 
of total United States coffee imports in the near future: 
indeed, the upper limit may well be unduly optimistic.®" 
Ibid., pp. 27-28, and The Economic Development of Panama 
(E/CN.12/494), pp. 239-242. 
" See the projections published in El Desarrollo Económico de 
El Salvador (E/CN.12/495/Rev.l), op. cit., pp. 79-80; FAO, 
Coffee, Commodity Bulletin No. 31, August 1959, pp. 65-67; and 
United "States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Economics 
Research; Coffee Consumption in the United States, July 1958. It 
should be noted, moreover, that none of these projections makes 
allowance for the possibility, however remote, of natural coffee 
being displaced in part or in whole by synthetic flavour compounds 
(see Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Development and their poten-
Table 12 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF BANANAS FROM SELECTED AREAS 
(Volumes in millions of pounds) 
Average 
period 
From all areas From Central America From rest of Latin America 
Ecuador Balance 
Volume (%) Volume (%) Volume (%) Volume (%) 
1946-49 . . . . 2 921 (100) 1792 (61) 133 ( 5) 966 (34) 
1950-54 . . . . 3341 (100) 1665 (50) 683 (20) 993 (30) 
1955-58 . . . . 3318 (100) 1407 (42) 1052 (32) 859 (26) 
SOURCE: Annex, table VI. 
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On the other hand, confronted by the highest level of 
world coflfee stocks since the late 1930's, and with an 
excess of world exportable production over exports that 
amounted to some 20 million bags in the past crop year 
alone and which still shows nQ„.signs of abating, it is 
difficuh to expect that coffee prices will rally very much 
from their present depressed level for some time to come. 
And, as must be remembered, world coffee prices by late 
1959 had relumed to their level of a full decade ago. 
Added to these circumstances, there is the further pro-
blem for Central America constituted by the strong and 
persistent pressure of competition from Africa. In short, 
whereas coffee and bananas as a group were by far the 
principal contributors to the rapid growth in the value 
of Central American sales to the United States for so 
many post-war years, a phase now seems under way in 
which they could well be the source of a stagnant or a 
declining export trend. The next section will therefore deal 
with the remaining United States imports from Central 
America, with a view to investigating what promise they 
might hold of offsetting the weaknesses expected in these 
two traditional export commodities. 
(c) "ResiduaV commodities 
United States "residual" imports (i.e. excluding coffee 
and bananas) from Central America comprise a variety 
of items of which the majority are of agricultural origin 
(see table 13). Their individual levels have been typically 
very small in any given year, a circumstance that in turn 
enables rélatively minor shifts in supply or demand to 
produce very sharp percentage changes in their totals. 
Given the variability in their volume and values, it is 
difficult to envisage what their combined totals might be 
in the future. Generally speaking, however, it would ap-
pear that these items as a group open up a prospect of 
modest but not significant growth during the next few 
years. 
In 1946, Central America's "residual" exports to the 
United States amounted to 16.6 million dollars. During 
the ensuing years they averaged approximately 25 million 
dollars annually, reaching their peak post-war levels of 
35-36 million dollars in 1957-58. None the less, their 
tial impact on foreign Policy Problems of the United 5iaies, . Study-
No. 2, prepared at the request of the United States Senate, Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, by the Stanford Research Institute, 
September 1959). 
growth has been insufficient to broaden the composition 
of Central America's exports to -the United States. On 
the contrary, as mentioned previously, these items in the 
aggregate provided a smaller proportion of such trade in 
1958 (13.4 per cent) than they had in 1946 (16.2 per 
cent). As a further indication of this lack of commodity 
diversification, it will be noted that, while total United, 
States imports from Central America rose by two and a 
half times from 1946 to 1958, only four "residual" items, 
taken separately, accounted for 1 per cent or more of this 
total at both the beginning and end of the post-war 
period.^^ In the following sections, some post-war develop-
ments in Central American sales of these items to the 
United States will be examined. For purposes of con-
venience, they have been arbitrarily divided into two broad 
categories. The first comprises soluble coffee, shrimps, beef 
and timber, all of which have characteristics which place 
thém in a special position. The second covers all other 
commodities. 
' ' ' In 1946, silver, abaca, chicle, and citronella oil each repre-
sented 1 per cent or more of total United States imports from 
Central America. In 1958, only silver, abaca, cacao beans and 
soluble coffee represented over 1 per cent of total trade. 
T^ble 13 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF RESIDUAL ITEMS FROM 
CENTRAL AMERICA IN SELECTED POST-WAR YEARS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Product 1946 1950 1954 1958 
Total. 16^6 205 26^ 2 316 
Silver 2.8 3.6 4.5 3.1 
Cacao beans 0.9 1.4 6.5 3.8 
Abaca fibre 1.5 4.0 2.6 2.9 
Sesame seed 0.4 0.9 2.5 2.3 
Sugar 0.6 1.0 2.0 
Soluble coffee 6.3 
Seafood 0.4 1.4 0.1 1.8 
Lead ore 0.7 0.7 1.6 
Zinc ore 0.2 1.1 
Lumber 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 
Chicle 3.0 0.8 0.9 1.3 
Lemon grass oil . . . 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
Citronella oil 1.5 1.0 0.1 0.4 
Miscellaneous . . . . 5.0 4.6 5.2 5.6 
SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, FT Reports 110 
and 120. Silver imports in ore and base bullion obtained from 
Department of Commerce, FT Report 2402. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES AS A MARKET FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMODITIES 
1. SOLUBLE COFFEE 
Wide scale consumption of soluble coffee in the major 
coffee-drinking regions of the world is a fairly recent 
phenomena. Small quantities had been produced and sold 
prior to the Second World War, but only during the past 
decade has the use of solubles, and other powders, essences 
or equivalent instant substitutes risen to levels of consider-
able magnitude. Consumption increases have been par-
ticularly notable in the United States, Cánada and some 
European countries,^^ and in the following sections atten-
In 1959, one third of Canada's coffee consumption was esti-
mated to have been in soluble form. For Europe as a whole, the 
proportion was probably close to 5 per cent, although in the ' 
specific cases of the United Kingdom and Switzerland the ratios 
have been placed at 62 and 15 per cent respectively (see Pan 
tion is limited solely to developments within the large and 
important United States market. 
Three basic developments may be singled out for special 
mention in describing the demand characteristics of the 
United States instant coffee sector during the recent past. 
(a) The first such development relates to the pheno-
menal growth in the consumption of solubles that has taken 
place since 1950. This in turn can be illustrated in two 
ways. On the one hand, household purchases of soluble 
coffee, in representative volume units, have increased 
almost fivefold in less than a decade (see table 14). 
Thus, since householders currently account for about three 
fourths of all United States coffee consumption, and since 
more than 90 per cent of all United States instant coffee 
American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics 1959, No. 23, 
p. 14) . 
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Table 14 
UNITED STATES: NUMBER OF TWO-OUNCE EQUIVALENT UNITS" OF SOLUBLE 
COFFEE PURCHASED ANNUALLY BY HOUSEHOLDS, 1951-59 
(Millions of equivalent units) 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Number 212 267 358 519 608 720 869 
Percentage 
increase over 
preceding year . 26 34 45 17 18 21 
924 976 
SOURCE: Market Research Corporation of America, as published in Pan American Coffee Bureau, 
Anual Coffee Statistics 1959, No. 23, p. 13. 
' The two-ounce equivalent unit has been used since it was formerly the most common unit 
of sale. 
is consumed in the home, this dynamic trehd can be 
considered as indicative of demand developments in the 
United States soluble coffee sector generally. Similarly, 
table 15 gives comparative growth rates in aggregate sup-
plies available from domestic roastings of green coffee, 
for solubles and for all other forms, since 1954 (the first 
year in which such data have been tabulated). From 
that table it will be observed that from 1954 to 1959 
soluble roastings have increased at the rate of 12.8 per 
cent, compounded annually, or more than four times faster 
than the 2.9 per cent rate recorded for regular coffee. 
As a result, solubles now account for over 17 per cent 
of all United States domestic production of roasted coffees, 
whereas approximately a decade ago the share of solubles 
was only 11.6 per cent. 
(b) The second major development relates to the slow-
down over the last two or three years in the growth rate 
of United States consumption of solubles. Household use 
of instants, measured in terms of sales volume, rose by 
between 17 and 45 per cent in each successive year 
from 1951 to 1957, after which the increases have been 
closer to 6 per cent per annum (see again table 14). This 
same general characteristic is also apparent from data on 
roastings (see again table 15) . 
A variety of reasons exist to explain ^his pattern of a 
sharp initial expansion in consumption that has been 
declining in momentum more recently. According to spe-
cial surveys on the subject, the. earlier and very rapid 
growth was heavily influenced by the factor of "con-
venience", i.e. ease of storage, elimination of waste, and 
especially speed and simplicity of preparation.^® The Di-
rector of Research of the Pan American Coffee Bureau has 
further amplified this point as follows: " . . . the expanding 
use of the product was part of the general development 
of foods that could be quickly prepared, that offered con-
venience and minimized kitchen work. . . It was also ex-
plained by the newness of the item, the strong promo-
tional support it received, and the resulting willingness of 
people to give it a try".^® At the same time, it should be 
added that lower priced and stronger flavoured coffee are 
extensively used in the manufacture of instant blends. 
Thus, during those post-war years when coffee prices were 
rising to historical peak levels, householders could obtain 
some price advantage by buying instant brands in which 
the harsher tasting but cheaper green coffees comprised 
a substantial proportion of the total roastings.^' 
"" See "A Survey of Instant Coffee Consumption", Tea and 
Coffee Journal, July 1959. 
Dr. J. E. Wood, "Growth Trends in Soluble Coffee", ibid., 
July 1959, pp. 22 and 24. 
Table 14 shows that the most phenomenal increase in soluble 
coffee purchases took place prior to 1955, i.e. precisely during 
Table 15 
UNITED STATES: COMPARATIVE DATA ON COFFEE ROASTINGS, 1954-59 






















1954 . , 17.60 15.55 2.05 11.6 
1955 . , , 18.81 16.50 2.32 12.3 
1956 . . . 20.26 17.12 3.14 15.5 
1957 20.32 16.99 3.34 16.4 
1958 20.94 17.44 3.49 16.7 
1959 21.70 17.96 3.74 17.2 
Annual compound 
rate of growth: 
1954 to 1959 2.9 12.8 




UNITED STATES: TWO-OUNCE EQUIVALENT UNITS OF 
SOLUBLE COFFEE PURCHASED FOR HOUSEHOLD USE 
(Millons of units) 
SEMI-LOGARITHMIC SCALE 
More recendy, however, the above two circumstances 
have become less significant in influencing the patterns of 
United States household demand. For one thing, after the 
novelty had worn off, and when large numbers of house-
holders giving high priority to convenience of preparation 
had already been absorbed into the soluble coffee sector, 
the number of new customers with identical priorities was 
correspondingly reduced. Moreover, since the price differ-
ential favouring Robusta over the milder Arabica coffee 
varieties has been narrowing in the recent past, the superior 
flavour of the latter, taken in conjunction with their rela-
tive price improvements, have tended to inhabit the earlier 
shift in sales from instant to regular blends.^ ® At present, 
therefore, " . . .while the number of first-year users is still 
substantial, the pace of converting new users to instant 
coffee has slowed down".^® 
(c) A third basic development relating to the United 
States soluble coffee sector concerns the pattern of its 
import trade. The United States has long been a net 
those years when green coffee prices were also increasing at an 
exceptionally rapid rate. According to Dr. J. E. Wood " . . . this 
suggests that the large annual rates of increase in purchases of 
soluble coffee in those years were closely associated with house-
holders trying to economize, which was one expression of consumer 
resentment toward the rapid rise in coffee prices and toward the 
relatively high levels they temporarily attained", (ibid., p. 24). 
" In the "Survey of Instant Coffee Consumption", op. cit., pp. 
20 and 29, two interesting points relating to price and flavour 
might be noted. Firstly, whereas more than 32 per cent of instant 
coffee users felt that solubles cost less than regular coffee in 1954, 
by 1958 this ratio had fallen to 24 per cent. Secondly, when asked 
"What qualities in regular coffee do you consider lacking in 
instant coffee?", two thirds of all respondents currently refer to 
shortcomings in taste, flavour or aroma. 
" Tea and Coffee Journal, on. cit.. D. 20. 
exporter of soluble coffee,?" but imports have risen from 
negligible levels prior to 1956 to close to 10 million 
dollars during 1958 and 1959. Thus, despite the steady 
increase in domestic roastings of soluble coffees, national 
requirements have tended to exceed domestic roastings by 
small but growing amounts over the past few yearsJ®^ 
Latin America provides by far the bulk of all United 
States soluble coffee imports (see table 16). El Salvador is 
the most important single supplier, with its output origin-
ating from two plants completed since 1955. From 1956 
to 1959, United States imports from El Salvador rose by 
more than 60 per cent in volume. Since the completion of 
a new factory in 1957, Guatemala's sales have also risen 
very rapidly (more than fourfold between 1958 and 1959). 
These two countries together currently account for more 
than 70 per cent of total United States soluble imports, 
measured on the basis of weight. Virtually all the balance 
comes from Mexico. 
Given the serious glut in international coffee markets 
at present and the importance of the United States within 
such markets, considerable interest attaches to the course 
that will be followed by United States coffee demand in 
the medium-term future. Several analyses and projections 
have been published during the past few years, pertaining 
to trends in world coffee trade generally and to die United 
States market specifically.®^ Yet, although the growing 
impact oí instant coffee has been taken into account in 
most such publications, their final conclusions have usual-
ly been presented in terms of green bean equivalent totals, 
without separate break-downs of the respective shares of 
regular and instant coffee. 
Canada is the principal market for United States soluble 
coffee exports, having imported 67 per cent of the total in 1957 
and almost 84 per cent in 1958 (see Annual Cogee Statistics 
1959, op. cit., p. 14). 
In 1958, imports represented 2.8 per cent of all soluble coffee 
produced in the United States, as determined by Bureau of the 
Census data on roastings. In 1959, the proportion had risen to 
approximately 3.5 per cent. 
See A. Szarf and F. Pignalosa, "Factors influencing United 
States coffee consumption", in FAO, Monthly Bulletin of Agri-
cultural Economics and Statistics, Vol. Ill, No. 10; R. F. Daly, 
"Coffee Consumption and Prices", Agricultural Economics' Re-
search, July 1958; "The Worid Coffee Economy", in FAO, Com-
modity Bulletin 31, November 1959; The future of Latin Ameri-
can exports to the United States, 1965 and 1970, NPA, 1959; and 
El Desarrollo Económico de El Salvador (E/CN.12/495/Rev.l), 
op. cit.. Part Two, Chapter II. In addition a comprehensive study 
is being prepared by the International Coffee Agreement author-
ities for publication during late 1960. 
Table 16 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF SOLUBLE COFFEE, 1958-59 
Country 
Volume 
(Thousands of 60-kg 
bags equivalent of 
sreen coffee) 
Value 
(Millions of dollars) 
1958 1050 195R 1959 
El Salvador 
Guatemala . 
Mexico . . 





















SOURCE: Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics, 
Niimhprs 22 and 23. 
In one of the recent papers, however,®^ an attempt has 
been made to project total United States coffee consump-
tion for selected years up to and including 1980 and to 
subdivide this total as between the two previously men-
tioned types of coffee. Based upon a variety of different 
demand assumptions, this study concludes that United 
States consumption of coffee in all its forms could total 
between 26.7 million and 31.3 million bags by 1965, a 
range that might be compared with the 23.3 million bag 
import level recorded during 1959. Regardless of the like-
lihood of achieving the lower as against the higher of these 
two limits, it is interesting to note that the study presents 
only a single figure for soluble coffee consumption in 
1965, namely, a level of some 6 million bags. In view of 
the comprehensive statistical and analytical coverage pre-
sented in the paper referred to, its findings can be con-
sidered as offering a meaningful order of magnitude for 
United States soluble coffee demand by the middle of the 
coming decade. On the basis of currently available infor-
mation (covering United States roastings, exports and 
imports of solubles), it may be tentatively calculated that 
United States consumption of solubles in 1959 was approxi-
mately 3.7 million bags. Thus the projected level would 
indicate a growth rate of United States instant coffee con-
sumption of about 8.5 per cent, compounded annually, 
during the next five years. 
This rate, it will be noted, is somewhat in excess of that 
recently recorded for household purchases, a fact that may 
be considered somewhat surprising in view of the slow-
down in the momentum of soluble coffee consumption 
discussed above, but it is explained, in the projection 
study cited, by the hypotheses used for future United States 
population growth by coffee-drinking age groups, by 
promotional steps designed to increase the number of cups 
consumed per person per day by these different age 
groups, and finally by other possible developments that 
could reduce the cup-yield rate for soluble coffee.^* 
The aforementioned study does not indicate what pro-
portion of the 6 million bag total might be obtained from 
soluble imports as against domestic roastings of imported 
green beans. This subdivision is difficult to forecast since 
it will be determined by the future price and quality 
characteristics of the two different forms of coffee supplies. 
According to tentative information, however, domestic 
roastings might be placed at some 5.5 million bags by 1965 
as compared with 3.7 million at present, leaving imports 
in soluble form at approximately 500 000 bags as com-
pared with 126 000 in 1959. 
Central America's share of imports in 1965 is equally 
difficult to assess quaiititatively, but given the highly com-
petitive prices and qualities currently characterizing the 
output of the new plants, it seems reasoiiable to assume 
that it should provide about the same share in 1965 as 
in the past two years, i.e. about two thirds. If so. Central 
America could ship approximately 333 000 bags to the 
United States in 1965, compared to some 90 000 at present, 
i.e. slightly less than a fourfold expansion. Such an in-
crease, it should be noted, conforms closely to the findings 
of a recent United Nations study measuring United States 
imports of soluble coffee from El Salvador up to 1966.^° 
°° Pan American Coffee Bureau, Prospects for United States 
Coffee Consumption in the next 20 years. Special Report, August 
1959. 
The number of cups obtained per ounce of soluble coffee is 
expected to decline from almost 14 at present to 12.5 by 1965. 
On the assumption that El Salvador can maintain its cur-
If, however, prices do not change appreciably from their 
1959 levels, the value of Central American soluble coffee 
sales to the United States could rise from 7.3 million 
dollars in 1959 to as much as 27 million dollars by 
1965.»« 
2 . SHRIMPS 
World shrimp production has increased rapidly since the 
end of the Second World War; between 1948 and 1959, 
for example, the global total more than doubled in volume 
(see table 17). This substantial growth has in turn been 
a result of a number of circumstances. On the supply side, 
several basic improvements in production technology have 
taken place, such as more and better trawling nets and 
craft, new methods of detecting and exploiting richer 
supply beds, and the introduction of superior processing 
and freezing plants. These have followed upon a very 
dynamic post-war pattern of demand. The growing use of 
deep-freeze facilities at the ports and for inland distribu-
tion and home refrigeration has been especially important 
in promoting higher levels of consumption in the principal 
industrial markets and especially in the United States. 
Shrimps have become so commercially important in the 
United States that they are now its most va uable fishing 
resource. During 1958 the value of the United States dom-
estic shrimp catch amounted to almost 75 million dollars 
and was thus far in excess of the next two most important 
seafoods—salmon and tuna—whose catches were valued 
at 46 million and 43 million dollars respectively. 
United States domestic shrimp landings^' are currently 
far higher than in the 1930's or early post-war years. But 
it should be noted that the peak levels of 155-160 million 
pounds in 1953-54 have never been regained let alone 
exceeded. On the contrary, over the past five years the 
rently competitive prices and qualities, it is estimated that its 
export volume of soluble coffee to the United States, will increase 
three to four times by 1966 (see El Desarrollo Económico de El 
Salvador, (E/CN.12/495/Rev.l ) , op. cit., p. 90). 
" The product of 333 000 bags at 80.55 dollars per bag (i.e. 
the 1959 average unit value of United States soluble imports 
iErom Central America, in dollars per bag of green coffee weight 
equivalent). 
The terras "landing" or "catch" refer to the quantity of 
shrimp brought to port by United States craft. In these notes, 
all references to volumes refer to headless shrimp, the unit most 
commonly used in official United States publications (see, for 
instance, United States Department of the Interior, Fresh, Frozen 
and Processed Shrimp, April 1960, p. 1 ) . 
Table 17 
WORLD SHRIMP PRODUCTION; BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES 
(Millions of pounds'^) 
Country or area , mS 1953 1958 
United States 99 155 127 
Mainland China . . . 120 
Indian 49 119 114 
Japan 44 54 74 
Mexico 45 46 . 69 
Total countries listed . . . . . . 504 
World (excluding China) . . . 354 583 632 
World (including China) . . . . . . . . . . 752 
SOURCE: United States Department of the Interior, Fresh, Frozen 
and Processed Shrimp, April 1960, Table I. 
" In this, and all subsequent tables, volume data refer to heads-
off weight. 
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volume of domestic production has fallen back to a new 
and lower level averaging approximately 133 million 
pounds per annum. The fact that this has taken place 
despite a greater input of labour and equipment is mainly 
attributable to two developments. Firstly, domestic resour-
ces have not been increasing; indeed, an irregular but 
somewhat downward trend in domestic catches has charac-
terized the recent pasti^ ® Secondly and simultaneously, oper. 
ating costs have been, rising, as more men and craft have 
been assigned to a fairly constant domestic resource.^' 
Given these two circumstarices, the average gross return 
per United States shrimp craft had, by 1959, dropped to 
its lowest level of the past ten years.^ ® 
While United States domestic shrimp production has 
been following a more or less stagnant trend however, 
consumption has increased very rapidly. As mentioned 
earlier, this has been influenced primarily by the growing 
use of deep-freeze processes enabling the product to become 
a standard item inland as well as on the coast, in the 
home as well as in hotels and restaurants, and in a pro-
gressively wider variety of forms.^^ 
As a result of its incréasing popularity and use, the 
total new supply of shrimp available for domestic United 
States consumption has been increasing at the rate of 
about 50 million pounds every five years, amounting to 
149 million in 1950, 190 million in 1955, and an all-time 
Resource availability series have recently been calculated for 
the main United States supply areas in the Gulf of Mexico. Ac-
cording to these estimates, access to catches in this area declined 
by about 5 per cent from 1956 to 1958 (see Fresh, Frozen and 
Processed Shrimp, bp. cit., pp. 46-47). 
The total tonnage of the United States shrimp fleet doubled 
between 1950 and 1959, and the number of fishermen employed 
in the fleet increased more or less proportionately (see United 
States Tariff Commission, Shrimps, May 1960, p. 11; and Fresh, 
Frozen and Processed Shrimp, op. cit., table 9, p. 48. 
Fresh, Frozen and Processed Shrimps, op. cit., p. 46. 
Whereas fresh and canned shrimps predominated during the 
inter-war period, today the frozen products have become by far 
the most important. Other forms include dried, spiced, smoked 
and breaded shrimps and shrimp soups, pastes and sauces. Certain 
by-products are also being used for animal feed. 
record of 239 rnillion pounds estimated for 1959 (see 
Table 18). Apparent consumption*^ per capita has in turn 
grown steadily from only 0.48 pounds in 1939 to 0.78 in 
1950 and 1.12 in 1959. 
The United States demand for shrimps has, in short, 
mounted under the dual impact of increasing population 
and a steadily higher intake per person. Since this has not 
been followed by an equivalent growth in the domestic 
catch, the result has been to estimúlate an exceptionally 
rapid growth of imports. Thus, whereas imports totalled 
only 4 million pounds in 1939, they rose tenfold to 40 
million in 1950, and still further to a peak of 107 million 
during 1959 (see table 19). Indeed, the persistent upsurge 
of imports has lead to a current situation in which United 
States stocks are at peak levels (averaging 36 million 
pounds during 1959 compared with 25 million in 1958, 
and 18 million in both 1955 and 1950), and prices have 
returned to 1955 levels.*^ 
In the face of the heavy and sustained import volume, a 
basic structural change has therefore characterized the 
supply side of the United States industry during the 
post-war period: by 1959 imports were accounting for 45 
per cent of total hew supplies available for annual con-
sumption, as compared with only 4 per cent at the begin-
ning of the Second World War and 27 per cent in 1950. 
During 1950, although 18 countries were exporting 
shrimps to the United States, Mexico alone accounted for 
almost all the total. By 1955 the number of countries 
had risen to 27, and by 1959 to more than 50. Mexico 
still predominated, with 64 per cent of the 1959 total, 
but several other countries had notably increased their 
participation. The Eastern Hemisphere supplied 14 per 
cent in 1959 compared with only 3 per cent five years 
earlier. Similarly, the share provided by Latin America 
exclusive of Mexico, reached 21 per cent in 1959 com-
Total new supplies, minus estimated stocks, divided by popu-
lation. 
" The average ex-vessel prices, for landings of domestic shrimp 
craft between 1955 and 1959, were 42.5, 53.1, 60.3, 61.6 and 41.0 
cents per pound respectively (see Shrimps, op. cit., p. 54) . 
Table 18 
UNITED STATES: NEW SHRIMP SUPPLIES AVAILABLE FOR CONSUMPTION 
(Volumes in millions of pounds) 












1939 . . . . 89 4 1 94 5 4 
1950 . . . . 114 40 5 149 35 27 
1951 . . . . 134 42 7 169 31 25 
1952 . . . . 135 39 7 167 28 23 
1953 . . . . 155 43 6 192 28 22 
1954 . . . . . 159 42 8 194 26 21 
1955 . . . . 145 54 9 190 37 28 
1956 . . . . 133 69 7 195 51 35 
1957 . . . . 121 70 7 184 57 38 
1958 . . . . , , , 125 85 7 204 68 42 
1959'- . . . 142 107 9 239 75 45 
SOUBCE: United States Tariff Commission, Shrimps, May 1960, page 96. 
° Excluding carry-overs. 
'' Provisional figures. 
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Table 14 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF SHRIMPS FROM SELECTED AREAS 
(Volumes in millions of pounds) 
Area 
1939 1950 1955 1959" 
Volume (%)_ Volume (%) Volume (%) Volume (%) 
Mexico . . . . . 3.8 96 39.7 99 45.4 84 68.7 64 
Panama . . . . — • — 0.1 — 4.2 8 8.8 8 
Japan 0 1 2 0.1 — 0.9 ' 2 7.2 7 
India — — — — 0.1 — 2.9 3 
Central America . — — • 0.2 — 3.7 4 
All others" . . . ! 0,1 2 0.3 1 3.0 6 15.3 14 
Total . . . . 40 100 40.2. 100 53.8 100 106.6 100 
SOURCE: United States Department of the Interior, Fresh, Frozen and Processed Shrimps, April, 
1960, p. 65. 
' Preliminary. 
" in 1959, other principal suppliers included Ecuador (4.7), Colombia (1.9), Egypt (1.3) and 
Argentina (1.0). The other Latin American countries were Venezuela (0.4), Cuba (0.2) 
and Peru (0.2). -
pared with 13 per cent in 1955. Panama was the largest 
contributor in the latter group, more than doubling its 
export volume from 4.2 million to 8.8 million pounds 
between 1955 and 1959. As for the five countries which 
are liow members of the Central American Economic In-
tegration Programme, their exports were negligible until 
the late 1950's. More recently their combined shipments 
have risen at a very striking pace from only 0.3 million 
pounds in 1957 to 3.0 million and 3.7 million in 1958 
and 1959 respectively (see table 20). At present they 
provide close to 4 per cent of the United States import 
demand. 
El Salvador is the largest producer in Central America; 
its exports to the United States amounted to 1.8 million 
pounds in 1959. Costa Rica was next in importance with 
1.2 million, followed at some distance by Honduras, Gua-
temala and Nicaragua whose shipments were about 0.2-
0.3 million pounds each in 1959. In every case, the higher 
export levels have been evident only since 1958, aided 
by public and private efforts to increase the number and 
efficiency of vessels, crews and processing facilities.^^ The 
recent price structure in the United States has also fos-
tered growing interest in this activity in Central America.^" 
Thus, the most important post-war characteristics of the 
United States shrimp industry include a relatively stable 
volume of domestic catch, a steadily rising level of per 
capita and hence of aggregate consumption; a corollary 
pressure on imports to bridge the resultant gap; a growth 
in imports from sources other than Mexico, the tradi-
tional supplies, namely from Central America's formerly 
marginal supplies which have recently expanded in a 
During 1959, for example, the Salvadorian Government raised 
its former limiution on the number of shrimp vessels from 17 to 
50 units. At present, more than 30 trawlers are in operation, of 
modern design and all diesel powered. El Salvador is abo unique in 
having three domestic plants to freeze shrimps for the export trade 
(see. Fresh, Frozen and Processed Shrimp, op. cit., pp. 86-87). 
Fish and Wildlife Service, Survey of Shrimp fisheries of 
Central and South America, Special Scientific Report No. 235, 
1957. 
Table 20 
UNITED STATES: SHRIMP IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA 
(Thousands of pounds) 
















1939 . . . . . . - — • — — — — — 3 984 
1950 — — — — — 40198 
1954 43 43 41 519 
1955 — 151 — 8 — 159 53 772 
1956 — 421 — — — 421 68 618 
1957 66 227 — — 293 69676 
1958 . 1130 717 836 39 278 3 000 85 394 
1959' . 1838 1156 271 182 213 3 660 106 555 
SOÜRCE: United States Department of the Interior, Fresh, Frozen and Processed Shrimps, April, 
1960, p. 65. 
' Provisional figures. 
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most dynamic fashion; and, currendy at least, substantial 
stocks and a lower price level. 
Looking ahead to the mid-1960's, it is likely that the 
first three characteristics mentioned above will continue. 
Thus, in a recent and authoritative survey of the United 
States shrimp industry that included projections as far as 
1975, it was felt that "the prospects of a sizable expan-
sion of domestic production do not appear very bright"." 
For the purposes of this article, therefore, the 1965 dom-
estic catch is not expected to exceed its peak (1954) 
historical level of 160 million pounds, which was some 
20 million higher than that obtained in 1959. The same 
survey estimated that, if prices remain at a reasonable 
level, per capita consumption should continue growing to 
as much as 2.4 pounds per person by 1975.''' A 1965 
level of 1.5 pounds might therefore be selected as a 
reasonable figure, representing as it does only some 6 
ounces more than that recorded in 1959. Given these 
variables, and a 1965 population of slightly over 200 
million,*® aggregate consumption minus domestic catch 
would give a figure of about 140 million pounds for im-
port requirements in 1965,*® 31 per cent in excess of 
imports in 1959. Although this implies a continued and 
substantial growth rate during the next six years, it is 
well below the increase recorded over the past six years. 
Admittedly various circumstances could invalidate the 
above projection. One important but unpredictable deve-
lopment, for example, relates to the fact that, whereas 
shrimps currently enter the United States free of duty 
and of quotas, the impact of imports upon the United 
States industry has already resulted in discussions concern-
ing possible future restrictions.'" But no action has yet 
been taken on such restrictions and even where potential 
quota limits have been studied, the allocations thus far 
estimated have been quite close to the 140 million pound 
projection mentioned above.°^ 
Central America's ability to benefit from a growing 
United States import demand seems promising on various 
grounds, namely, geographic proximity, the recent moder-
nization of Central America's shrimp industries, and the 
price and quality of their product. Hence there are reasons 
for anticipating that Central America's share could rise 
to 6 per cent as compared with 1 per cent at present. In 
turn, this would permit Central America's exports to the 
United States to reach 8.4 million pounds by 1965 as 
against 3.7 million in 1959.°^ Similarly, if prices do not 
" United States Department of the Interior, Special Scientific 
Report No. 308, June 1959, p. 111. 
" Ibid., table VIII-28, p. 113. 
" Representing a compound growth rate of 1.7 per cent per 
annum over the 1959 population. 
" Based upon the concept of new supplies available fór con-
sumption, i.e. that stocks do not differ noticeably from their cur-
rent levels. 
A resolution, adopted on 6 February 1960 by the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, requests the United • States Tariff 
Commission to investigate whether shrimps " . . .are being imported 
into the States in such increased quantities, either actual or relative 
to domestic production, as to cause or threaten serious injury to 
the domestic i n d u s t r y . . ( s e e Shrimps, ibid., pp. 1 and 2) . 
See, for example, the table estimating possible United States 
import quotas for 1960-64, as proposed in HR 8779 and HR 8899, 
published by the United States Tariff Commission in December 
1959. In that table, the 1964 quota estimate was slightly under 139 
million pounds. 
" In the estimates prepared for HR 8779 and HR 8899, referred 
to in the preceding footnote, the Central American quota was 7.3 
million pounds for the latest year shown (1964). According to the 
Survey of shrimp fisheries of Central and South America, on. cit.. 
Table 14 















































































SOURCE: United States Department of Agriculture, The Livestock 
and Meat Situation, L.M.S.-102, Agricultural Marketing Service, 
Washington, D.C., 12 May 1959. 
vary noticeably for their 1959 levels, the values of these 
exports would total approximately 5.0 million dollars in 
1965, compared with 2.2 million dollars in 1959. 
3. BEEF AND VEAL 
United States cattle inventories are increasing intensive-
ly,®^ and at the present time exceed 100 million head. Con-
siderable changes are also registered in beef production 
figures, which, as analysis of the statistical series shows, 
are 97.4 per cent higher for 1960 than for 1939 (see 
table 21) . Every year, between 4 and 5 million head are 
added to existing cattle stocks. The doubling of the output 
of beef since the beginning of the Second World War, and 
the improvements in the average weight of cattle on the 
potential shrimp production in the five Central American republics 
has been estimated at between a minimum of 8 million and a 
maximum of 16 million pounds in the foreseeable future. 
Current inventories show an increment of 53.7 per cent in 
relation to pre-war levels. 
Table 22 
ANNUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF BEEF IN TEN 
COUNTRIES. 1957 




New Zealand . 113 
United States 93 
Canada 84 
France . 64 
United Kingdom 55 
Denmark 54 
Federal Renublic of Germany . . . . 39 
SOURCE: United States Department of Agriculture, Trends in 
World Meat Consumption, Foreign Agriculture Circular FLM 
11-58. 84. Washington, D.C., 31 October 1958. 
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Average 1957-59 . . . 190.6 157.2 89.3 63.5 4.4 33.4 
1957 190.4 159.0 93.4 61.5 4.1 31.4 
1958 186.5 152.4 87.2 60.7 4.5 34.1 
1959 . 194.9 160.1 873 68.3 4.5 34.8 
SOURCE: United States Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Meat Situation, Agricultural 
Marketing Service, L.M.S., 109, Washington, D.C., 11 May 1960. 
hoof,®^ are indicative of the success achieved in research 
on feeding and selection systems and all the varied aspects 
involved in the rational management of stock farms. 
The United States is one of the biggest consumers of 
beef in the world. An annual per capita level which in 
1957 amounted to 93 pounds places it fifth among the 
countries with the highest consumption coefficients, and 
is far above those recorded for the same year in Canada 
and Western Europe, larger volumes being shown only 
by Argentina, Uruguay, Australia and New Zealand (see 
table 22) . Total consumption of beef in the United States 
amounted to 14 232 million pounds, with an aggregate 
value estimated at about 10 million dollars, or approx-
imately half that of all the red meat consumed by the 
population of the United States. 
During the three-year period 1957-59, annual per capita 
meat consumption averaged 190.6 pounds (see table 23) , 
of which 157.2 were red meat (beef, pork and mutton) 
and 33.4 white (turkey and fowls). Beef was prepon-
derant, since it accounted for 89.3 pounds, or 46.9 per 
cent of the total. 
The exceptional volume of beef production was not 
enough to cover domestic demand for this commodity. A 
large proportion of the imports effected, besides consisting 
of types of beef that have undergone some degree of 
processing, is of a markedly seasonal character, since 
purchases abroad are basically concentrated at the end of 
the winter and in early spring, the time of year when the 
supply of domestically-produced meat decreases on account 
of seasonal conditions.''' 
Owing to an annual falling-off, of more than 1000 
million pounds in domestic production during the last two 
years, imports of beef have substantially increased. Ana-
lysis of the data available for the past decade indicates 
that beef imports are subject to abrupt short-term fluctua-
tions. Suffice it to mention that between 1950 and 1952 a 
high level of imjjprts was registered, whereas the subse-
quent phase, covering the years 1953 to 1956, was charac-
terized by á pronounced decline in purchases abroad. Leist-
ly, between 1957 and 1959 another remarkable expansion 
of imports raised them to "Unprecedented levels (see table 
24) . 
" The weight per head of cattle on the hoof increased by 29 
per cent between 1939 and 1959, according to the data given by the 
United States Department of Agriculture in The Livestock and Meat 
Situation, L.M.S. 102 (Washington, D.C., 12 May 1959). 
" United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural 
Service, Foreign Agriculture, (Washington, D.C., August 1958), 
p. 6. 
The foregoing changes in the volume of imports can be 
more clearly grasped if the averages for the periods con-
cerned are compared. In 1950-52, imports reached an 
annual average of 272.8 million pounds, which dropped 
to only 129.0 million in 1953-56, i.e. by 47.3 per cent. In 
1958-59, on the other hand, annual imports rose to 670.7 
million pounds, which represented a 245.8 per cent in-
crease over the 1950-52 figures and an increment of 519.9 
per cent in relation to 1953-56. 
The leading suppliers of beef are Argentina, Uruguay, 
Canada and Mexico in the American continent, and Aus-
tralia, Ireland and New Zealand in the rest of the world. 
The expansion of United States imports during recent 
years has benefited all these countries, but especially Ar-
gentina, Australia and New Zealand, whose status as the 
world's biggest producers and exporters places them in a 
better position to react quickly to favourable changes in 
external demand. Nevertheless, the volume of this demand 
influenced the export trade of other countries which had 
been virtually crowded out of the United States market 
during the period when imports were declining, cases in 
point being Cuba, the Dominican Republic and the United 
Kingdom.'® 
" Imports from the Dominican Republic dropped from 8 733.4 
million pounds in 1950 to 600.2 million in 1956, but rose again 
to 5 305.6 million, in 1959. Cuba's exports to the United States 
increased from 73.7 million pounds in 1956 to 2 244.5 million in 
1959 (see United States Department of Commerce, United States 
Imports of Merchandise for Consumption, 1950, 1955, 1957 and 
1959). 
Table 24 
UNITED STATES: BEEF AND VEAL IMPORTS 
(Millions of pounds) 
Country of origin 1950 1955 1957 1958 1959 
Total . . . . 210.1 118.5 230.6 619.7 722.3 
Argentina . . . . 90.4 86.5 86.3 216.7 128.6 
— 10.4 12.9 75.0 48.9 
Canada . . o o c 73.4 8.0 47.4 53.6 22.6 
Uruguay • . « o o 22.8 1.3 9.6 9.6 — 
0.8 6.5 23.8 42.0 
Australia . . . . . 0.1 2.2 5.5 17.7 224.0 
New Zealand . . . — 2.6 50.0 183.7 161.6 
Other countries . . 23.0 6.7 12.4 39.2 94.6 
SOURCES: United States Department of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Meat Statistics 1957, Agricultural Marketing Service, Washing-
ton, D.C.; and Livestock and Meat Situation, L.M.S., 109, 
Washington, D.C., 11 May 1960. 
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The Central American countries are just gaining foot-
hold in the United States meat market. While it is true 
that Honduras and Nicaragua are traditional exporters of 
cattle on the hoof and that Costa Rica also emerged as an 
exporter some years ago, the area's meat sales to the 
United States market were formerly very modest. Only the 
increase recently registered in the United States' total 
imports has enabled Central America to make substantial 
sales on the market in question. 
In 1956, imports of beef from Central America did not 
amount to more than 83 000 pounds, almost the whole 
of which corresponded to Costa Rica. A year later they 
had climbed to 742 500 pounds, while in 1959 the volume 
of United States purchases from Central America was 
more than 17 million pounds, and their value over 5.5 
million dollars (see table "25), the exporters being Hon-
duras and Nicaragua, in addition to Costa Rica—i.e., the 
three countries in the area whose stock farming is most 
highly developed. It is difficult to predict the trend of 
imports from Central America in the immediate future, 
but unquestionably, if the United States market were to 
be stabilized or expanded, the Central American coun-
tries would be in a position to increase their exports 
considerably. 
From the standpoint of the Central American supply, it 
should be recalled that in recent years significant changes 
have taken place in livestock production in the countries 
of the area. Firstly, the value of cattle for export, mainly 
to Colombia, Curagao and Peru, increased by 40.2 per 
cent between 1955 and 1958, and this upward trend 
is sure to continue in the near future because of the im-
portance which is being attached to technological improve-
ments in stock farming. Secondly, the Central American 
countries have devoted special attention to the establish-
ment of slaughterhouses and cold storage plants for the 
processing of catüe for export, their installations being in 
ine with the standards of hygiene established by the 
United States Government. 
To judge from the evolution of beef production in the 
United States, its expansion is likely to continue in the 
immediate future, since in practice stock farming is gen-
erally carried on in the gram-growing area, where feed 
is not a heavy item in production costs. Again, the rear-
ing of beef cattle requires only a small percentage of 
Table 25 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF BEEF AND VEAL* 




Country of origin 1957 sands sands 
of of 
pounds) dollars) 
Costa Rica 742.5 9 748.8. , 3185.1 
Nicaragua . . . . . . . — 5 764.7. , 1833.2 
Honduras — , 1 509.9 482.2 
Total from Central 
America . . . . . . . 742.5 17 023.4 5 500.5 
Total from rest of world 722 000.0 — 
SOURCE : United States Department of Commerce, Report No. 
FT-110, United States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption, 
Bureau of Census, 1950, 1955, 1957 and 1959. 
' The reference is to fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal. 
manpower, which ranks high on the list of costs. Lastly, 
technological innovations in stock farming will also contri-
bute to the expansion in question. 
As regards consumption, it is forecast that by 1965 
per capita consumption of beef (excluding veal) will be 
about 95 pounds,®' or approximately 6 per cent more than 
in 1957-59. The addition of veal would probably raise 
per capita consumption to 104 pounds. 
If these two future possibilities—the probable expan-
sion of production and the improvement of consump-
tion levels in the future—are taken into consideration, it 
seems unlikely that there will be any significant increase 
in the volume of beef imports, and even doubtful whether 
they will remain as large as in the last two years. Never-
theless, seasonal fluctuations will help to maintain import 
margins that will leave room for some countries to sell 
part of their output on the United States markets. Further-
more, relatively low-priced types of meat, not considered 
of prime quality, will continue to be imported. 
The Central American countries' prospects of maintain-
ing or even increasing their exports of beef to the United 
States will of course be partly determined, on the one 
hand, by the development of the latter's domestic supply 
situation, and by the contributions of the various supplier 
countries, on the other. In this last context, it should be 
borne in mind that the meat imported from South Ame-
rica, especially Argentina, is of a type against which the 
Central American countries can put up no competition. In 
contrast, imports frorti Australia, Canada, the Dominican 
Republic, Ireland, Mexico and New Zealand are mainly 
composed of carcass and boned meat for industrial pur-
poses, of a type similar to that exported by Central Ame-
rica. Attention has already been drawn to the greater 
demand for imports of such meat, but this does not mean 
that no seasonal fluctuations are experienced. It may also 
be noted that some of the regular suppliers, like Australia 
and New Zealand, are countries whose production capacity 
enables them to withstand these vicissitudes in external 
demand, since no other interpretation can be placed on 
the fact that between 1957 and 1959, Australia increased 
its exports from 5.5 million pounds to 224.0 million (ac-
cording to United States import statistics), while those 
of New Zealand rose from 50 million to 161.6 million 
(see again table 24) . 
To conclule this brief analysis, therefore, it may be 
jointed out that one of the few advantages which may 
lelp the Central American countries to maintain their foot-
ing in the United States meat market seems to lie in their 
proximity, and in the consequent reduction of refrigerated 
transport costs. 
4 . WOOD AND WOOD PRODUCTS 
The United States has provided a very substantial and 
growing post-war market for imported forestry products 
in primary and final forms. Thus, since the end of the 
Second World War, one put of every eight dollars worth 
of United States imports has been wood or paper, and by 
1956-58, imports of these two commodities were averaging 
close to 1 500 million dollars per annum. Paper (includ-
ing manufactures and base stocks) has typically accounted 
for the great bulk (70-80 per cent) of the combined wood 
" United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Market-
ing Service, The Livestock and Meat Situation, L.M.S. 102 
(Washington, D.C., 12 May 1959). 
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and paper total (see table 26) . Since Central American 
exports of paper are negligible, however, the following 
notes relate solely to United States imports of the remain-
ing category, namely, wood and wood products. 
Within this category, table 26 shows three clearly de-
fined but different growth patterns. Firstly, United States 
imports of wood manufactures have been rising at an 
exceptionally rapid pace, almost quadrupling since the 
early post-war years. Secondly, imports of unmanufactured 
woods have followed a stagnant trend and represent only 
a minor part of the trade under discussion. Thirdly, im-
ported lumber rose rapidly during the first post-war de-
cade. Although the rate of growth has slowed down in 
recent years, lumber is still the largest single component 
of the total, currently representing approximately three 
fifths of all United States imports of wood and wood 
products. 
Post-war trend in United States imports of Central 
American wood and wood products have basically reflected 
those described in the preceding paragraph (see table 
27). Thus shipments of wood in unmanufactured forms®' 
have stagnated, falling from 0.7 million dollars in 1949 
to only 0.5 million dollars in 1959. Wood manufactures,®® 
conversely, have risen from negligible amounts a decade 
ago to 0.5 million dollars in 1959. Lumber,®" more than 
quadrupled from 0.7 million dollars in 1949 to a post-
war peak of 2.9 million dollars in 1959. By the latter year. 
Central American exports of all wood and wood products 
to the United States totalled 3.8 million dollars, and lumber 
alone accounted for 75 per cent of this total. 
Nicaragua and Honduras are the major Central Ameri-
Central American exports of unmanufactured woods to the 
United States in 1959 were mainly logs (of mahogany, Spanish 
cedar, lignum vitae and other hardwoods), and small quantities 
of round hewn timber. 
" In 1959, Central American exports of such manufactures com-
prised plywoods, veneers and minor amounts of furniture. 
°° Sawmill products, predominantly pine and mahogany lumber. 
Table 26 
UNITED STATES: TOTAL IMPORTS OF WOOD, PAPER 
AND THEIR PRODUCTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Product 
Averages 
1946-50 1951-55 1956-58 
Total: wood and wood products 203 372 443 
Wood, unprocessed" 23 29 25 
Lumber" 142 252 270 
Wood manufactures" . . . . 38 91 148 
Total: paper and products' 662 966 1050 
Total: wood and paper 
products 865 1338 1493 
Percentage of total United States 
imports (13.2) (12.5) (11.7) 
SOURCE: United States, Department of Commerce. Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States, 1959. p. 888. 
' Mainly logs and round or hewn timber. Also includes ties, 
bamboo, evergreen Christmas trees, etc. 
'' Sawmill products. 
Mainly plywood and veneers. Also includes furniture, baskets, 
barrels, etc. 
" In 1956-58, paper base stocks accounted for 70 per cent of this 
total, and paper plus manufactures for virtually all the re-
mainder. A minor proportion of the total is represented by 
work and manufactures. 
Table 14 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF WOOD FROM 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
(Thousands of dollars) 
Country and products 1949 1956 1959 
Nicaragua: Total - 686.1 1 203.3 1 9142 
Wood, unmanufactured . 350.8 235.1 2753 
Lumber 335.3 968.2 1 638.9 
Wood manufactures . . . , — — — 
Guatemala: Total 132.5 411.9 618.5 
Wood, unmanufactured . 82.0 332.2 163.3 
Lumber 47.0 47.7 81.3 
Wood manufactures . . . , 3.5 32.0 373.9 
Honduras: Total 409.4 656.7 1 153.6 
Wood, unmanufactured . . 197.0 80.9 8.1 
Lumber 210.0 552.4 1140.3 
Wood manufactures . . . , 2.4 23.4 5.2 
Costa Rica: Total 230.0 417.2 153.9 
Wood, unmanufactured . . 108.2 4.4 4.4 
Lumber . 121.8 412.8 29.9 
Wood manufactures . . . . — — 119.6 
Central America: Total . . . J 458.0 2 689.Í 3 840.2 
Wood, unmanufactured . , 738.0 652.6 451.1 
Lumber 713.0 1981.1 2 890.4 
Wood manufactures . . . . 7.0 55.4 498.7 
SotiRCE: United States Department of Commerce, FT 120, selected 
issues. 
can suppliers, exporting 1.9 million and 1.2 million dollars 
worth respectively to the United states during 1959. Gua-
temala ranked third in importance that year with 0.6 
million dollars, followed by Costa Rica with less than 0.2 
million dollars.®^ It will be noted from the composition of 
each country's trade that exports of unmanufactured woods 
have been declining in almost every case. Such woods had 
virtually disappeared from the export trade of Honduras 
and Costa Rica by 1959. The recent growth in wood 
manufactures is restricted to only two countries—Guate-
mala and Costa Rica. Similarly, two countries—Nicaragua 
and Honduras—which together provided almost all of 
Central American such shipments by 1959, account almost 
exclusively for the sharp increase in lumber exports. 
From 1947-50 to 1956-58, the volume of total United 
States lumber imports rose by 59 per cent. This was 
mainly due to the substantial growth in softwood lumber, 
whose volume rose by 63 per cent. Conversely, hardwoods 
increased by less than 20 per cent during that period. 
Central America was not able to record proportional in-
creases in its trade (see table 28) . Thus, Central Ame-
rica's total lumber exports to the United States rose by 
only 12 per cent; its softwood exports to that market ex-
panded by less than 40 per cent; and its hardwood lumber 
shipments actually declined. 
It was pointed out with reference to table 27 that Nica-
ragua and Honduras are by far the two largest Central 
American exporters of wood in all forms. The same table 
also shows that the predominance of these two countries 
was attributable almost exclusively to a rapid growth trend 
in shipments of lumber (i.e. as opposed to wood in un-
manufactured or manufactured forms). These same two 
countries have achieved their higher level of lumber ex-
ports by progressively shifting away from hard to soft-
El Salvador's shipments to the United States have amounted 
to less than 100 000 dollars in all but three post-war years. 
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Table 14 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF LUMBER 
(Thousands of board feet) 
Country 









Costa Rica 2.7 . 2.7 1.9 1.9 
Guatemala . . . . . 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.4 
1.3 1.7 3.0 0.9 3.2 4.1 
Nicaragua 1.9 3.5 5.4 2.9 4.0 6.9 
Total from Central 
America 6.6 5.3 11.9 6.0 7.3 13.3 
Total imports . . . . 208.6. 1839.3 2 047.9 247.5 3 004.5 3252.0 
SOURCES: United States Department of Commerce, Forest Products Division, United States Lumber 
Imports 1947-59. 
wood varieties (see table 28) . Thus, between 1947-50 and 
1956-58, their combined exports of hardwood lumber rose 
from 3.2 to 3.8 million board feet (or by less than 20 
per cent), whereas their combined shipments of softwood 
lumbers to the United States rose from 5.2 to 7.2 million 
board feet (by 40 per cent). 
To sum up, the following four main points relating to 
United States imports are of particular importance: 
(а) In the face of a rapidly growing United Sutes import 
demand for wood and wood products, Central American sales to 
that market have also increased substantially during the past 
decade. 
( б ) United States imports of wood in various forms from Central 
America have reflected, although in differing degrees, the chang-
ing commodity composition to total United States wood imports 
wood manufactures rising most rapidly, unmanufacteurd woods fol 
lowing a stagnant trend, and lumber imports increasing substan 
tially and representing the largest single item in the trade under 
review. 
(c ) Within the important category of lumber. United States im-
ports of soft-woods have risen far more rapidly than those of 
hardwoods. This trend was also apparent in Central American 
exports, although again not to the same extent. 
id) Two countries (Nicaragua and Honduras) together provide 
approximately 75 per cent of Central Americas total exports of 
wood to the United States. Both have been able to increase their 
export trade by shifting away from unmanufactured wood to lumber 
and by producing more of the latter from soft as against hardwood 
varieties. 
Central American exports of unmanufactured wood 
consist primarily of mahogany logs from Nicaragua and 
lignum vitae logs from Guatemala (see table 29) . Small 
amounts of Spanish cedar logs and some rough timber are 
also shipped from these two countries and from Honduras 
and Costa Rica as well. Over the past decade, Céntral 
American shipments of such logs and timber have fluc-
tuated irregularly but on a declining scale: frOm 738 000 
dollars in 1949 to only 451 000 dollars in 1959, one of 
the lowest levels recorded since the Second World War. 
This stagnant pattern is a result of the shift in United 
States demand from logs and towards imports directly 
utilizable in the form of lumber. Thus, as new and larger 
sawmills have been constructed in Central America since 
the war, the decline in the exports of logs has constituted 
the counterpart of its higehr level of exports in the form 
of sawmill products. 
Since the current level of Central American log exports 
is so small, minor shifts in United States demand could 
induce much larger changes in the small Central Ameri-
can trade involved. Excluding the possibility of sharp 
annual fluctuations, however, such exports are not ex-
pected to vary noticeably from present levels. A range 
of 0.3-0.8 dollars is considered reasonable for 1965. 
In 1959, the United States imported 499 000 dollars 
worth of wood manufactures from Central America. Ap-
proximately three quarters of this total consisted of ply-
woods produced in Guatemala, and almost all the balance 
was accounted for by Costa Rican wood veneers. Small 
amounts of furniture (chairs, rattan items, etc.) were also 
included. 
For two reasons it is difficult to make a projection of 
Central America's future exports of wood manufactures in 
new or existing forms. One was earlier: the current level 
of exports is so small that even a few orders from United 
States retailers or distributors would mean very large in-
creases for the Central American products. The other is 
the fact that United States demand for plywoods, veneers, 
and competitively priced furniture items has contributed 
substantially to the dynamic post-war growth in aggregate 
United States imports of wood manufactures. Depending 
upon future Central American production and transport 
facilities therefore, very significant increases could be 
anticipated from Central America. In the absence of bases 
for estimating the growth in such investments or the ex-
tent to which Central American prices and qualities can 
be competitive in the United Státes márkét, however, only 
a very tentative projection is possible. According to some 
specialists, the range would be 2.5-5 million dollars in 
1965. The upper limit, it will be noted, assumes that Cen-
tral America can increáse its sales over the next five years 
by the same extent as it has since 1956, i.e. approximately 
ten-fold. ' ' 
Central American exports of sawmill products to the 
United States currently consist of two niain varieties: 
pitch pine and dressed mahogany lumber from Honduras 
and Nicaragua. By 1959, these two varieties represented 
over 95 per cent of the regional total, the balance being 
made up of. cedar, balsa and lignum vitae sawed woods. 
Guatemala and Costa Rica provided only about 4 per cent 
of the total trade during 1959. 
As mentioned earlier, Central American lumber sales to 
the United States have risen substantially during the post-
war period, and currently account for three fourths of all 
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Table 14 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF WOOD AND WOOD PRODUCTS FROM 
CENTRAL AMERICA, 1959 








A. Wood, unmanufactured 
Logs, mahogany 
Logs, cedar 
Logs, Lignum vitae 














Total 275.3 163.3 8.1 4.4 451.1 
B. Wood manufactures 
Plywood 
Veneers 









Total — 373.9 5.2 119.6 498.7 
C. Lumber fsawmill products) 
Lumber, northern pine . . . 
Lumber, other pine 
Lumber, cedar 
Lumber, balsa 
Lumber, Mahogany . . . . 
Lumber, lignum vitae . . . . 

























Total 1638.9 81.3 1140.3 29.9 2 890.4 
Grand total 1 914.2 618.5 1153.6 153.9 3 840.2 
SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, FT 110, 1959. 
the re^on's exports of wood and wood products. This 
expansion is attributable to three interrelated develop-
ments. Firstly the volume of hardwood lumber shipped 
from Central America has remained fairly stable. Second-
ly, the volume of its softwood lumber exports has in-
creased noticeably since the end of the war. And thirdly, 
United States lumber prices have risen at an exceptionally 
rapid pace over the same period.®^ 
During the next five years, Central American exports 
of hardwood lumber will probably not vary appreciably 
from their recent levels. The end uses to which Central 
American hardwoods are put in the United States cover 
primarily high-quality and high-priced items such as 
superior types of furniture; yachts and other small craft; 
millwork trim and stair railings; instrument casings; and 
a variety of other specialized products. Given the nature 
of these items, the demand for them tends to be relatively 
inelastic as regards price, usually responding to trends in 
real disposable income levels and to changes in the ex-
penditure patterns of higher income brackets within the 
United States. On the assumption that such groups con-
tinue their recent spending patterns, therefore, the demand 
for Central America's superior hardwoods should be main-
tained at a relatively stable level in the near future. As 
for softwood lumbers. United States demand has risen 
sharply over the past decade—^mainly because of the 
" In 1946, the wholesale price index for United States lumber 
was 59.3 (1947-49 = 100). By 1950 it had increased to 114.5 and 
by March 1959 to 125.4 (see Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, selected issues). Separate break-downs are not given for 
different types of lumber. 
steadily growing volume of urban residential construc-
tion—with almost all the imported supplies coming from 
Canada.®^ However, the marginal quantities purchased 
from Central America have been sufficiently competitive to 
enable that region to record a sustained growth trend in 
its small export totals over the past decade. To the extent 
therefore that Central America can match the price and 
quality standards set by the important Canadian supplier, 
the quantities moving from that region to the United States 
market could increase considerably over the next five 
years. 
It might be assumed that taken together, Central Ameri-
can soft and hardwood lumber exports to the United 
States will rise from their 1959 level of 2.9 million dollars 
to a 1965 range of between 5 million and 10 million 
dollars. Whether the higher or lower limit will prevail 
depends, of course, primarily on the extent to which sup-
ply elasticities, and production and quality standards in 
Central America,®* enable Central America to maintain 
its recent position aa a marginal but growing supplier of 
the large United States import market. 
On balance, therefore, United States imports of all wood 
and wood products from Central America might be ten-
tatively projected within the limits of 7.8 million and 15.8 
" From 1957 to 1959, approximately 98 per cent of all United 
States softwood lumber imports came from Canada. 
" It has been estimated that the construction of a large modern 
sawmill in the Olancho region of northern Honduras could alone 
increase Central American exports of pitch pine lumber by more 
than 5 million dollars during the coming decade (see FAO prelimi-
nary report FAO/CAIS/59/l ,TAA, 1959). 
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million dollars in 1965, as compared with 3.8 million 
dollars in 1955. These estimates, involving a twofold to 
fourfold increase over the next five years, presuppose a 
faster rate of growth than was recorded during the decade 
1949-59, when such exports rose less than threefold.®® 
5 . OTHER COMMODITIES 
United States imports of Central American cacao beans 
rose sharply after the war, stimulated by existing supply 
shortages and especially by the fivefold price increase that 
took place between the removal of wartime price controls 
and 1954. By the latter year, Central American sales to 
the United States amounted to 6.5 million dollars, com-
lared with less than 1 million dollars in 1946. Since 1954, 
lowever. United States prices have fallen considerably, 
and at the same time there has been a steadily growing 
use of natural and synthetic substitutes for cacao butter in 
the United States confectionery industry, and a simulta-
neous shift in the composition of confectionery sales away 
from items containing relatively large amounts of cacao.®® 
Per capita consumption has consistently remained below 
initial post-war level and total United States imports have 
remained stagnant in terms of volume for the past decade. 
By 1958, therefore, these price and volume developments 
had served to lower United States imports from Central 
America to only 3.8 million dollars. 
Silver, in the form of ore and base bullion, was shipped 
to the United States well before the Second World War. 
Unlike the merchandise items under review, this metal 
is unique in that it is not confronted. with consumer-
based variations in demand and price, and hence its ex-
port totals change exclusively in response to changes in 
supply. Although silver is produced in different parts of 
the region, one large foreign-owned company has usually 
provided the bulk of the output. In 1946, Central Ameri-
can silver sales to the United States totalled 2.8 million 
dollars, a level which subsequently rose steadily until, by 
1951-53, the annual average was over 6 million dollars. 
Since then rising production costs, on the one hand, and 
the depletion of some previously sizable ore deposits, 
on the other, have led to a falling production trend, and 
from • 1955-58 imports averaged closer to 2.5 million dol-
lars. Some new claims have recently been worked, but as 
recently as 1958 United States imports were only slightly 
larger than those existing at the beginning of the post-
war period. 
Central America first exported hard fibres to the United 
States during the Second World War, when the United 
States was, unable to obtain abaca from its traditional 
sources of supply in the Philippines. To ensure access to 
this important cordage fibre, so valuable for military ropes 
and hawsers, the United States Government helped to 
finance extensive plantings in Central America for direct 
shipment to the United States under a guaranteed sales 
arrangement. This arrangement, plus the subsequent de-
mand resulting from the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, 
led to an expansion in the volume and value of Central 
It should be noted that no forecasts have been included here 
regarding Central America as a potential exporter of paper or 
paper-base stocks. If, for example, the pulping mill discussed in 
the FAO report mentioned in footnote 64, is inaugurated, the 
estimates given above could be significantly higher. 
See "Recent trends in the exports and prices of some pro-
ducts"i Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. I, No.l (San-
tiago, Chile, January 1956), pp. 69 ei. seq. 
American sales until, by 1954, they amounted to 4 millior 
dollars. In more recent years, however, Philippine abacs 
has once, again become available in plentiful supply anc 
at competitive prices. At the same time, various techno-
logical developments have reduced the peacetime cordage 
demand for abaca.®' By 1958, therefore, United States 
iinports from Central America amounted to only 2.9 mil-
lion dollars and further cuts are expected.®® 
The United States does not produce sesame seed in 
commercial quantities, and Central America traditionally 
provides four fifths or more of its total imports. Its im-
ports rose progressively during the first post-war decade, 
mainly because of the growing use of sesame seed for 
bakery products and as a derivative oil for confectionary 
and various other kitchen purposes. As a result United 
States imports from Central America increased more than 
fivefold from 1946 to 1954, reaching 2.5 million dollars,-
by the latter year. Imports fell temporarily in 1955, 
and have been characterized subsequently by progressive 
volume increases and a steady price level. Despite the. 
recent recovery, however, Central American sales in 1958 
amounted to only 2.3 million dollars. 
By far the bulk of the United States sugar quota comes 
from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Peru.®® 
While Central America's allotment is very small, its growth 
in response to the gradual rise in United States sugar 
consumption has initiated a modest but rising trend in 
exports. Admittedly, the volume has fluctuated in cer-
tain post-war years, when the differential between inter-
national and United States quota prices caused Central 
America to redirect its marginal output towards markets 
other than the United States. None the less, from insigni-
ficant amounts in 1946, Central American exports to the 
United States had risen to 2 million dollars in 1958, 
the highest level ever recorded by the region. 
To sum up, exports of the first four items (cacao beans, 
silver, abaca and sesame) to the United States rose stead-
ily from 1946 to 1954, reaching a post-war peak of 16 
million dollars in that year. During the subsequent five 
years, on the other hand, owing to lower prices, the 
resurgence of traditional supply areas, various techno-
logical arid' consumer taste developments, and Central 
American supply inelasticities, their combined values have 
not been able to maintain a steady level let alone increase. 
On the contrary, they declined to only 12 million dollars 
in 1958. These four itenSs thus stand in contrast to soluble 
coffee and sugar, both of which were of negligible impor-
tance until 1954 but subsequently rose to a post-war peak 
of 8 million dollars in 1958. 
Lead and zinc ore exports from Central America were 
of minor importance during the first post-war decade, 
amounting together to less than 1 million dollars up to 
1954. In the next few years, however, both rose rapidly, 
as a" result, on the one hand, of the general strengthening 
of lead and zinc prices, during this period, and, on the 
" Man-made fibres are being increasingly used for marine ropes 
because of their greater tensile strength, water resistance and light 
weight. Similarly, the growing use of cartons, and gummed or 
sealing paper, has reduced industrial consumption of hard-fibre 
twines. 
The United States has already begun to terminate its con-
tractual arrangements for abaca production in Central America. 
When Cuba's sugar export quota was cut, the quotas of Nica-
ragua and Costa Rica increased by 23 265 tons, and annual quotas 
of 6 000 tons were allotted to El Salvador and Guatemala. Thus 
the total sugar quota for export from Central America to the United 
States amounts to 54 173 tons. 
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other, of a United States government purchase agreement 
signed with a Central American mining company after 
the Korean hostilities providing for preferential prices and 
guaranteed sales terms. Under the combined stimuli of 
these developments, United States imports from Central 
America rose to almost 6 million dollars by 1957. Begin-
ning in 1958, however, when sinking lead and zinc prices 
were limiting production in marginal Central American 
mines, and as delivery commitments under the govern-
ment contract were nearing completion. Central American 
sales to the United States fell back sharply, amounting to 
only 2.7 million dollars in that year.''® 
United States imports of citronella and Lemon grass oils 
have always been small. During the entire post-war period, 
total United States imports of these two so-called essential 
oils averaged only about 4 million dollars per year. Their 
main uses are as scenting or flavouring agents in the manu-
facture of soaps, bath salts, insect repellents, and for cer-
tain foods and drugs. In 1946, when supplies from Asia 
were not yet fully available. Central American exports of 
the two items were valued at 1.7 million dollars. Subse-
quently, Central American shipments fluctuated irregularly 
but usually close to or below their combined 1946 level 
because of the inroads made by other natural and syn-
thetic substitutes and of the strong competition from other 
suppliers such as China (Formosa) and India. By 1958, 
United States imports from Central America of the two 
oils amounted to only 1 million dollars. 
Chicle, jelutang and leche caspi are the principal base 
ingredients used in the manufacture of chewing gum. 
None are produced commercially in the United States. The 
three ingredients are interchangeable and hence their res-
pective import trends depend upon supplies and relative 
prices. During the Second World War when jelutong was 
not obtainable from Asia, imports of leche caspi and espe-
cially of chicle rose sharply in both volume and unit 
values. Although Mexico is the main chicle supplier, 
Central America also benefited from this situation, selling 
record amounts worth 3.0 to 3.5 million dollars to the 
United States in 1946 and 1947 respectively. During the 
next few yeai;s, the reverse situation prevailed, when the 
high price of chicle as compared with the other two in-
gredients and the growing post-war supplies of the latter 
brought about a declining trend in United States imports 
from Central America. More recently chicle prices have 
remained quite steady, and the volume has moved irregu-
larly, but as recently as 1958 imports were still less than 
half of their 1946 level. 
In addition to the various commodities mentioned. Cen-
tral America's residual export to the United States include 
United States import quotas for lead and zinc were imposed 
during October 1958. Between the third quarter of that year and 
the first quarter of 1959, United States imports of lead and zinc 
fell by 10 and 30 per cent respectively in volume. 
a final miscellaneous category comprising several minor 
and specialized items such as exotic fruits, herbs and 
spices, oils, waxes, gums and resins, hides and skins, 
curios, and various light manufactured products. Some 
of these items have not been able to maintain their foot-
hold in the United States market, whereas other new prod-
ucts have emerged to take their place. In general, how-
ever, the main characteristic of this miscellaneous category 
is that its total has remained very close to 5 million dol-
lars per year throughout the entire post-war period. 
In summary, therefore, United States residual imports 
from Central America have, for a variety of reasons, fol-
lowed widely different patterns of growth, stability and 
decline since 1946. Roughly speaking, they might be con-
sidered to fall within the following three groups. Firstly, 
soluble coffee, seafood, lumber and sugar have all followed 
quite favourable patterns during the post-war period, and 
as regards the prospects currently facing them in the 
United States, their growth possibilities in the near future 
look promising. Secondly, the prospects for abaca, lead 
and zinc are gloomy owing, among other reasons, to the 
pending termination of various governmental contracts 
that had been largely instrumental in stimulating their 
development. Thirdly, cacao beans, sesame seeds, essential 
oils, chicle, silver and miscellaneous items have all fol-
lowed erratic post-war courses, but in virtually all cases 
their recent value and volume levels were well below 
those existing during the first ten post-war years. While 
the fate of each product in this third group will depend 
upon a number of circumstances that cannot now be as-
certained, there are grounds for expecting that some future 
growth could take place over their combined 1958 level. 
The use of these three broad categories to indicate 
possible future developments should not be construed in 
any way as forecasts. For Central America, whose residual 
exports are so small and varied, and where short-term 
circumstances affecting supply and demand can lead to 
very sharp and erratic fluctuations in export levels from 
one year to another, quantitative projections would re-
quire detailed market surveys for each of the many prod-
ucts concerned, a task beyond the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, there are grounds for assuming that growth 
prospects are very good for items comprising about a 
third of all the "residual" commodities in 1958, that they 
are poor for items constituting about one sixth of these 
commodities, and that the remaining half occupy a middle 
position in which some expansion in their combined total 
is possible. On balance, however, and taking all these 
items together, they do not appear to offer much more 
than modest possibilities of growth as regards the near 
future. This situation, together with their small magni-
tudes, indicates that Central America's residual exports to 
the United States could at best only partially offset the 
pesssimistic short-term outlook facing the region's two 
traditional commodity exports. 
V. TRENDS IN COMMODITY DIVERSIFICATION BY COUNTRIES 
In section III, 2 above. Central American exports of coffee, 
bananas and residual items to the United States were 
presented from the viewpoint of the region as a whole. In 
the following section, a brief examination will be made of 
some individual country totals, primarily in order to as-
certain the extent to which the traditional emphasis placed 
on coffee and bananas by each republic increased or de-
creased from the beginning to the end of the post-war 
period. 
Table 30 was prepared to show the relative importance 
of each country within the total of Central American ex-
ports to the United States. For the years 1946-58 taken as 
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Table 14 
U N I T E D S T A T E S : I M P O R T S F R O M C E N T R A L A M E R I C A , B Y C O U N T R I E S 




Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua. 
Value (%) Value (%) • Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) 
1946-49 158.8 30.6 (19) 28.7 (18) 52.5 (33) 38.3 (24) 8.8 (6) 
1950-54 262.5 51.2 (20) 60.8 (23) 70.2 (27) 56.7 (22) 23.7 , (9) 
1955-58 . . . . . . . . 252.9 42.3 (17) 53.8 (21) 80.8 (32) 53.4 (21) 22.6 (9) 
1946-58 227.7 42.1 (19) 48.8 (21) 68.0 (30) 50.0 (22) 18.8 (8) 
SOURCE: Annex, table VII. 
a whole, it will be seen that Guatemala has accounted for 
the largest proportion (30 per cent) and Nicaragua the 
smallest (8 per cent). Honduras, El Salvador and Costa 
Rica have occupied intermediate positions (22, 21 and 19 
per cent respectively) between these upper and lower ex-
tremes. Although variations have taken place in the pro-
portions recorded for each country from one year to an-
other, this broad threefold order of rank has not changed 
since the end of the Second World War. 
Virtually the entire increase in Guatemala's exports to 
the United States was due to its rapidly expanding coffee 
trade (see table 31). Bananas have shown no net post-war 
growth, and despite the increasing number of residual ex-
ports, the latter category also revealed a virtually stagnant 
post-war trend. Coffee has therefore grown so substantially 
in importance that its share of the total jumped from 42 
per cent in 1946 to 70 per cent in 1958. Conversely, the 
share represented by bananas fell from 41 to 20 per cent, 
and that of residual exports from 17 to only 10 per cent 
during these same years. It is thus very clear that Gua-
temala's commodity composition has become increasingly 
more rigid so far as its post-war exports to the United 
States are concerned i.e. it has not been able to reduce 
its historic emphasis upon bananas and coffee as a group 
through the development of new export items, and further-
more it is now far more dependent upon a single crop 
—coffee—than was the case at the beginning of the post-
war period. 
In one respect, Honduras has differed from Guatemala 
in that coffee has never ousted bananas (see table 32). In 
two other respects, however, post-war trends in the com-
modity composition of Honduran and Guatemalan exporta 
to the United States show a considerable similarity. Firstly, 
coffee and bananas together have increased in importance 
in both countries to the point of accounting for 90 per 
cent or more of their respective totals. Thus, even though 
a progressively larger number of items has entered the 
Honduran category of residual exports, this category has 
not grown in value terms since 1946 and hence its share 
fell from 24 per cent in the latter year to only 10 per 
cent in 1958. 
Secondly, while Honduran banana exports have fluctu-
ated widely in recent years, especially owing to produc-
tion problems since 1953, this fruit by itself has usually 
provided between 60 and 80 per cent of Honduran sales 
to the United States, a range virtually identical with that 
recorded for coffee in the case of Guatemala. 
Costa Rica's commodity trends vis-a-vis the United 
States have differed somewhat from those of Guatemala 
and Honduras in that the combined share of bananas and 
Table 31 
U N I T E D S T A T E S : I M P O R T S F R O M G U A T E M A L A I N S E L E C T E D P O S T - W A R Y E A R S 
(Values in millions of dollars) 
Item 
1946 1950 1954 1958 
Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) 
Bananas and coffee: Total 32.5 ( 83 J 61.0 ( 92) 68.6 ( 93) 68.3 ( 90) 
Bananas . . . . . . . 16.1 ( 41) 17.8 ( 27) 13.5 ( 18) 15.0 ( 20) 
Coffee . . . . . 16:4 ( 4 2 ) 43.2 ( 65) 55.1 X 75) 53.3 ( 70) , 
Other items: Total . . . 6.4 ( 17) 5.7 ( 8) 5.0 ( 7) 7.4 ( 10) 
Chicle . . . . . 3.0 0.8 0.9 1.3 
Abaca 0.4 1.9 1.0 0.8 
Citronella oil . . 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.4 
Lemon grass oil . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
Lumber . . . . , 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Cacao beans . . . . . — 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Lead ore . . . . . . . —^  0.4 0.4 0.6 
Zinc ore . . . . — 0.1 0.7 
Miscellaneous . . . 1.5 1.0 1.8 2.6 
All items: Total . . 38.9 (100) 66.7 (100) 73.6 (100) 75.7 (100) 




U N I T E D S T A T E S : I M P O R T S F R O M H O N D U R A S I N S E L E C T E D P O S T - W A R Y E A R S 
(Values in millions of dollars) 
Item 
1946 1950 1954 1958 
Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) 
Bananas and coffee: Total 19S ( 76) 47.7 (90) 43.0 ( 88) 55.4 ( 90) 
Bananas . . . . . . . 18.7 { 73) 42.7 ( 81) 29.4 ( 60) 46.6 ( 76) 
Coffee 0.8 ( 3) 5.0 ( 9) 13.6 { 28) 8.8 ( 14) 
Other items: Total . . . 6.1 (24) 5.5 ( 10) 6.1 ( 12) 6.2 ( 10) 
Abaca • . . . 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.7 
Lumber . . . . . . . 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 
Lead ore . . . . 0.1 0.4 1.0 
Zinc ore . . . . . . — 0.2 0.3 
Silver 2.8 3.1 3.8 2.4 
Miscellaneous . . . 2.7 1.7 0.9 1.3 
All items: Total . . . . . 25.6 (100) 53.2 (100) 49.1 (100) 61.6 (100) 
SOURCE: FT Report 120, with adjustments for banana undervaluations, and including silver ore 
and base bullion. 
cofFee has not increased in Costa Rican post-war exports to 
the United States. In fact, a modest movement in the 
opposite direction has taken place (see table 33). But, 
while Costa Rica's residual exports have been growing 
in both absolute and relative terms, this has been due 
almost exclusively to two items—cacao beans and abaca. 
The future of the latter at least is doubtful. 
El Salvador is unique among the Central American 
countries in that bananas have never figured in its export 
trade, and also because coffee has long accounted for all 
but 1 to 2 per cent of its exports to the United States (see 
table 34). During the first ten post-war years, the sharp 
rise in coffee prices redounded substantially to El Salva-
dor's benefit and its sales to the United States rose far 
more rapidly than did those of Central America as a 
whole. Since 1955, conversely, declining prices have re-
acted very adversely upon El Salvador's coffee sales, a de-
velopment that has been partially offset in the last few 
years by the increase in residual export values. But, as in 
the case of Costa Rica, it should be noted that only a very 
few residual items are involved, one in particular (soluble 
coffee) being of outstanding importance. 
Nicaragimn exports of bananas are minor, and coffee 
has traditionally accounted for the bulk of its sales to the 
United States market (see table 35). However, while 
the absolute magnitudes of Nicaragua's residual exports 
are small, they have grown in relative importance to the 
point where their combined share (typically 20 to 30 
per cent of the total) has been well in excess of that re-
corded for any of the other four countries mentioned. In 
this respect at least, Nicaragua might be said to have 
achieved the widest degree of commodity diversification 
so far as Central America's post-war trade with the United 
States is concerned. 
On reviewing tables 31 to 35 it will be seen that the 
emphasis upon coffee and bananas as a group has in-
creased for Guatemala and Honduras since 1946 and also 
that both of these countries must now depend very heavily 
Table 33 
U N I T E D S T A T E S : I M P O R T S F R O M C O S T A R I C A , I N S E L E C T E D P O S T - W A R Y E A R S 
(Values in millions of dollars) 
Item 
1946 1950 1954 1958 
Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) 
Bananas and coffee: Total 14.3 ( 89) 42.1 ( 91) 43.6 ( 84) 44.0 ( 86) 
Bananas . . . . . . . 9.5 ( 59) 30.7 ( 66) 30.4 ( 59) 24.7 ( 49) 
Coffee . . . 4.8 ( 30) 11.4 ( 25) 13.2 ( 25) 19.3 ( 37) 
Other items: Total . . . 1.8 ( 11) 4.4 ( 9) 8.1 ( 16) 6.9 ( 14) 
Cacao beans . . . . — 1.1 6.2 3.6 
Abaca . . . — 1.4 0.3 1.3 
Lumber . . . . 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Seafood . . . . 0.3 1.4 0.2 0.1 
Sugar — 0.1 0.5 
Miscellaneous . . . 1.1 0.4 1.2 1.3 
All items: Total . . . . . 16.1 (100) 46.5 (100) 51.7 (100) 50S (100) 
SouBCE: FT Report 120, with adjustments for banana undervaluations. 
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Table 14 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS FROM EL SALVADOR, IN SELECTED POST^WAR YEARS 
(Vallies in millions of dollars) 
Item. 
1946 1950 1954 1958 
Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) 
Green coffee: Total . . 14.9 ( 98) 50.3 ( 98) 60.2 ( 98) 40.7 ( 83) 
Other items: Total . . 0.3 ( 2) 1.2 ( 2) 1.2 ( 2) 8.1 ( 17) 
Soluble cpfifee . . — — — 5.7 
Sesame seed . . . — o.i 0.4 0.6 
Seafood — • — — 0.7 
Miscellaneous . . . 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.1 
All items: Toted . . . . 15.2 (100) 51.5 (100) 61.4 (100) 48.8 (100) 
SOÜRCE: f t Report 120. 
upon only one of these two traditional crops. Costa Rica, 
H Salvador and Nicaragua have all succeeded in reducing 
their reliance upon coffee and bananas, but the degree to 
which they have developed an expanding category of resi-
dual exports has usually been modest. Moreover, even 
where the latter category has grown, only one or a very 
few new items have been involved. Taken singly or to-
gether therefore, the Central American republics have ex-
perienced little or no change in their export commodity 
diversification to the United States during the post-war 
period. This problem of an exceptionally rigid export base 
renders all the more difficult the region's ability to solve 
the equally serious problem of the recent decline in its 
exports to that market. 
VI. SOME IMPLICATION FOR THE FUTURE 
Per capita incomes in Central America are currently 
among the lowest in Latin America, and the extent to 
which they can be raised in the future will, as in the past, 
depend considerably upon the growth in earnings origin-
ating in the region's export sector. In this context, the 
United States occupies an important position since it still 
accounts for over half of Central America's total income 
generated by merchandise exports. Whether Central Ameri-
can sales to the United States will once again recover the 
growth momentum that was their major characteristic 
during the first post-war decade, or will continue to decline 
as has been the case in recent years, is a matter of great 
potential concern to the future economic and political 
well-being of the region. 
Unfortunately there are few grounds for anticipating 
that the recent and declining trend has as yet run its course. 
On the one hand, coffee still faces its most serious crisis 
of over-supply and depressed prices since the end of the 
Second World War, and recent studies indicate little like-
lihood if any of a forthcoming reversal in the post-war pat-
tern of declining United States per capita banana con-
sumption. Secondly, and as has been so markedly evident 
Table 35 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS FROM NICARAGUA IN SELECTED POST-WAR YEARS 
(Values in millions of dollars) 
1946 1950 1954 1958 
Item — 
Value (%) Value (%) Value <%) Value (%) 
Bananas and coffee: Toted 4.5 ( 69) 16.7 ( 84) 21.5 ( 79) 15.5 ( 72) 
Bananas 0.3 ( 5 ) 1.1 ( 6 ) 1.2 ( 4) 0.3 ( 1) 
Coffee 4.2 ( 64) 15.6 ( 78) 20.3 ( 75) 15.2 ( 71) 
Other items: Total . . . 2.0 ( 31) 3J ( 16) 5.8 ( 21) 6.0 ( 28) 
Sesame seed 0.4 0.7 2.0 1.6 
Sugar — 0.6 0.9 1.9 
Lumber 0.2 0.9 0.9 1.1 
Silver — 0.1 0.5 0.2 
Miscellaneous . . . . 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.2 
All items: Total 6.5 (100) 20.0 (100) 273 (100) 21.5 (100) 
SOURCE: Report FT 120, with adjustments for banana undervaluation, and including silver ore 
and base bullion. 
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throughout the period 1946-58, Central America must 
« continue to expect active and persistent competition from 
other coffee and banana producers selling in the United 
States market. Considering that coffee has provided 55 per 
cent, and bananas about 35 per cent of Central American 
exports to the United States since the war, the prospects 
of growth seem limited so far as these two traditional 
products are concerned. As for residual items, it has been 
shown that they have not succeeded in reducing Central 
America's historically rigid range of commodity exports to 
the United States, whether viewed on a country-by-country 
basis or in terms of the region as a whole. Moreover, with 
only a few exceptions, the post-war performance of these 
residual items has not been such as to indicate more than 
a modest growth potential in the foreseeable future. 
In view of these circumstances, Central America is con-
fronted with a current and pressing need to re-examine 
its regional export prospects. On the one hand, every step 
should be taken to strengthen its position within the 
United States market, not only by maintaining compe-
titive price and quality standards for its coffee and ba-
nanas, but also through the active promotion of existing, 
and the development of new exports.^^ The recent and 
rapid export growth of soluble coffee and seafood items 
are cases in point. In addition, Central America has other 
and hitherto unexploited possibilities, such as forest pro-
ducts (including pulp), meat and meat products, rubber, 
vanilla and spices.''^ 
Again, Central America's access to markets in other 
industrialized countries—such as Japan and Canada, and 
especially Europe—should be actively encouraged. Im-
See Economic Survey of Latin America (E/CN.12/480/Rev.l ) , 
United Nations publication. Sales No. 58.II.G.1, pp. 16 et seq. 
See Kathryn Wylie, "Central America as a market and com-
petitor for United States agriculture", in Foreign Agriculture 
Report, op. cit. 
ports of coffee and bananas into Western Europe, for 
example, have been rising substantially during recent 
years, in contrast to the trend followed by the United 
States. Moreover, this group of countries, and especially 
Japan, have provided important outlets for Central Ameri-
can cotton, again in contrast with the United States. 
Finally, special mention should be made of the stimuli 
)rovided by the Central American Economic Integration 
'rogramme for developing new products within, and in-
creasing trade flows between, the various countries of the 
region. By facilitating the adoption of a common tariff 
policy vis-a-vis other areas, by progressively eliminating 
trade barriers between member countries,'^ by directly 
assisting in the development of new industrial projects,'^ 
and by a variety of other measures that it is actively pro-
moting for the raising of income, employment and invest-
ment levels generally, the Programme should ensure for 
Central American intra-regional trade a much faster rate 
of growth in the future than in the past. A variety of 
existing and new products, both agricultural and industrial, 
will be affected by the Programme and will offer an 
excellent source of growth potential for the future.'® To 
the extent, therefore, that the Programme facilitates the 
prompt and rapid development of these items and accele-
rates their subsequent entry into intra-regional trade chan-
nels, Central America's problems of inadequate commodity 
and area diversification will become progressively less 
serious. 
Under the terms of the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and 
Central American Economic Integration (10 June 1958) and the 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties 
and Charges (1 September 1959). 
Under the Agreement on the Regime for Central American 
Integration Industries (10 June 1958). 
See El desarrollo económico de El Salvador, op. cit., pp. 
91-95. 
STATISTICAL INDEX 
Central American exports to the United States, as reported by 
official sources in the various exporting countries, and United 
States imports from Central America, as tabulated in United States 
governmental publications, may differ for a variety of reasons, 
including time-lags in reporting, differences in commodity classific-
ation and country allocation, the use of general or special trade 
coverage, and because of the different valuation procedures used. 
To provide a greater degree of comparability, therefore, virtually 
all the statistical data used in section III were taken from two 
publications of the United States Bureau of the Census, namely 
FT (Foreign Trade ) Reports Nos. 110 and 120, which provide 
volume and value totals for United States imports on commodity-
by-country and country-by-commodity bases, respectively. These 
reports measure merchandise imports entering consumption chan-
nels and are based upon the various entry forms which importers 
are required to file for each shipment arriving in the United 
States. In general, the dollar totals represent f.o.b. market values 
in the foreign country, i.e. excluding United States import duties, 
ocean freight and maritime insurance. 
Two modifications have, however, been made in the above-men-
tioned Bureau of the Census data for the purpose of the tables 
presented in this article. Firstly, while United States imports of 
silver ore and bullion are excluded in the FT sources mentioned, 
they have been incorporated in the subsequent tables, following 
in this respect the methodology used in United Nations trade 
publications." Secondly, the FT coverage for United States banana 
" See United Nations, "Definitions and Explanatory Notes", 
Supplement to the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1954, p. 83. It 
imports has been adjusted to take account of both volume and 
value shortcomings. The FT data, for example, show "volume" 
only in terms of the number of stems imported. Since, however, 
average weights per stem can differ so substantially from one 
year to another and from one country to another, a more accurate 
volume estimate is obtained by using the weight of bananas listed 
in the import shipping manifests as published in other Bureau of 
the Census sources. For value data the FT publications use im-
porters' declarations which have been found to contain serious 
undervaluations of the value of transactions at the point of foreign 
origin. To compensate for this shortcoming, import values have been 
adjusted by multiplying the shipping weights by an estimated price 
per pound of bananas at the foreign port. Both of these volume and 
value adjustments have been effected in conformity with the pro-
cedures adopted by the United States Department of Commerce 
in preparing the official United States balance-of-payments tables. 
As will be seen from table I of this annex, the differences between 
the reported (unadjusted) FT values and the balance-of-pay-
ments (revalued) values are exceptionally large: from 1955 to 
1958, for example, the adjusted total was on the average almost 
110 million dollars per year higher than the unadjusted figure. 
Given this substantial discrepancy, on the one hand, and the 
importance of bananas in United States imports from Central 
America, on the other, the methodology utilized by the Balance 
of Payments Division of the United States Department of Com-
merce in effecting such valuation adjustments is reproduced below : 
should be noted from this supplement that gold ore and bullion 
are excluded. 
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"There are various reasons why values incorporated in the 
Census statistics for goods entering free of duty, or dutiable 
at specific rates, may not represent actual transactions prices 
applicable at the foreign port or border. Perhaps the most im-
portant of these is the assignment, in some cases, of arbitrary 
values to imports produced by foreign branches or subsidiaries 
of American companies. Bananas are one of the major United 
States imports supplied in this manner. Because arbitrarily low 
prices are declared by leading United States importers. Census 
import statistics seriously understate the amount of dollars 
actually credited to the foreign subsidiaries to cover production 
costs and profits assigned to foreign operations. • Adjustments 
have been made to correct for this undervaluation of bananas 
in the Census data by deducting, from the domestic wholesale 
(banana) prices in leading ports of entry, estimated costs of 
ocean transportation and estimated expenditures in the United 
States such as storage and marketing. The resulting estimated 
prices f.a.s. foreign port were then applied to the estimated 
shipping weights of bananas imported from subsidiaries or bran-
ches of American companies. The differences between these 
estimated values and the values shown in the Census statistics 
for corresponding statistics represent the actual adjustments 
made^  Census statistics covering imports other than bananas from 
foreign branches or subsidiaries of United States companies 
appear to represent more accurately the actual amoimts for 
which the foreign producers were credited on the books of the 
parent companies." 
As will be noted, the above procedure relies upon certain esti-
mates and assumptions which cannot be checked for accuracy. But 
it provides a far more accurate indication of post-war trends in 
United States banana imports from Central America than would 
be availáble from the FT publications. This article therefore uses 




UNITED STATES: TOTAL IMPORTS OF BANANAS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Table II 
UNITED STATES: BROAD BREAK-DOWN OF IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA, 
BY COMMODITIES 
(Values in millions of dollars) 
Year Reported data Undervaluation Adjusted unadjusted'' estimate^ total 
1946 28 71 
1947 50 53 103 
1948 . . 50 69 119 
1949 53 84 137 
1950 . . 56 95 151 
1951 55 100 155 
1952 103 159 
1953 67 96 163 
1954 , , . 65 97 162 
1955 67 94 161 
1956 68 97 165 
1957 70 118 188 
1958 . . . . . . . 69 120 189 


















As published in United States bureau of the Census, Report No. 
FT no, under Schedule A number 1301 000, "Bananas, Green 
or Ripe". 
As published in the United States Department of Commerce, 
Balance of Payments Supplement to the Survey of Current 
Business, 1958, and Survey of Current Business, June, 1959. 
1946 . . . 102.2 100.0 41.0 40.1 44.6 43.6 16.6 16.2 
1947 . . . 162.6 100.0 .69.8 42.9 70.1 43.1 22.7 14.0 
1948 . . . 181.2 100.0 78.1 43.1 79.0 43.6 24.1 13.3 
1949 . . . 189.3 100.0 86.1 45.5 83.9 44.3 19.3 10.2 
1950 . . . 238.1 100.0 125.3 52.6 92.3 38.8 20.5 8.6 
1951 . . . 271.2 100.0 155.1 57.2 88.5 32.6 27.6 10.2 
1952 . . . 265.1 100.0 156.5 59.0 81.1 30.6 27.5 10.4 
1953 . . . 275.3 100.0 167.1 60.7 83.2 30.2 25.0 9.1 
1954 . . . 263.0 100.0 162.3 61.7 74.5 28.3 26.2 10.0 
1955 . . . 249.0 100.0 162.1 65.1 64.0 25.7 22.9 9.2 
1956 . . . 243.4 100.0 141.2 58.0 75.4 31.0 26.8 11.0 
1957 . . . 260.8 100.0 146.8 56.3 77.8 29.8 36.2 13.9 
1958 . . . 258.5 100.0 137.3 53.1 86.6 33.5 34.6 13.4 
Table III 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF GREEN COFFEE FROM CENTRAL AMERICA 
SOURCE: Coffee: United States Department of Commerce FT Report 110. Bananas: Data pro-
vided by the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, including 
estimated undervaluation adjustments. Residual items: FT Report 110, plus imports of silver 
in the form of ore and base bullion. 
Table IV 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF GREEN COFFEE, 
FROM SELECTED AREAS' 
(Millions of pounds) 
Value Volume Unit value Indices: 1954 = 100 
Year 
Year (millions (millions (cent per Unit 
value of dollars) of pounds) pound) Value Volume 
1946 41.0 233 17.6 25 88 29 
1947 285 24.6 43 108 40 
1948 294 26.6 48 111 43 
1949 305 28.2 53 116 46 
1950 125.3 330 38.0 77 125 62 
1951 155.1 319 48.6 96 121 79 
1952 . . . . . 156.5 319 49.1 97 121 80 
1953 338 49.4 103 128 80 
1954 162.3 264 61.5 100 100 100 
1955 162.1 298 54.4 100 113 89 
1956 244 58.2 87 92 95 
1957 268 54.8 90 102 89 
























2 729 233 2 440 55 
2 495 285 2153 53 
2 774 294 2 423 48 
2 923 305 2 553 57 
2 440 330 1993 109 
. 2 693 319 2 237 129 
2 681 319 2193 162 
2 787 338 2 245 194 
. 2 261 264 1781 203 
. 2 599 298 1992 297 
, 2 812 244 2 220 330 
. 2 761 268 2 056 413 
, 2 671 305 1952 393 
SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, FT Report 110. 
SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, FT Reports 110 
and 120. 
" Imports from regions not shown account for less than 1 per 
cent of the total. 
tu Table V 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF BANANAS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA 
Valae Volume Unit value Indices: 1954 — 100 
Year ( millions ( millions (cents per Unit 
value of dollars) of pounds) pound) Value Volume 
1946 . . . . 44.6 1477 3.02 60 103 58 
1947 . . . . 70.1 1895 3.70 94 132 71 
1948 . . . . 79.0 1950 4.05 106 136 78 
1949 . . . . . . . 83.9 1844 4.55 113 129 87 
1950 . . . . 92.3 1845 5.00 124 129 96 
1951 . . . . 88.5 1769 5.00 119 124 96 
1952 . . . . . . . 81.1 1621 5.00 109 113 96 
1953 . . . . . . . 83.2 , 1664 5.00 112 116 96 
1954 . . . . 74.5 1432 5.20 100 100 100 
1955 . . . . 64.0 1255 5.10 86 88 98 
1956 . . . . 75.4 1461 5.16 101 102 99 
1957 . . . . . . . 77.8 1378 5.64 104 96 108 
1958 . . . . . . . 86.6 - 1535 5.64 116 107 108 
SOURCE: Volume ~ Based upon shipping weights, as provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Value — Data provided by the Office of Business Economics, U.S., Department of Commerce, 
including estimated undervaluation adjustments. 
Table VI 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF BANANAS FROM 
SELECTED AREAS 
(Millions of pounds) 




From rest of Latin 
America 
Ecuador Balance' 
1946 . . . . 2 500 1477 24 999 
1947 . . . . 2904 1895 109 900 
1948 . . . . 3 080 1950 156 974 
1949 . . . . 3 200 1844 245 1111 
1950 . . . . 3 256 1845 375 1036 
1951 . . . . 3 287 1769 468 1050 
1952 . . . . 3 367 1621 932 814 
1953 . . . . 3 463 1664 795 1004 
1954 . . . . 3 336 1432 845 1059 
1955 . . . . 3 267 1255 1039 973 
1956 . . . . 3 298 1461 1042 795 
1957 . . . . 3 344 1378 1100 866 
1958 . . . . 3364 1535 1026 803 
SOÜKCE: Based on shipping weights, as provided by the United 
States Census Bureau. 
' Including minor amounts from non-Latin American suppliers. 
Table VII 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA, BY COUNTRIES 
(Millions of dollars) 
Year Total Costa Rica 
El Scd. 
vadoT Guatemala Honduras 
Nicara-
gua 
1946 102.2 16.1 15.2 38.9 25.5 6.5 
1947 , , 162.6 29.9 27.7 57.0 38.6 9.4 
1948 181.2 36.2 31.4 58.9 42.5 12.2 
1949 , , 189.3 40.0 40.4 55.2 46.7 7.1 
1950 , . 238.1 46.4 51.5 66.7 53.3 20.1 
1951 271.2 47.6 63.9 73.7 64.5 21.5 
1952 , . 265.1 57.0 61.5 66.8 56.1 23.7 
1953 275.3 53.4 65.5 70.2 60.5 25.8 
1954 . 263.0 51.7 61.4 73.5 49.2 27.2 
1955 , 249.0 43.6 62.4 78.5 38.1 26.3 
1956 , , 243.4 30.7 48.5 86.7 57.5 20.0 
1957 . . . . . 260.8 43.9 55.7 82.3 56.2 22.7 • 
1958 . . 258.5 50.9 48.7 75.7 61.7 21.5 
SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, FT Report 120, including imports of silver 
ore and bullion, and adjusted for banana undervaluations. 
THE COFFEE INDUSTRY IN SAO PAULO 
The following pages contain a synthesis of the findings of 
the coffee survey conducted in the State of Sao Paulo in 
1558. The survey was sponsored jointly by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the 
Brazilian Coffee Institute {Instituto Brasileiro do Café) 
(IBC) and the Department of Agriculture {Secretaria da 
Agricultura (DA) of the State of Sao Paulo.^ 
The purpose of the survey was to supply information on 
a variety of characteristics of coffee growing in the State 
of Sao Paulo, which were hitherto insufficiently known. 
For this purpose it was necessary to collect original data 
in the field by means of a large-scale and statistically 
representative sample of all coffee farms in the State. 
Quantitative estimates, of, for instance, the number of 
trees, area and production, are based on the careful on-
the-spot investigation of 1 991 coffee farms in all parts 
of the State. Economic information, such as the number of 
man-days employed in coffee growing, the use of capital, 
etc., are derived from an even more detailed study of 
486 farms, included in the 1 991 already mentioned. 
All data have been rigorously inspected and sifted by 
technicians fully acquainted with coffee-growing methods 
in the State of Sao Paulo. In addition, the results of the 
survey have been checked with those obtained on 33 farms 
which independently kept daily records of activities during 
the survey period. 
Though original farm data, obtained through a field 
survey, cannot be expected to yield mathematically ac-
curate results, it is considered that the data presented in 
the following pages are reasonably reliable and adequately 
reflect the average conditions under which coffee is pro-
duced in Sao Paulo. 
Although many features of coffee growing are, of course, 
similar irrespective of the place where it is cultivated, it 
is stressed that the detailed results obtained and the ana-
lysis made are valid only for the State of Sao Paulo and 
that they do not apply to Brazil as a whole. Many of the 
characteristics and problems of coffee growing in Sao 
Paulo, as well as many of the possible solutions, are 
' The complete report, in its different aspects and phases, has 
already gone to press, and will form part of the series Coffee in 
Latin America, published jointly by ECLA and FAO, the first 
volume of which was devoted to Colombia and El Salvador (see 
E/CN.12/490, United Nations publication. Sales No. 58.II.G.4). 
The Sao Paulo survey will appear in the following two volumes 
(II and III) in the same series: the first is entitled The stale 
and prospects of production (EyCN.12/545/Vol. l ) ; the second 
(E/CN.I2/545/V0I.2) is divided into two main sections: Case 
study of 33 farms and Analysis of the functions of production. 
peculiar to that State. The situation in other States is 
often very different. 
This study does not enter into the present problem of 
world supply and prices, although the conditions in Sao 
Paulo are directly related to the world coffee situation 
owing to the importance of the State in total production. 
Many of the internal problems of the industry are of a 
long-term nature and their solution calls for independent 
measures, to a certain extent regardless of the present 
world market situation. 
But for the splendid co-operation of the Brazilian Coffee 
Institute and of the Department of Agriculture of Sao 
Paulo it would have been impossible to undertake an 
extensive and important survey such as the one outlined 
here. The Institute financed local costs and also supplied 
technicians to supervise the various field operations and 
plan the statistical services. The Department, through its 
Division of Rural Economy, headed by Mr. Ruy Miller 
Paiva, provided regional technical personnel for the field 
enumeration as well as central personnel for the planning, 
execution and evaluation of the multiple phases involved. 
These phases included the planning of the samples and of 
the questionnaires, the checking of the data collected, the 
mechanical tabulation of results, and permanent consult-
ations with FAO and ECLA staff members assigned to the 
project. Special recognition is therefore due to all who 
worked so assiduously to complete the survey, often under 
difficult conditions. 
As the results of the survey will be given in greater 
detail in the volumes mentioned previously, they are com-
mended to the attention of the reader who wishes to delve 
more deeply into the subject. This article presents the 
most important data obtained, as concisely and clearly as 
possible. It has been divided into five sections: the first 
contains the principal conclusions deriving from the sur-
vey, and is followed by a consideration of the structure of 
coffee cultivation, of the main economic factors bearing 
on production and of basic technical and economic pro-
blems. The final section contains an evaluation of the 
industry's prospects. 
The Sao Paulo coffee industry is facing serious problems 
at present owing to greatly expanded output in many pro-
duction areas, prices notably below those of the past de-
cade, and certain inherent weaknesses in the State's coffee 
production structure, which are analysed in these pages. 
It is hoped that the result of this joint study will contri-
bute towards a better understanding of the present diffi-
culties and that it will also help to suggest adequate long-
term solutions. 
I. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Sao Paulo coffee industry has entered upon a 
critical phase of its development owing to the world situa-
tion as well as to factors peculiar to the State. The steep 
rise in output in other areas of Brazil, particularly in 
Paraná, as well as in other regions of the world (Africa), 
is creating much stronger competition on the world mar-
ket. These are a challenge to the position of Sao Paulo as 
an efficient coffee producer. At the same time the incor-
poration of new lands has practically come to an end in 
State, and no further expansion can take place in this 
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way. Existing plantings are faced with serious problems 
of soil exhaustion, excessive age, poor yields and corres-
pondingly low productivity. 
2. World market prospects are unlikely to improve in the 
short run, and internal coffee prices seem more likely to 
fall further in real terms than to rise. The present price 
situation is illustrated in figures XVIII and XIX.^' In 
these circumstances the position of the Sao Paulo industry 
may well deteriorate further, unless determined efforts 
are made to adjust to the new situation. While it is not 
possible to separate coffee prospects in Sao Paulo from 
the world picture, special measures may nevertheless be 
adopted to deal with the problems which are largely 
peculiar to that State. Corrective action should, of course, 
take the world coffee situation fully into account, especially 
as regards its effect on the total level of production. 
3. Six hundred million trees, half of the adult plantings 
in Sao Paulo, produce yields below 400 kg per 1 000 trees 
(see figure XVII ) . It is doubtful whether coffee produc-
tion is profitable at such low levels of yield with the 
existing price and cost structure, and if the cost of capital 
is duly accounted for. The large majority of these p ant-
ings must therefore be considered as sub-marginal. They 
do not provide the State with net economic profits and 
this situation could be radically changed only through 
large-scale new investments aiming at their replacement 
by more productive plantings or by other profitable agri-
cultural activities. While the causes of this extremely low 
productivity are manifold, the magnitude of the State's in-
ternal production problem can be judged from the preced-
ing estimate. 
4. The existing situation characterized by poor yields 
and productivity is the outcome of the migratory develop-
ment of coffee cultivation for more than a century. Grow-
ing techniques seem to have varied little over this period 
and they are generally etill at a low level. A cycle of 
developments has therefore taken place which has resulted 
in the loss of the original soil fertility, the abandonment 
of former coffee areas, the continued existence of over-
aged plantings and the steady westward movement of the 
centre of gravity of production. Though these trends have 
been known to exist for a considerable time, this survey 
presents the problem on a quantitative basis. 
5. The following are among the main factors contribut-
ing to current technical defects in coffee growing: 
(o) Only 13 per cent of the existing plantings receive 
any chemical fertilizer no fertilizer of any kind is used on 
about 60 per cent (see figure X V ) . This indicates a 
widespread failure to rectify low yields and soil depletion. 
As a result, coffee yields are far lower in Sao Paulo than 
in competing areas, even with relatively young plantings 
and improved varieties. 
(6 ) About oiie third of all plantings are over 30 years 
old (see figure 111). This indicates that farmers do not 
replace their trees in order to maintain productivity at 
the highest possible level. Neither are they interested, 
generally speaking, in introducing new practices which 
require new planting systems. The present proportion of 
old trees would even be greater but for the exceptionally 
high rates of abandonment and elimination prevailing in 
the abnormal 1930's and during the Second World War. 
(e) Eighty-five per cent of the State's coffee trees are of 
" The figures quoted in this section appear in their appropriate 
places in sections II and V, good vide. 
the traditional varieties. Considerably improved strains 
have been available for more than a decade (see figure , 
IV) , but the introduction of new ones in Sao Paulo is 
limited to a rather marginal volume of new planting, and 
the position of the industry as a whole has been hardly 
affected so far. This means, in effect, that average produc-
tivity is at least a fourth lower than what it would be if all 
plantings consisted of improved trees, other conditions 
being identical. Furthermore, the high frequency of new 
varieties in recent plantings is not an indication of new 
cultivation techniques, as it is not always accompanied by 
any other structural improvements in coffee growing. 
(d) Less than 20 per cent of the labour employed in 
coffee production is used on tree improvement or soil main-
tenance (see figure XII ) . This means not only that in-
adequate attention is paid to the future of coffee growing, 
but also that the technological pattern is excessively rigid. 
This is especially serious, as labour is the predominant 
variable input in coffee production. 
6. Large amounts of additional capital investment would 
be required to solve the present problems. On the basis of 
the elimination of about one half of the existing trees, 
of their partial replacement by new coffee plantings, and of 
related farm adjustments, it may be estimated that total 
new investment needed to complete such a programme 
would be of the order of Cr. 30 000-40 000 million at 
1958 prices. A large part of the investment would begin 
to pay only three to four years after it was made. 
Furthermore, farmers would not harvest an estimated 
10 million bags of coffee, normally obtained from the low-
yielding trees in three years. If this loss is valued at 
about Cr. 20 000 million, it will be seen that the total 
amount involved would be of the magnitude of Cr. 50 000 
million to 60 000 million, i.e. equivalent to the value of 
about three coffee crops for the entire State. These figures 
show the magnitude of the problem as a whole. Naturally 
replacement would always be gradual and call for a 
smaller but steady financial investment. 
7. It is unrealistic to suppose that farmers would be 
willing to make such large financial sacrifices on their 
own initiative, particularly in view of the present un-
certain prospects of the coffee market. The new invest-
ment would involve a considerable risk because of fluc-
tuating coffee prices. Again, anticipated profits, though 
substantial, might not equal those obtainable over an equal 
period from alternative investments. They would also in-
volve a widespread shift to modern production technology, 
with all the accompanying difficulties and structural ad-
justments and the heavy demands for agricultural exten-
sion services. Hence, spontaneous action by farmers is 
expected to be strictly limited despite the presence of 
favourable factors in the economic development of Sao 
Paulo and of many technical improvement possibilities. 
8. The "three-to-one programme" of the Brazilian Coffee 
Institute, under which the elimination of three low-yield-
ing trees and the establishment of one new tree by mod-
ern methods is to be financed, constitute a constructive 
effort to break the vicious circle of stagnation affecting 
coffee cultivation in many parts of Sao Paulo. They would 
encourage higher coffee-growing standards and greater 
diversification in farm production. Though important, the 
programmes so far approved are only a first step and can 
satisfy only a small part of present requirements as re-
gards capital and technology. It might be possible to use 
available funds in ways which would attract further pri-
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vate capital for use along the same lines, but this would 
require special approaches. The effectiveness of the exist-
ing programmes would also be enhanced if they included 
specific plans to utilize the resources freed by the elimi-
nation of old trees, for different enterprises could be as-
sociated with coffee in many zones of the State. One 
difficulty of the present programme is that it contributes 
little towards balancing total coffee supplies with prospec-
tive demand. In three years the production of one new 
tree might well equal that of the three old trees which it 
replaced. The general increase in production which may 
be expected on the basis of other factors would more than 
offset even the modest temporary reduction caused by the 
three-to-one programme. Thus the emphasis is mainly on 
raising the productivity of coffee growing within given 
volumes of output. 
9. Present indications are that, up to the mid-sixties, 
much of the low productivity problem will remain as an 
outstanding handicap to the Sao Paulo industry. On the 
other hand, it is likely that the rising post-war trend in 
total production will continue until then. An analysis of 
the existing structure of plantings and of reasonable as-
sumptions for the industry's evolution up to 1965 leads 
to the conclusion that total output might increase by 30-35 
per cent in the six years 1958/59-1964/65, reaching a 
level of 15 million to 16 million bags by 1964/65. These 
figures provide, of course, only a very general picture 
which may be considerably modified by weather condi-
tions, new Government programmes affecting coffee, or 
unforeseen events, but they indicate the general produc-
tion trend calculated from rather complete observations 
in 1958 and in large measure already determined by the 
present structure of the industry. 
10. Although serious problems are now facing the Sao 
Paulo coffee industry and are likely to continue in the 
near future, it is also true that favourable opportunities 
exist for successful corrective action. The economy of the 
State is becoming gradually less dependent on coffee grow-
ing, owing to the significant progress of industrialization 
in recent years. Internal demand for agricultural com-
modities other than coffee is at record levels and is certain 
to increase still further, with rising income levels, strong 
urbanization trends and rapid population growth. A favour-
able internal environment therefore exists in which the 
modernization of coffee cultivation might take place, and 
any resources shifting away from coffee production can 
be profitably employed in a host of other agricultural and 
livestock activities, which will find favourable market out-
lets in the State. The recent discovery that high-yielding 
plantings may be re-established on old coffee lands, which 
was formerly considered impossible, is also an important 
contributing factor. There is no intrinsic reason for stag-
nation in the coffee sector, other than the unavoidable 
rigidities of coffee production itself and the traditional 
immobility of the State's rural economy in general. On 
other occasions it has already been shown, however, that 
Sao Paulo's agriculture can face up to the requirements 
of basic shifts in demand and of important technological 
innovations. All possible efforts should therefore be di-
rected towards eliminating specific impediments in the 
way of change, and towards stimulating the establishment 
of a permanent and modem coffee industry, profitably as-
sociated with other important branches of farm produc-
tion. Only under these conditions can the State's economy 
be expected to continue to prosper in the long run, as the 
experience of other industrial nations has proved. 
II. PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF COFFEE GROWING 
It is common knowledge that the State of Sao Paulo has 
led the world in coffee production for at least the past 
60 years. After the introduction of coffee growing in Sao 
Paulo at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the basis 
for the great expansion in production was laid in the 
second half of that century and the main upsurge look 
place in the first 40 years of the present century. During 
the latter period, the volume of production in the State of 
SSo Paulo alone exceeded that of all other areas in Brazil 
plus that of the rest of the entire world. 
The spectacular growth of coffee cultivation in Sao Pau-
lo in the past 100 years has been made possible by the 
existence of especially favourable internal physical and 
economic factors, which operated in conjunction with the 
rapidly expanding world coffee market. The most impor-
tant internal physical factors include rather homogene-
ously favourable climatic and edaphological conditions 
and a relatively even topography. Furthermore, important 
railways gradually penetrated into the extensive territory 
of the State, consolidating the opening-up of virgin lancfe 
to coffee the production of which could reach the port of 
Santos easily. At about the same time large-scale immigra-
tion from Europe helped to provide manpower for the 
coffee plantings, which require a relatively high labour 
import. 
The entire period of rapid growth of the Sao Paulo 
coffee industry was characterized by the clearing of virgin 
forests and by the opening up of new lands, which prod-
uced high yields for at least one generation of coffee trees. 
Subsequent declines in yield, as well as periods of un-
favourable coffee prices, resulted in the abandonment of 
large areas, especially in the eastern and north-eastern 
parts of the State, and in a general east-west shift of the 
centre of gravity of production. However, the volume of 
new planting exceeded the abandonment of old trees at 
least up to about 1930, and total production continued 
to expand. 
In the period 1930-45, the abandonment and elimi-
nation of trees greatly exceeded new planting, and Sao Pau-
lo's production fell off sharply. This occurred when the 
maximum cyclical volume of coffee output coincided with 
the world-wide economic depression, and when the im-
portant European market was closed by the war after 
1939. The east-west shift of cultivation, however, con-
tinued in this period, with the limited new planting taking 
place primarily in the Araraquarense, Noroeste e Alta 
Paulista and Sorocabana regions, and much of the aban-
donment occurring in the Mogiana, Alta Mogiana and 
Central regions (see map 1). 
The post-war period of expansion, once more involving 
the westward penetration of coffee growing, culminated in 
the recent large crops of 1958 and 1959, but also coincided 
with the final incorporation of the last western reserves of 
SSo Paulo's virgin lands. Between the 1948-52 average 
and 1959, and additional 400 000 hectares were planted to 
coffee (an increase of 31.5 per cent). The traditional 
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MAP 1 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALL EXISTING COFFEE 
PLANTINGS, 1958 
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evolution of coffee growing in Sao Paulo can therefore 
no longer continue, and the industry has reached a de-
cisive juncture in the history of the State. 
As the limit of western expansion was reached in Sao 
Paulo, surplus production again began to bedevil the world 
coffee market. Real prices and farmers' profits fell sharply 
after 1954 and helped to bring the structural problems of 
the Sao Paulo industry into perspective. 
It is no exaggeration to say that, under these circum-
stances, the future of coffee growing in Sao Paulo will 
be strongly affected by the events of the next few years, 
when the world production cycle is expected to raise out-
put further. 
During 1958, when the present survey was made, coffee 
occupied a leading role both in the economy of the State 
and of Brazil as a whole as well as in the world coffee 
picture. Sao Paulo accounted for about 40 per cent of 
Brazil's total production and one fifth of world output. It 
also provided one fourth of the total value of Brazil's 
exports, a crucial dynamic contribution to the country's 
economic development efforts. Within the State's agri-
culture, coffee still remained the principal commodity, pro-
viding nearly a fourth of the total gross value of farm 
production. While the recent growth of industry and of 
agricultural activities other than coffee cultivation has 
relatively diminished the role of coffee in the economy of 
Sao Paulo as a whole, coffee still absorbs a massive volume 
of human and other resources and continues to be the 
mainstay of nearly all rural areas. 
1. PLANTINGS AND THEIR PRESENT DISTRIBUTION IN 
THE STATE 
The total area occupied by coffee farms comprises about 
one half of the State's total land area of some 247 000 
square kilometres. 
Within this area, the 104 800 coffee farms in the State of 
Sao Paulo are estimated to have occupied, in 1958, some 
1.7 million hectares for growing purposes, which consti-
tutes 14 per cent of the total area of the farms. The total 
number of trees in 1958 is estimated at 1 500 million.^ 
Total coffee production, including all types and qualities, 
amounted to 11.7 million bags clean equivalent, or 700 900 
metric tons, in 1958 (see figure I ) . These figures indicate 
the magnitude of the physical structure within which the 
industry is operating. 
The resident population on coffee farms, which is one 
measure of the direct human dependence on coffee grow-
ing, is estimated at nearly 2.2 million in 1958, composed 
as follows: 
Farm owners and their families 
Hired labourers (colonos) and their families . 
Sharecroppers iparceiros) and their families 
Other workers and their families 







This total is only a partial estimate of the number of 
people actually dependent on coffee in Sao Paulo. To it 
should be added those engaged in transporting, storing and 
marketing coffee in all rural communities, in the State 
capital and in Santos, as well as the large number of 
people servicing the requirements of coffee farms and 
their resident population. The figure of 2.2 million is there-
fore a very conservative one, but even so it corresponds to 
about 20 per cent of the entire population of the State. 
Estimates of the total investment represented by coffee 
" Throughout this report the term "trees" refers to the Brazilian 
cava or pe', which consists of four to eight individual coffee plants 
growing closely together and constituting one bush for operational 
purposes. 
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farms are rather difficult to make, because land values are 
frequently influenced by factors which may not adequately 
reflect agricultural productivity. However, on the basis of 
the 1958 commercial farm value, it is estimated that coffee 
growing represented a total asset value of between 120 000 
million and 140 000 million cruzeiros at 1958 prices.* 
Map 1 shows that more than 70 per cent of the trees are 
now concentrated in the three western regions, whereas 
only 28 per cent are found in the Central, Mogiana and 
Alta Mogiana regions, which several decades earlier were 
the main producing zones. The greatest concentration of 
production is now found in the Noroeste e Alta Paulista 
area, which accounts for nearly one-third of the entire 
output of the State. 
An analysis of existing plantings by age of establish-
ment clearly reveals the geographical shift of the industry 
during the past 60 years. The bulk of the oldest coffee 
plantings, as of 1958, is still found in the north-east, the 
centre of coffee growing during the early part of the cen-
tury. Similarly, the current heavy concentration of young 
plantings in the west points to the displacement of coffee 
growing in that direction. An intermediate situation is 
revealed with respect to the remaining share of plantings, 
as reflected in the following data (see also map 2 ) : 
Percentage of trees 
Over 50 4-50 All trees less 
Area years years than 4 years 
Mogiana 14.0 3.3 4.9 
Aha Mogiana 21.5 8.0 5.5 
Central 43.9 12.7 9.3 
Araraquarense 11.2 22.4 34.8 
Noroeste e Aha Paulista . 2.8 34.7 30.4 
Sorocabana 6.6 18.3 13.3 
Litoral e Sul — 0.6 1.8 
Total . . . : 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2 . AGE COMPOSITION OF TREES 
Special attention was paid to a full investigation of the 
distribution by ages of the coffee plantings in existence 
in 1958. The proportion of trees by major age groups and 
by significant historical periods are given below (see also 
figure II) , 
Age of planting 
(years) 
0 - 3 . 
4 - 1 2 . 
13-28 . , 
29 - 40 . 
41-50 . . 
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These results, tabulated from farmers' reports on the 
specific age of each of their plantings, show a highly sig-
nificant pattern. The post-war period of variable, but 
generally high, planting rates has by now led to the pre-
dominance of new plantings in Sao Paulo. On the other 
hand, about one third of A e post-war plantings, i.e. 13.3 
per cent of all existing plantings consisted, in 1958, of 
trees up to three years old, which had not yet entered full 
* This would represent an equivalent of about 1000 million 
dollars at the average free-exchange rate prevailing in 1958. 
MAP 1 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OLD AND NEW COFFEE 
PLANTINGS BY REGIONS, 1958 
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production. The proportion of output represented by this 
group was therefore notably less than the share of trees. 
But the production of post-war plantings will probably 
exceed the proportion of 40 per cent of total output in 
1960, as trees planted in the period 1956-58, reach full 
production. 
FIGURE II 
PROPORTION OF EXISTING COFFEE TREES PLANTED IN 
SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL PERIODS, 1958 
NATURAL SCALE 
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In 1958, only 22.0 per cent of existing trees and 26.5 
per cent of production corresponded to plantings estab-
lished in the disturbed period 1930-45 covering the great 
depression and the Second World War. This relatively 
small proportion seems to be the direct result of low plan-
ting rates in the unfavourable period mentioned rather than 
the result of abandonment, for the corresponding plantings 
are still relatively young at present, falling within the age 
group 15-30 years. 
The estimates for the period 1918-1929 show that the 
coffee boom of the 1920's is reflected even today in the 
high proportion of trees belonging to that period. One 
fourth of the plantings in 1958 was established between 
the end of the First World War and the beginning of the 
depression, i.e. after 1929. This figure is especially signifi-
cant, since the abandonment and elimination of the 1930's 
and 1940's have probably greatly reduced the frequency 
of this age group. 
Finally, about 14 per cent of all existing trees was 
planted before 1918, equally divided between the age 
groups 40-50 and more than 50 years. It would appear, 
however, that only the best plantings originating in those 
periods have survived the economic upsets of later years 
and that a large proportion of the trees planted that long 
ago no longer exist. 
The age composition of coffee trees is particularly im-
portant in SSo Paulo in view of current efforts to modern-
ize the industry and to increase its competitive strength. 
The following are detailed estimates prepared on the basis 
of the survey (see also figure III) . 
FIGURE III 
AGE COMPOSITION OF EXISTING COFFEE PLANTINGS, 
1958 
Age of plantings 
in 1958 (years) 
1 - 3 . . 
4 - 6 . . 
7 - 9 . . 
10-12 . . 
13-15 . . 
16-20 . . 
21-25 . . 
26-30 . . 
31-35 . . 
36-40 . . 
41-50 . . 
51-60 . . 
61-70 . . 
71-80 . . 





































These estimates also throw light on rates of planting. If 
it is assumed that no significant proportion of the originally 
established plantings up to 25 years old were eliminated 
or abandoned by 1958, the following planting rates would 
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The very low rates up to 1946 and the sharp increases 
in plantings as soon as market prospects improved after 
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the war stand out clearly. But the surprising thing is 
that the largest volume of new plantings over the period 
—some 65 million trees—^were planted in the most re-
cent triennium 1956-58. In that period the world market 
situation changed profoundly, but planting rates showed 
no reaction. This is probably largely explained by the fact 
that cruzeiro prices did not begin to decline up to the 
middle of 1958, though dollar prices had already fallen 
sharply in 1957 and early 1958. The effects of this rising 
trend in new planting, up to 1958, in likely to be felt until 
the mid-1960's when the 1956-58 plantings reach maxi-
mum production. 
3. SHIFT TOWARDS NEW VARIETIES 
One of the most dynamic changes in coffee growing in 
SSo Paulo in recent years is certainly the rapid shift to-
wards improved varieties. The introduction of the Mundo 
Novo has proceeded at a striking pace since about 1950, 
but improved strains of Bourbon and the new Caturra 
variety ako of commercial importance. The trend towards 
better types of tree is a direct result of the well-known 
research carried out by the Agronomic Institute of Cam-
pinas, which began during the 1930's. 
Mundo Novo, which became available for distribution 
only after 1950 accounts for 14.7 million trees in the age 
group originating in 1950-53 (7 to 9 years), or 13.0 per 
cent of all coffee trees of this age. During the next three 
years (1953-55), 48.2 million trees of Mundo Novo were 
planted, constituting 36.5 per cent of total planting. Dur-
ing the last three-year period for which data are available 
through the present survey, it is estimated that 111.3 mil-
lion trees of Mundo Novo were planted, representing 57.0 
per cent of all new planting, and this proportion appears 
to be increasing further, as the 1958 percentage was 63.7 
(see figure IV) . 
The Caturra variety was introduced somewhat earlier 
than Mundo Novo and shows up in the survey estimates in 
the age group 7-9 years, with 2.4 per cent of all trees of 
this age. Since that time the proportion of Caturra on new 
plantings has increased Somewhat, but it has never reached 
as much as 5 per cent in any one year. It was not possible 
to make a distinction between the different strains of 
Bourbon plants used. 
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Altogether it may be estimated that about 70 per cent 
of all trees planted in the last few years have been of 
various improved types. Yet, a classification of all trees 
existing in 1958 by variety shows that the traditional types 
still predominate strongly, as is apparent from the follow-
ing data: 
Variety Millions of trees in 1958 Percentage 
Comum 682.1 46.3 
Bourbon 591.6 40.1 
Mundo Novo 174.2 11.8 
Caturra 15.5 1.0 
Mixtures and minor types . . . 11.1 0.8 
1 474.6 100.0 
Figure IV illustrates, furthermore, that nearly 30 per 
cent of new plantings continue to be of the Comum va-
riety though Comum has in part also given way to Mundo 
Novo. But Bourbon is apparently most affected by the 
invasion of Mundo Novo and by the less rapid introduc-
tion of Caturra, its proportion falling from nearly 50 to 
only 10 per cent of new planting in the post-war period.® 
At current average planting rates, it would therefore still 
take several decades for improved varieties to occupy a 
dominant position in Sao Paulo coffee production as a 
whole. However, available statistics clearly indicate that 
Mundo Novo will play a major role in the future develop-
ment of the industry. 
4. PRESENT SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF COFFEE FARMS 
The average size of coffee farms in Sao Paulo is greater 
than that in most other producing zones in Latin America, 
especially outside Brazil. The average area in coffee in 
' Many farmers do not make a clear distinction between Comum 
and Bourbon. The current proportion of Comum among new plant-
ings is therefore likely to be less than 30 per cent. 
Sao Paulo is estimated at 16.2 hectares, or 14 100 trees 
per farm unit. In Colombia, for instance, coffee farms 
average only 3.2 hectares in coffee, and in El Salvador 
6.9 hectares. Average production per farm in 1958 was 
about 112 bags of clean coffee, equivalent to 6.7 metric 
tons. A relatively large number of small farms (sitios), 
together with a smaller number of commercially impor-
tant fazenidas, produce this State average, but this figure 
does not represent the characteristics of the most typical 
or the most important farm type. 
The principal feature of the size structure of coffee 
farms in Sao Paulo is the commercial importance of 
medium-to-large farms with more than 8 000 but less than 
128 000 trees. This size group accounts for over two-
thirds of total production and tree numbers. Neither very 
large nor very small farms are of comparable importance 
in production though both the number and the proportion 
of small farm units is large (see figure V ) . 
The following table shows the relative importance of 
major size groups: 
Share of number Share of 
Number of trees of farms production 
(Percentage) (Percentage) 
up to 8 000 56.7 10.0 
8 - 32 000 33.8 35.1 
32- 64 000 6.1 17.8 
64-128 000 2.3 15.5 
more than 128 000 1.1 21.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
An analysis of the size structure of farms established in 
various past periods seems to indicate that, over the years, 
the smaller farms have gained in importance, while the 
larger ones have gradually come to play a smaller role. 
This trend towards smaller coffee farms appears to have 
manifested itself in the last 30 years according to the 
survey. 
FIGURE IV 
AVERAGE VARIETY COMPOSITION OF EXISTING COFFEE PLANTINGS AND 
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF NEW VARIETIES IN RECENT PLANTINGS 
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FIGURE V 
THE SIZE STRUCTURE OF SAO PAULO COFFEE FARMS, 1958 
UP TO E 0 0 0 TREES 
0 0 0 32 OOO 
••Z 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 
i i m i i i u i i 
i i i i i i E i E i i i i i i i i m i i i i i i E i n i i i i m E i i i 
í » í ] . 
i i i i i n i n i i i i i i i i i i i 
64 0 0 0 128 OOO <1' 
I I I I H I I I I 1 1 I 3 I I I I Q 
MORE THAN 128 000 TREES N 
i i i i i i i i i i i i m i i i i i i i i i i a 
' KEY: S 0 0 0 FARMS 
I S 100 OOO BASS 
5. DIVERSIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES ON COFFEE FARMS 
The description of the physical structure of production 
would not be complete without mentioning the relation-
ship on coffee farms of coffee growing to other activities 
and the intrinsic importance of the latter. 
It was shown in figure 1 that coffee plantings in Sao 
Paulo in 1958 occupied some 17 000 km ,^ whereas the 
total area belonging to coffee farms as a whole was esti-
mated at about 121 000 km ,^ more than seven times as 
much. The various uses of the land on these farms are indi-
cated in figure VI. 
About one half of the total farm area was used as pas-
ture. Cash crops other than coffee took up a total of about 
10 per cent of the total farm area. Pastures thus made up 
an area over three times that in coffee and cash crops 
other than coffee covered an area equivalent to about two 
thirds of that used for this staple crop. 
The estimate of the area in crops includes both that di-
rectly planted by farm-owners and that contracted under 
various share-cropping arrangements. Such arrangements 
generally allow the individuals concerned relatively little 
independent management, unlike the situation of share 
croppers in some other countries. In Sao Paulo, a large 
part of the main food crops, especially maize and rice, are 
produced in this way, and this accounts for the fact that 
more than five per cent of the total land on coffee farms 
is let out on share-cropping contracts. 
A further 3.2 per cent of the land of coffee farms was 
allocated to hired labourers (colonos) in partial remuner-
ation for their work in the coffee plantings. While much 
of this area is also used for the growing of food crops, 
this output goes to supply the needs of the colonos and 
their families and does not contribute to commercial 
production. 
Finally, an important part of the total farm land (17.4 
per cent and including woodlands, fallow and otherwise 
idle land) was not used commercially. 
In general, the quality of land within a farm may vary 
considerably and this affects the use of each part. The 
best lands are generally used for coffee growing, the re-
mainder being left for non-coffee enterprises. Nearly all 
farms also produce most of their internal food crop re-
quirements, and a considerable number of them engage in 
the commercial production of food or other crops as well. 
The depleted lands naturally remain for livestock produc-
tion or are not usable. 
Though less than one sixth of the average farm area is 
thus directly employed for coffee production, the role of 
this commodity is far greater than that of any other single 
product. 
The economic importance of each of the main activi-
ties on coffee farms is reflected in the following estimates 
of gross value produced by each in 1958 (see also figure 
Gross farm value 
n , produced on coffee Percent-
Product farms, 1958 age 
(millions of cruzeiros) 
Coffee 20 590 51.6 
Cattle (except milk) 3 900 9.8 
Milk 3 250 8.1 
Sugar cane 2 940 - 7.3 
Cotton 2150 5.4 
Maize 2110 5.3 
Rice 1210 3.0 
Eggs 990 2.5 
Pigs 820 2.1 
Groundnuts 510 1.3 
Castor beans 440 1.1 
Other 990 2.5 
Total gross value produced . 39 900 100.0 
The predominant role of coffee in the total value ob-
tained emerges clearly from these data, as the value of its 
production was almost three times as high as the estimated 
value of cattle and milk together, and about seven times 
that of sugar cane, the most valuable single crop after 
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FIGURE VI 
T H E U S E O F L A N D O N C O F F E E F A R M S , 1958 
cofifee. But the evidence also demonstrates that commodi-
ties other than coffee have already acquired considerable 
commercial importance. Taken together, the non-coffee-
growing activities contributed nearly as much to the total 
gross value of farm production as did coffee growing 
itself. 
Unfortunately it is impossible to compare these estimates 
for 1958 with similar ones for other periods. Yet it ap-
FIGURE VII 
D I S T R I B U T I O N O F G R O S S F A R M V A L U E O F P R O ' D U C T I O N 
O N C O F F E E F A R M S , 1958 
pears that the traditionally highly specialized coffee farm 
structure may have been modified by the rapidly chang-
ing economic conditions in the post-war period. This is 
not to say that before 1945 no other commercial activities 
existed on coffee farms. The rapid introduction of cotton 
during the 1930's is a notable example of such a develop-
ment. But the recent rise in non-coffee activities seems 
both to cover a wider range of products and also to grow 
in new directions. 
The most important recent development has been the 
increasing association of animal husbandry with coffee pro-
duction. The manures produced are especially valuable in 
connexion with the maintenance > or restoration of low-
yielding coffee plantings. At the same time animal hus-
bandry could be practiced on the pasture land formerly 
used for coffee growing, but which no longer provided 
economic returns. 
The association of dairy production with coffee grow-
ing has gained special prominence, and it is estimated that 
currently probably over half of the State's total milk sup-
plies originate on farms also producing coffee. If the value 
of the meat produced by dairy cattle is added to that of 
milk production, the total gross value produced by the 
dairy enterprise on coffee farms may be calculated at 
about Cr. 4 500 million in 1958. This represents more 
than one fifth of the farm value of coffee production in 
the same year. 
Another important livestock activity associated with 
coffee is poultry raising. The introduction of the poultry-
coffee combination is of recent origin, and perhaps owes 
much of its original acceptance to the high nutrient con-
tent of chicken manure in restoring old coffee plantings. 
By now, however, most-commercial poultry farms special-
ize in egg production, and meat and chicken manure 
constitute important by-products. It is estimated that there 
were more than eight million chickens on coffee farms 
in 1958. 
Sugar cane, cotton and maize are the principal non-
coffee crops on the coffee farms in SSo Paulo. Together 
these three crops added about Cr. 6 500 million to the 
gross value of-production, nearly the same value as that 
contributed, by dairy and cattle production together. The 
total value of all smaller crops, not including the three 
already mentioned, amounted to close to Cr. 3 000 million, 
about equal to that of sugar cane production. In addition, 
maize and beans are widely grown by colonos for subsist-
ence purposes. 
The competitive situation of the various crops in rela-
tion to coffee varies considerably, and this point will be 
further analysed in section V. 
Suffice it to point out here that many crops have ap-
parently already found a place in the production plan of 
coffee farms and that this process would seem to be part 
of an important change in the farm structure itself. 
The growth of the internal market for food and agri-
cultural products is the main underlying force which now 
stimulates the diversification process. The strong indus-
trialization movement in Sao Paulo has raised the level 
of real incomes and has attracted workers to already large 
urban centres, thus causing the demand for food and other 
farm products to rise steeply. Rates of population growth 
in Sao Paulo are also high, both on account of natural 
increase and because of immigration from other parts of 
Brazil and abroad. Added to this is the fact that coffee 
yields tend to decline gradually with the advancing age 
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of trees,. and that the present average level is already 
rather low. 
Generally speaking, the degree of diversification of coffee 
farms is higher in the more easily accessible eastern parts 
of the State than in the western areas. In the former, dairy 
and poultry production and the cultivation of fruit arid 
vegetables are of special importance. Those enterprises are 
favoured by geographic factors and by the fact that coffee 
yields in the east are smaller than in the west. Further 
west, the principal non-coffee crops are cotton, ground-
nuts, castor beans and other less perishable and relatively 
high-priced cash crops. 
As long as farm prices for coffee were at high levels, 
the returns from coffée growing greatly exceeded those of 
most other agricultural activities. But, in the last few 
years, prices for coffee have fallen appreciably, both in 
absolute and in real terms, while the prices of other prod-
ucts have usually at least kept up with the rise in the 
general price level. These divergent price tendencies have 
no doubt exercised a strong influence in recent years. 
6. VARIATIONS IN COFFEE YIELD 
Coffee yields on individual farms, or on specific groups 
of plantings, are determined by a host of different physical 
and economic factors. Owing to the perennial character of 
coffee growing, the yield of any one year is affected as 
much (or more) by the accumulated conditions of previous 
years as by those prevailing in the year of the crop. 
A large part of the variations in yields of , coffee plant-
ings is explained by the impact of two important physical 
variables mentioned earlier: age and variety. The evidence 
shows that, as conditions are in SSo Paulo, these two fac-
tors have a strong impact on yields, especially in the first 
20 years of the planting's existence, which are at the same 
time its most productive years. 
Figure VIII gives the average yields, in 1958, of coffee 
plantings for age groups up to more than 85 years. These 
data refer to all plantings in the State, regardless of var-
iety, soil type, cultivation technique or othér important 
factors. 
FIGURE V i n 
AVERAGE YIELD PER HECTARE OF PLANTINGS OF 
DIFFERENT AGES, 1958 
NATURAL SCALE 
No yield was reported for plantings one or two years 
old. In the third year, which is still generally considered 
to belong to the formation period, a small production of 
99 kg per hectare was registered. Plantings 4 to 6 years 
old showed the first complete production at 441 kg per 
hectare. Another sharp increase can be noted for the 7 
to 9 year old plantings, which yielded 634 kg per hectare. 
The latter figure was at the same time higher than that 
of any other age group and therefore appears to coincide 
with the maximum of the age-yield cycle. The next most 
productive age group showed yields somewhere between 
those of the 4 to 6 and the 7 to 9 year old plantings. Fur-
ther declines, smaller than those registered immediately 
after the maximum, took place subsequently, average out-
puts approaching 400 kg per hectare for plantings just 
over 20 years old. 
• It should be emphasized that, after the initial matura-
tion period, a large part of the age-yield fluctuations are 
actually a reflection of inadequate growing methods, par-
ticularly the failure to replenish soil nutrients. Under 
fully modern conditions no large decline in yields need 
occur after ten years. 
The fact that maximum yields in SSo Paulo seem to 
fall within the 7 to 9 year group, as compared with the 
10 to 12 year group in both Colombia and El Salvador, 
merits some attention. It is perhaps explained by the rapid 
introduction of higher-yielding trees in the past decade, 
the commercial production performance of which is not 
yet fully known over a long period. The lack of shade 
cover may be another factor which tends to advance the 
yield maximum of Sao Paulo plantings, for it is known 
that this also leads to higher output in the first pro-
ductive years. Insuflicient data are available for it to be 
concluded definitely whether the occurrence of maximum 
yields in the 7 to 9 year group is a characteristic feature 
of coffee cultivation in SSo Paulo or whether the 1958 
figure has been influenced by special factors. The follow-
ing average yields were obtained in 1958 for specified, 
age groups up to 25 years: 
Age of plantings 
(years) 
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For ages up to about 25 years, it may be assumed that 
these yield differences approximately reflect the exper-
ience of individual plantings over a like period, at least 
in relative terms. No significant portion of these relatively 
young plantings is likely to have been eliminated or aban-
doned up to 1958, and average yields in that year there-
fore represent a cross-section of the plantings established 
in a given period. 
Though the yields of age groups up to 10 years are 
higher than "normal" due to the introduction of new vari-
eties, it will be seen that, starting with the 10 to 12 year 
groups, yields fall significantly for each succeeding group. 
Plantings of 21 to 25 years produced, in 1958, yields 25 
to 30 per cent below those obtained in the 10 to 12 year 
group. This reveals a marked influence of age, and soil 
depletion on yields. 
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On the other hand, there appears to be no clear relation-
ship between age and yield for age groups over 25 years, 
as is seen from the following data: 
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Except for the very oldest plantings (over 80 years), 
average yields in these age groups fluctuated irregularly 
around 400 kg within a margin of about 10 per cent on 
either side. Yet it would not be reasonable to conclude 
that age has no effect on yields after plantings have 
reached the age of 25 years. The evidence is that older 
plantings are still subject to further degeneration, but that 
for the more advanced age groups 1958 yields no longer re-
present an average cross-section. This is due to the fact 
that the older plantings are subject to a continual process 
of selection, abandonment and/or elimination, as their 
yields decline further. For that reason, the majority of 
older plantings which still exist are of better than average 
quality. More fertilizer is also used on older plantings, as 
the survey results have shown. These tendencies seem to 
compensate for most of the natural effects of age, and soil 
depletion and they, indicate that farmers take remedial 
action when certain minimum levels of yield aré reached. 
It is interesting to note that these factors gradually 
become important after the plantings have passed the age 
of 20 years, which, in 1958, also coincided with yields of 
about 400 kg per hectare. Detailed estimates, made for 
purposes of the present survey, also indicate that this level 
corresponded, on the basis of 1958 cost and price relation-
ships, roughly to the minimum yield for coffee growing 
to be profitable. The two findings are apparently consistent. 
It was mentioned earlier that yields in the younger 
plantings not only reflect the maturing process but, in the 
specific case of Sao Paulo, also the impact of the shift 
towards improved varieties, which was already discussed. 
As the new trees produce higher yields, this factor raises 
average yields in the age groups up to 10 years. The fol-
lowing average yields result by main varieties: 
Yields per hectare, 1958 
( kilogrammes) 
Age of planting 
(years) Comum Bourbon Mundo Novo 
3 74 100 135 
4 - 6 297 442 491 
7 - 9 610 625 710 
10-12 525 551 
13-15 544 532 
16 - 30 451 460 
The superiority of Mundo Novo over Comum is ap-
parent from these figures. Up to the age of nine years, a 
hectare of this type produced, under average commercial 
conditions, nearly 1 000 kg of coffee more than Comum 
(see figures IX and X ) . As the value of this additional 
production alone represented about two-thirds of the entire 
establishment costs of the Mundo Novo planting, the power 
FIGURE III 
ANNUAL YIELDS UP TO NINE YEARS FOR COMUM, 
BOURBON AND MUNDO NOVO, 1958 
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ful incentive to change to this variety becomes apparent. 
This is further enhanced by the fact that the introduction 
of Mundo Novo does not require other, changes in grow-
ing methods or extra investment. The yield margin for 
FIGURE X 
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this tree-type thus brings a significant increase in net pro-
fits. Consequently, once Mundo Novo became available for 
distribution, this type was used on more than half of all 
new plantings. 
The remarkably higher yield of Mundo Novo, which 
was established through the survey, is representative of 
all the plantings of this type thus far made in Sao Paulo, 
some 87 million of which produced a crop in 1958. Tests 
carried out under above-average conditions may show 
even better results, but the significance of the figures just 
presented is that they reflect normal commercial condi-
tions of production, which are, of course, not optimum. 
The comparison of Bourbon with both Mundo Novo and 
'Comum is complicated by the circumstance that, in the 
past decade, new improved strains of Bourbon were dis-
tributed, which are indistinguishable from earlier strains 
for the purposes of the present survey. But the available 
figures show that for existing plantings of up to nine years 
Bourbon produced a margin over Comum of some 500 kg 
per hectare, whereas it fell short of Mundo Novo by ap-
proximately 450 kg. Average yields for Bourbon were 
therefore more or less equidistant between those of Com-
um and those of Mundo Novo. 
An evaluation of the improved varieties for a longer 
period is not yet possible, for Mundo Novo was available 
on a commercial scale only after 1950. On the other hand, 
the use of Caturra was too infrequent in any year for its 
average performance to be measured by a sample survey 
of limited coverage. The performance of Bourbon in plant-
ings of ten years and older differed very little from that 
of Comum according to the reported data. But the yield 
differences in favour of the improved varieties, especially 
Mundo Novo, in the first ten years after establishment 
have apparently already been amply sufficient to justify 
their large-scale introduction and to prove their competi-
tiveness. 
Despite the significant variation in yields between age 
groups and between different varietiM, it is stressed that 
many other factors, such as soil type, tree density, cul-
tivation practices, etc., also affect yields. After a detailed 
analysis, which will be presented separately, it is con-
cluded, however, that a large part of the differences in 
yield may be attributed to the independent effects of age 
and of variety. But as the available data cover only one 
year, they are intended primarily as an illustration of the 
yield structure, rather than as a measure of future yields. 
III. MAIN ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING PRODUCTION 
The combination in Sao Paulo of relatively low yields 
and of declining coffee prices in the last few years has 
led to a price-cost squeeze on many farms in the State. 
At the same time, the large-scale introduction of new 
varieties and types of trees, arid the intensive experiment-
ation with more modern cultivating techniques are focus-
ing attention increasingly on the cost structure of coffee 
growing and on methods to improve this structure in ac-
cordance with present technical and economic possibilities. 
In order to appraise such possibilities, it is necessary to 
review briefly the current situation as regards production 
costs. Detailed data were collected through the survey on 
the use of capital arid labour, the principal inputs, and 
on the application of fertilizers, machinery and equip-
ment in the various phases of coffee production. 
1. USE OF FIXED CAPITAL 
Due to the perennial character of coffee cultivation, fixed 
investment per unit of product greatly exceeds that of 
annual crops. In 1958, an average of 77 400 cruzeiros was 
invested in each hectare of coffee planting and in the 
corresponding share of farm buildings and equipment, 
which is equivalent to 159 cruzeiros per kilogramme of 
coffee produced. As one kilogramme of coffee on the farm 
in 1958 had a value of about 29 cruzeiros, this means a 
capital-output ratio of more than five to one. 
More than three; fourths of this capital investment is 
accounted for by the coffee trees themselves (51.2 per 
cent) and by the value of the land (26.1 per cent). The 
next important item is workers' housing, which is prac-
tically always owned by the farm. Among the smaller 
investments items are, in order of declining importance, 
installations for coffee processing, automotive power, work 
animals and miscellaneous equipment (see figure X I ) . The 
following table shows the average investment per hectare 
of coffee planting for nearly 500 representative farms 
which were covered in the survey: 
Type of investment 
Amount invested per 
hectare of planting, 1958 





Housing, etc 9.9 Í2.8 
Processing installations and 
3.3 4.2 equipment . . . . . . . 
Automotive power 2.9 3.8 
Work animals, etc. . . . . 0.8 1.1 
Miscellaneous equipment . . ' 0.6 0.7 
Total 77.4 100.0 
It will be seen that 95 per cent of the total investment 
referred to consists of fixed capital and only about 5 per 
cent of other kind of capital. At the same time, at least 
two thirds of the total farm investment is represented by 
the capitalized value of the farm's own labour, whereas 
only about one third of the investment consists of land or 
items in the non-agricultural sector. The former category 
of items includes the coffee trees themselvra and a large 
part of the housing and other construction. Practically 
the only items originating outside the farm are auto-
motive power and some minor installations and equip-
ment. These characteristics are important as they affect 
the degree to which growers would be able to modify the 
farm structure and the pattern of production with avail-
able resources. 
The data on capital investment also illustrate the low 
level of mechanization on coffee farms. Practically the en-
tire investment in machinery and power is for the coffee-
processing installations and lorries and other vehicles re-
quired for the transport within the farm of the crop and 
of materials such as fertilizers and manures. This is a 
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result of the difficulty of mechanizing the principal grow-
ing operations, especially the harvest itself, which on the 
average absorbs nearly 40 per cent of total labour require-
ments. As sufficient labour is maintained on the farm to 
guarantee the timely harvesting of the crop, the farmers 
are also less interested in mechanizing operations such 
as weeding, which are performed in other months of the 
year. Apart from this, the high cost of all machinery as 
compared with the outlay on labour is of course one of 
the principal factors working against the mechanization 
of coffee growing in a more general sense. 
It is difficult to estimate accurately what share of pro-
duction costs is accounted for by the use of capital. The 
rate of capital depreciation depends largely on the way 
in which the plantings are managed, the type of soil and 
its susceptibility to erosion, the age of the trees, etc. How-
ever, if the additional economic life of the average exist-
ing coffee planting in 1958 is considered to be 20 years, 
that of constructions 30 years, and that of mechanical 
equipment, installations and work animals 10 years, it 
.may be estimated that the cost of depreciation of a hectare 
of coffee planting amounted to about Cr. 3 000 in 1958. 
This is equivalent to Cr. 4:6 for each kilogramme, of coffee 
produced on the average. 
No depreciation of the land is included in this estimate, 
although most coffee land is subject to considerable physi-
cal deterioration as a result of erosion and depletion. It 
is considered, however, that the reported land values were 
also determined by many factors unconnected with coffee 
production or with agricultural productivity in general. 
The cost of the use of capital itself, i.e. the interest to 
be applied to the amount invested must be added to de-
préciation, in order to find the total capital cost. The use 
of a conventional interest rate of 6 per cent seems indi-
cated here, since it may be assumed that the current value 
of coffee properties fluctuates in accordance with rises in 
the general price level, and the rate need not therefore 
make allowance for inflation. The average cost of interest 
would therefore be of the order of Cr. 4 600 per hectare 
of planting, and Cr. 6.9 per kilogramme of coffee at 1958 
prices. (The average farm price in 1958 was Cr. 28.7 
per kilogramme.) 
As might be expected, larger farms have in general a 
more economic capital use pattern than smaller ones be-
cause their investment, in housing, other constructions and 
instaflations is correspondingly lower per hectare. 
A close relationship was found between the amount of 
capital invested per unit of product and yield. The fol-
lowing table referring to the 500 farms covered shows 
that, as yields increase, the amount of capital required per 
unit of product falls steadily: 
Yield per thousand trees 
( kilogrammes) 
up to 200 















1 001 -1100 
1101 - 1 200 
more than 1200 
Capital investment per 
100 kg of coffee 













This influence of yield on capital cost -per unit of 
product is a strong argument in favour of high-yielding 
plantings, especially since it will be seen later that simi-
lar findings apply for many other important cost items. 
The advantages derived from a situation of high yields 
must, therefore, not be examined in the light of capital 
utilization only but must take due account of the entire 
production relationship. But one general conclusion stands: 
owing to the high proportion of fixed and overhead costs, 
profits from coffee growing vary more sharply with yields 
than those of most other farm activities. 
2. USE OF MANPOWER 
On the majority of farms and at present levels of tech-
nique, manpower is still practically the only variable input 
in coffee production in SSo Paulo. The individual farmer 
faces the problem of cultivating a structure of plantings, 
which can only be modified at considerable cost. Non-
labour items of expense, on the other hand, such as ferti-
lizers, pesticides, machinery and equipment, are of much 
smaller economic importance, and their use is mainly 
limited to a relatively small minority of progressive far-
mers. There are no indications so far that the heavy 
dependence on manpower for coffee production is diminish-
ing, and even the wide application of technical improve-
ments would bring little or no change. 
In the year preceding the 1958 crop, an average of 
about 72 man-days were used in attending each hectare of 
producing coffee plantings, which corresponds to 95 man-
days per 1000 coffee trees. Correspondingly, one kilo-
fíQ 
gramme of coffee represented, on the average, a current 
labour use of 1.18 man-hours and an actual labour cost 
of 9.4 cruzeiros. 
Harvest operations accounted for 37.6 per cent of all 
labour use and absorbed 217 man-hours per hectare (see 
figure XII ) . Weedings represented most of the remaining 
use of labour (about 36 per cent of the total). Other 
operations were of much smaller importance than the two 
major categories already mentioned. They included the 
preparation and application of fertilizer (8.8 per cent), 
the maintenance and repair of installations and equipment 
(6.8 per cent), the control of pests and diseases (4.8 per 
cent) and various other activities (6.5 per cent). 
The labour cost per 100 kg of coffee seems to vary 
considerably from one region of the State to the other as 
is illustrated by the following findings:* 
Use of cultivating Yield 
''"'^est labour per ha Region of farms jg^ ^ jg^g "^^^^ 
m sample (^an-fJurs) (kg)-
Mogiana 50 161 408 
Alta Mogiana 63 143 330 
Central 119 88 612 
Araraquarense 69 152 432 
Noroeste e Alta Paulista 84 118 498 
Sorocabana 92 n 9 498 
Sao Paulo 477 118 488. 
* These figures are based on the second (B) sample of farms, 
which was less extensive in coverage than the basic (A) sample. 
For this reason the finding of the two samples are not always 
identical. The average yield of the above farms (488 kg/ha) is, 
for instance, slightly above the real State average yield of 446 kg 
per hectare. 
The regional data show that the variations in labour 
cost are closely related to yields. The lowest costs are 
reported in the Central region, which also has the highest 
yield average in the State (more than 600 kg). At the 
other extreme, Mogiana has labour costs nearly twice as 
high as those in the Central region and yields around 
400 kg. As regards the principal producing zones in the 
western part of the State, it will be seen that in both 
Sorocabana and Noroeste e Alta Paulista, average labour 
costs are at about the State average level. But Araraqua-
rense appears to have higher production costs. 
Although the differences between the results obtained 
on individual farms are very large, farms with the hired-
labour (colono) system or sharecroppers used labour more 
efficiently on the average than the usually small family 
concerns. These thee types of farms comprise the large 
majority of-coffee holdings in Sao Paulo, and average 
labour use resulted as follows for each type: 
Labour use per 
100 kg of coffee 
Type of farm (man-hours) 
Hired labour system 116 
Sharecropping system 114 
Family farms 193 
It was also established that labour costs are lower for 
larger farms than they are for smaller ones. This is true 
despite the fact that techniques of farming do not appear 
to differ greatly between farms of different sizes. Further-
more, there is little reason to suppose that economies of 
scale are effected in the manual processes of coffee cul-
tivation. The reasons for the differences in labour costs 
are attributable rather to the physical structure of the 
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respective coffee plantings, i.e. their composition by age 
and by type of trees, and not to the inherent superiority 
of large-scale farming as such. 
The relative uniformity of growing practices in Sao 
Paulo is illustrated by the concentration of a high propor-
tion of the farms in a rather small range of cultivation 
intensity (see figure XIII) . On about 60 per cent of the 
farms, these intensities (i.e. labour use excluding harvest 
operations) were found to range between 150 and 350 
man-hours per hectare. Nearly 90 per cent of the farms 
devoted less than 450 man-hours per hectare. The propor-
tion of intensively cultivated farms, with a wider range of 
advanced operations such as fertilization, pruning, replan-
ting, etc., therefore appears to be small. 
Owing to the perennial character of coffee growing, 
maintenance operations come under the heading of over-
head. Regardless of the yields obtained, many current 
operations, such as three to five weedings annually, must 
be performed, and the corresponding labour use is relat-
ively constant per area unit. This leads to a clear gain 
in efficiency for plantings of aÍ)Ove average yields. 
The close relationship between yield and average labour 
costs is indicated by the following data (see also figure 
X I V ) : 
Labour use per 100 kg coffee 
Yield in kg/1 000 trees per man-hours 
Total Harvest Cultivation 
up to 200 302 130 172 
201- 300 210 93 117 
301- 400 148 75 73 
401- 500 133 72 61 
501- 600 103 56 • 47 
601- 700 86 48 78 
701- 800 87 49 38 
801- 900 58 37 21 
901-1000 63 36 27 
Total labour cost per 100 kg coffee declines steadily as 
yield increases, from about 300 man-hours per 100 kg for 
yields below 200 kg per 1 OOO' trees to less than 100 man-
hours for yields above 600 kg per 1 000 trees. This gain 
in labour efficiency is attributable both to a saving in 
cultivation operations, as already mentioned, and to lower 
harvesting costs, as yields increase. High-yield plantings 
have therefore a strong advantage over low-yielding ones 
from the point of view of labour use. 
As the range in yields in Sao Paulo is rather large be-
cause of differences in the age and variety of plantings, 
soil conditions, the use of fertilizers, etc., the amount of 
labour used to produce 100 kg of coffee also varies greatly 
from farm to farm. Although the average use of labour for 
the State in the crop year 1958 amounted to 118 man-hours 
per 100 kg of coffee, 16.6 per cent of the plantings ab-
sorbed more than 200 man-hours. On the other hand, 42.8 
per cent were able to produce at a cost of less than 100 
man-hours per 100 kg: 
% O k f c o i r Percentage Percentage 
ZanMts) of farms of trees 
up to 100 . . . . 31.6 42.8 
101-200 . . . . 43.2 40.6 
201-300 . . . . 12.0 9.2 
301-400 . . . . 6.9 4.2 
more than 400 . . . . 6.3 3.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
The present discrepancy between the intensity of labour 
input and the average level of resultant productivity em-
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phasizes the fact that this major resource is being used 
unecomically in many farms. Though total (excluding har-
vest) labour input per hectare may fluctuate owing to 
certain soil-type and other ecological differences, this 
seems to be largely caused by differences in the quality 
of the work. Thus no great differences in technology can 
be observed between farms using, say, 200 and those using 
400 man-hours per hectare. Unfortunately it was not 
possible, for the purposes of the present survey, to analyse 
operating efficiency within given levels of total labour use. 
3. USE OF FERTILIZERS 
The use of organic and chemical fertilizers in Sao Paulo 
has become rather common in the relatively recent past. 
Available information indicates that few major coffee-
producing areas in the world equal this State in the aver-
age intensity of fertilization. Yet this is more the result 
of the very small use of fertilizers in coffee growing than 
to the intensive application of fertilizers in Sao Paulo. The 
large majority of existing coffee plantings are not yet 
benefiting from the rational administration of either or-
ganic or chemical fertilizers, as was clearly established in 
the present survey. 
About 13.2 per cent of all trees received chemical ferti-
lizers in 1958. On the other hand, a considerably larger 
proportion (some 29 per cent) were treated with one or 
more types of organic materials. Furthermore, the latter 
are frequently applied in rotation, which raises the total 
proportion of trees treated over a longer period. As the 
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use of both types of fertilizers is common on farms ap-
plying chemicals, it may be estimated from these figures 
that at least 60 per cent of all existing trees were not 
fertilized at all in 1958, while the remaining 40 per cent 
-received one or more types of fertilizer in varying quan-
tities (see figure X V ) . 
It is estimated that altogether about 103 000 tons of 
chemical fertilizers were applied in the survey year, as 
well as some 4.6 million tons of organic materials, the 
unit nutrient content of which is of course much lower. 
The estimated contents of the three main elements of both 
types of fertilizer are as follows: 
T O T A L NUTRIENT CONTENT OF FERTILIZERS APPLIED 
IN COFFEE PLANTINGS IN SÁO PAULO 
N . 
PsOe 











The above table shows that two to three times as much 
nutrient was applied by the use of organic materials than 
with chemicals (see figure XVI ) . This is interesting since 
there has been some controversy about the use of chemical 
fertilizers. Unfortunately no comparable data are available 
for years other than 1958, but the present figures at least 
show that chemical fertilizers now account for a sizable 
proportion of the total nutrient value applied. 
Many different types of chemical ferti izers were used, 
but more than half were mixed formulae containing various 
nutrient ingredients. On the other hand, the composition 
of organic materials was less varied: about two thirds of 
their total weight consisted of cattle manure, a clear in-
dication of the importance of the coffee-livestock cornbina-
tion. Another 11 per cent was made up of coffee hullings. 
Smaller quantities of compost, bone-meal, mulches, green 
manures, etc., were also applied. Among the minor groups, 
the importance of high-nutrient materials merits special 
mention. It is estimated that about 80 000 tons of poultry 
droppings and nearly 50 000 tons of oilseed meals (cotton-
seed, groundnut and castor bean mainly) were spread on 
the State's coffee plantings. The importance of poultry 
manure reflects the increasing frequency of the coffee-
poultry farm already mentioned. On the other hand, the 
use of oilseed meals on a relatively large scale is a curious 
phenomenon in a region of expanding dairy production, 
where many such meals could be used as feed concentrates 
if properly processed. 
It is significant that more than 90 per cent of the orga-
nic materials used as fertilizer are obtained on the farms 
themselves. This appears to have a strong influence on the 
farmer's choice of materials. The chemical ingredients 
must be purchased from outside sources and their prices 
are relatively high, as a portion of the nutrients is im-
ported. 
The issue of organic versus chemical fertilizers there-
fore has its economic as well as its technical aspects. 
Chemical fertilizers are expensive and have to be obtained 
from outside the farm. Most organic materials are avail-
able on the farm at a relatively small cost. Nevertheless, 
the cost of preparing and applying organic fertilizers is 
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considerable because of the greater volume of materials 
handled and their lower nutrient content. It is estimated 
that the total cost of applying a given quantity of nutrient 
by means of organic materials in Sao Paulo, is, on the 
average, at least twice as high in terms of labour and 
transport as is the case with chemical materials. 
The survey established various interesting differences in 
fertilizer use among different farm groups. In the first 
place, it was noted that the use of chemical fertilizers is 
practically unknown on smaller farms and increases steadily 
with size, as shown below: 
Size group 
(trees) 
up to 32 000 . . . . 
32- 64000 . . . . 
64-128 000 . . . . 
more than 128 000 . . . . 






No important variation in the use of organic materials 
was found between the different size groups. 
It was also observed that farmers try to offset the effects 
of the increasing age of their plantings, coinciding with 
greater soil depletion, by increased fertilization. Whereas 
the proportion of trees under 16 years old, which were 
fertilized with chemical or organic materials, was about 
10 and 24 per cent respectively, the comparable figures 
for trees of 16 years or older were about 20 per cent and 
33 per cent. This supports the conclusion that the older 
plantings existing today are the better ones of their period 
and that their average yields would be lower but for the 
wider application of fertilizers which partly compensates 
for the effect of soil exhaustion and age on yields. 
As regards varieties, Caturra received more fertilizer 
than the other types. The fertilization^both chemical and 
organic—of Mundo Novo and Bourbon plantings appeared 
to be of about the same intensity. Conmm was not ferti-
lized as intensively as the other varieties though the 
differences were not very substantial. 
Percentage of plantings fertilized 
Variety 
Chemical Organic 
Caturra 22 26 
Bourbon 15 32 
Mundo Novo 14 30 
Comum 11 27 
Despite the higher proportion of fertilizer used on Ca-
turra plantings, the large majority of the improved trees 
planted in the past decade are not being fertilized. This is 
an important conclusion, for it is often thought that the 
introduction of new varieties is also a sign of a more 
general technological advance. 
An analysis of fertilizer use by soil type shows that, on 
the sandy western soils, which are particularly susceptible 
to erosion, the intensity of fertilizer use was much lower 
than on the more clay-like soils of the north-east, at least 
so far as chemical materials are concerned. The use of 
organic materials shows rather little variation as between 
regions and farm types. 
On the average, each kilogramme of coffee in 1958 
represented an investment of about 3.7 cruzeiros in ferti-
lizing materials, including the value of organic products 
contributed by the farm itself. The cost of application 
amounted to an average of 1.0 cruzeiro, so that the total 
expenditure on fertilization may be estimated at about 4.7 
cruzeiros per kilogramme, a major element of production 
costs. 
4 . COFFEE PROCESSING ON FARMS 
Before the coffee enters marketing channels, it is usually 
processed on farms up to the stage where it can be stored 
safely. Although in many cases this farm processing takes 
the simple form of thoroughly drying the product after 
it comes from the fields, many farms also have equipment 
ranging from hulling ad sorting macliines to mechanical 
dryers. 
According to the survey, the investment in processing 
installations and equipment amounted to an average of 
3 300 cruzeiros per hectare, or 4 300 cruzeiros per 1 000 
trees in 1958. This represents 4.2 per cent of the total 
estimated commercial value of the farm and its coffe plant-
ings, but is about one fifth of the value invested in coffee 
farms, excluding land and coffee plantings. The impor-
tance of processing is therefore considerable in terms of 
investment requirements especially since machinery is one 
of the few items in coffee production which has to be 
bought outside the farm. 
About 30 per cent of the farms covered in the sample 
prepared the coffee up to the green stage after drying 
—usually on brick platforms and occasionally in mechani-
cal dryers—hulling and sorting. The average amount of 
labour required for these processes was 16 man-hours per 
100 Kg coffee, i. e. some 13 per cent of the total up to and 
including the harvest. The most labour-consuming opera-
tions of the processing phase are drying and hand-sorting 
after hulling. 
The coffee is also commonly marketed in the form of 
dried berries (coco seco). On 37 per cent of the farms, 
this was the final product sold and handling was limited 
to drying. In Sao Paulo the fruit dries suddenly and 
unevenly on the tree as it matures, leaving little time to 
pick it fresh as is customary in the mild-coffee countries 
of Latin America. It is therefore already partially dry 
when it is harvested. 
In certain areas of the State, notably in the higher 
north-eastern zones, the depulping of fresh coffee by the 
so-called "wet" process seems to be becoming more wide-
spread. This improves the quality of the end product, but 
it is also much more expensive for the beans have to be 
picked individually as is common in Colombia and other 
countries. In 1958, probably not more than 1 per cent of 
the crop was processed in this way under the incentive 
of higher prices for depulped grades. 
Finally, 25 per cent of the farms reported no formal 
processing activities. Among this group were the numerous 
small units, where the coffee is dried under primitive 
conditions and/or sold in the same form as it is harvested. 
5 . COST STRUCTURE AND PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS 
Despite the great variation in production costs on indivi-
dual farms, which in turn results in a wide range in the 
productivity of all resources engaged in coffee production, 
some important generalizations can be made about the 
present cost structure in Sao Paulo. 
One of the foremost characteristics of coffee growng 
in the State is the large proportion of fixed or overhead 
expenditure. Because of the relatively high commercial 
va ue of land and plantings, the large share of certain 
minimum routine cultivating operations (e.g. weeding) 
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and of harvest work in total labour use and a variety of 
minor fixed items such as general administrative outlay, 
etc., coffee growing has a rather rigid cost structure under 
present conditions. The causes of this apparent rigidity, 
which is noticeable throughout SSo Paulo, seem to derive 
from the fact that the technical level of operations is very 
uniform in the whole State and follows a pattern which 
has not been modified for a long time. New techniques, 
especially those that have come to the fore in the past 
decade, have not so far had a significant impact on coffee 
growing, though considerable attention is now paid to 
them. 
The use of labour, capital, fertilizers and other items 
was found to be similar by and large in all regions of the 
State and with all the various major soil types. Further-
more even the use of new tree types seems to have in-
fluenced the pattern of cultivation but little, as is apparent 
from a comparison of trée-spacing, labour and fertilizer 
application on Mundo Novo, Corrmm and Bourbon plant-
ings. 
The survey consequently established few clear differ-
ences in cultivation methods and cost structures between 
the groups of farms analysed. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant one is the fact that large farms appear to be following 
more advanced methods than the small ones, as is illus-
trated by the more intensive use of chemical fertilizers, 
higher yields and the more efficient use of harvest labour 
on the former. 
Another example of a different cost structure is the 
more intensive cultivation pattern which is followed for 
Caturra. This variety requires special care for optimum 
efficiency but all indications are that this has been one 
of the main reasons for its limited adoptions under com-
mercial conditions, which strengthens the conclusion that 
a rather rigid cultivating system tends to prevail in SSo 
Paulo. 
The high proportion of fixed costs is of course partly 
explained by the perennial character of coffee plantings, 
which require a rather, heavy permanent investment and 
maintenance. But they are a so partly the result of poor 
cultivating techniques. The wider adoption of fertilizers, 
better spacing and advanced growing practices in general 
would all result in higher variable and lower fixed costs 
per unit of product. 
Despite the relative uniformity of cultivating practices 
(i.e. input per area unit), great differences in produc-
tivity (i.e. input per product unit) were noticeable in the 
survey year. Total labour costs per 100 kg coffee ranged 
from less than 100 to more than 300 man-hours for sizable 
numbers of farms, and yields from 200 to more than 3 000 
kg were obtained per 1 000 trees. 
With the existing structure of coffee plantings and with 
the relatively extensive cultivation techniques that are 
common in the State, yields and hence productivity are 
especially influenced by ecological conditions and by fac-
tors which, for all practical purposes, are fixed from the 
point of view of the farmer, such as the age and variety 
of his plantings. Average growing techniques have not yet 
reached the level where the farmers' own effort is the 
decisive factor in maintaining yields. 
Thus a relatively old producing area such as Sao Paulo 
faces considerable difficulty at present in competing with 
zones such as those of Paraná, where newer soils are planted 
predominantly with improved varieties of rather young 
and vigorous trees. Nevertheless, basic techniques are simi-
lar in both these principal coffee-growing areas. In fact, 
typical conditions in the neighbouring State of Paraná 
today are very similar to those in SSo Paulo 30 to 40 
years ago. 
But whereas relatively simple techniques are perhaps 
justified in frontier areas, they no longer fit the case in 
SSo Paulo, which is now fully caught up in a process of 
rapid industrialization and economic growth. It is there-
fore not surprising that strong competition should make 
itself felt on SSo Paulo coffee farms at this stage. 
The technological improvements in coffee growing, which 
are now available after considerable experimentation, offer 
much that would seem adapted to the envolving economy 
of SSo Paulo, e.g. more intensive utilization of the land, 
the maintenance of adequate soil fertility levels, the partial 
mechanization of maintenance operations and the use of 
the best available varieties. On the other hand, relatively 
few farmers, as yet have adopted such innovations on a 
commercial scale. This is not to say, howevér, that the 
behaviour of fanners is necessarily irrational. As will be 
discussed later, there are serious technical and financial 
obstacles in the way of any important transformation of 
coffee growing in SSo Paulo, which would need to be re-
moved in order to assist farmers in modernizing their 
production structure. 
Yet, though the original fertility of the soils in SSo 
Paulo has been greatly reduced, climatological and other 
conditions for coffee growing remain especially' favourable, 
a factor which in the long run favours the State's com-
petitive position over many other producing areas. But 
there is little doubt that the industry will face great dif-
ficulties in the short run, unless action is taken to improve 
the production structure itself. The characteristics of the 
existing cost distribution already show that such adjust-
ments will be painful and expensive and that they can 
therefore be effected only at a considerable outlay and 
with a special impetus in the desired direction. 
IV. BASIC TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
The present study covers all types of coffee farms 
throughout the State of SSo Paulo. General conclusions 
may therefore be drawn for the State as a whole with 
respect to the basic technical and economic problems 
affecting coffee growers. "An objective discussion of these 
problems is essential if an effective coffee production 
policy is to be carried out. The following examiiiation of 
these problems is not exhaustive but it covers some impor-
tant issues emerging from an analysis of the survey 
findings. 
1. DEFECTS IN PRESENT PLANTINGS 
(a) Old plantings and replacement practices 
Despite the large-scale abandonment and elimination of 
coffee plantings during the 1930's and the Second World 
War, and despite high plantings rates in the fifteen post-
war years, the proportion of trees over thirty years old 
reached the impressive figure of 31.5 per cent in 1958 
(see again figures 2 and 3) , a good portion of them ex-
ceeding 50 years. 
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The fact that yields decline with age as soils become 
depleted, while maintenance costs remain equal, this shows 
that the productivity of these old plantings is much less 
than what it could be if proper replacement practices were 
followed. Higher productivity would not only result from 
a better age distribution of trees but also from the gradual 
modernization of existing plantings in keeping with the 
technical improvements that have become available since 
the old planting was established. 
So far, the general policy of coffee growers in SSo 
Paulo has been to reap the highest possible profits- from 
the original capital invested in estab ishing the plantings, 
without much further investment which would guarantee 
reasonable stability in farming. As a result, coffee grow-
ing moved to new lands as the original soils and trees 
were depleted. The older zones therefore contain large 
tracts of former coffee lands, now frequently turned into 
low-productive pastures, and a ^till considerable number 
of old plantings, many of which are technically in very 
poor condition. 
Thus it is very difficult to indicate any specific age at 
which it would be economical to replace the old plantings 
by new ones so as to maximize profits. Variety and soil 
type are the main determining factors on a well-kept coffee 
planting. The profit incentive to shift from depleted lands 
to virgin areas further west, inside or outside the State of 
Sao Paulo, has been much stronger up to now than that 
associated with the stable types of cultivation, including 
the application of modern technical principles and reason-
able replacement practices on existing farms. Yet, in the 
long run, traditional practices are unlikely to be main-
tained as they are wasting too much of the land resources. 
The harsh fact of the matter is however, that little fur-
ther opportunity exists today for coffee migration in Sao 
Paulo, owing to the incorporation of the last reserves of 
virgin land in the recent past. A choice must therefore 
now be made between two clear-cut possibilities. The first 
would be to leave the situation as it is. This might lead 
to a gradual decline in coffee growing in the State and to 
the aggravation of the already serious problems of low 
productivity. The second would be to try to revive coffee 
production in order to adapt it more to the present real-
ities of resource availability and to strong world-wide com-
petition, while imparting a more stable growing pattern. 
The existence of a high proportion of old {plantings and 
the apparent absence of adequate replacement practices 
are two signs that the second choice has not so far been 
widely selected. Other evidence available through the pre-
sent survey and from other sources confirms this. Thus 
coffee producers, as well as the State as a whole, are faced 
with the grave problems outlined above. 
(b) Obstacles to modernization 
At a time when little virgin land remains for coffee 
production and when cultivation may be considered "ma-
ture", in the sense that no spectacular changes compar-
able to those of earlier periods can be expected, growers 
are facing the fact that new techniques of production are 
emerging as the outcome of research undertaken mainly 
over the last twenty to thirty years. 
It has been proved that, taken together, the use of 
fertilizers, soil conservation measures, new varieties and 
a better layout of plantings may raise productivity to le-
vels much above the prevailing ones. 
The Sao Paulo industry is in a difl&cult position to adopt 
such changes despite the benefits that would accrue there-
from, for most of the improvements cannot be applied on 
the existing old plantings. The lack of soil conservation 
measures, inadequate spacing and the existence of tradi-
tional varieties all require rather profound and costly 
changes involving the total replacement of present plant-
ings by new ones. Such changes would of course imply 
strong financial backing and technical assistance. 
But, under present circumstances, the farmers most in 
need of these improvements are also the ones least likely 
to have sufficient resources or technical preparation for 
carrying them out. On many low-yielding plantings few, 
if any, profits are now made from coffee, as appears from 
a detailed analysis of survey results. Cash incomes there-
fore barely suffice for a continuation of existing condi-
tions far less large-scale new investment. 
It is therefore clear that there are serious obstacles to 
modernizing coffee cultivation methods in SSa Paulo and 
that a special effort would be required to assist this 
process. 
(c) New varieties 
An estimated 85 per cent of SSo Paulo's tree stock still 
consists of the traditional varieties (see figure IV) . As 
new planting is of marginal importance and represents 
the only possibility of spreading improved types, most farms 
are not benefiting from this important method of raising 
productivity. Though it is difficult to make a specific esti-
mate of the potential increase in productivity through the 
introduction of new varieties, because of incomplete data, 
the magnitude of this factor under average commercial 
conditions appears to be of the order of 25 to 30 per cent, 
other items being equal (see figures IX and X ) . 
At the same time, competing producing areas in newer 
regions are making full use of the improved seeds, having 
the additional advantage of fertile virgin soils. The in-
troduction of new varieties has so far been one of the few 
rather general technical changes made by farmers invest-
ing in new plantings in SSo Paulo, and the question arises 
whether it would not be useful to enhance the State's com-
petitive position by encouraging the current trend towards 
improved varieties, on the older farms also. Despite the 
high proportion of new planting with improved seeds, the 
entire subject of new varieties is thus of marginal impor-
tance in SSo Paulo and is likely to remain so until the 
older, plantings are replaced by new ones. 
(d) Soil depletion 
Soil deterioration is probably the most serious standing 
problem of coffee growing in SSo Paulo and has existed 
since the introduction of this crop in the State more than 
a century ago. In its westward shift coffee expansion has 
now reached and surpassed State limits, and virtually no 
areas remain that retain their original fertility. Further-
more, the new post-war plantings, which occupied the last 
reserves of land, are situated on generally sandy soils in 
the west, subject to heavy and rapid erosion. 
From the point of view of the State of SSo Paulo as a 
whole, the soil problem is therefore assuming critical pro-
portions. Losses in soil fertility affect practically all parts 
of the State and not only the older ones. As a result 
average yields have dropped and are considerably below 
in 
those obtained in adjacent competing areas. Furthermore, 
part af the soils in Paraná seem to be of higher quality 
than those of several western zones of Sao Paulo, a factor 
which favours competing producers still further. 
The problems connected with soil exhaustion are among 
the most difficult ones to solve, for heavy investment is 
required to counteract it effectively, and yet it has proved 
possible to devise new systems of coffee production on the 
basis of soil restoration, even in the case of soils which 
were abandoned years ago for coffee growing. The econo-
mic aspects of these technological improvements will be 
taken up in chapter VI. 
2 . DEFECTS IN PRESENT EXPLOITATION METHODS 
(a) Labour use 
A detailed analysis of labour use in coffee production 
reveals several important shortcomings which are naturally 
closely related to the advanced age and bad condition of 
the plantings themselves. On the one hand, it was found 
that a uniformly high proportion of labour is spent on the 
harvest and on basic routine operations which are indis-
pensable. On the other hand, present variations in the 
intensity of labour use seem to be largely unrelated to 
differences in cultivation techniques and in productivity. 
This would seem to imply wide differences in the opera-
ting efficiency of this principal resource, which accounts 
for more than half of all production costs. 
On the large majority of farms, the more advanced 
cultivating methods, including fertilization, pruning, soil 
conservation measures, etc., are still the exception. More 
than 80 per cent of the total labour is employed on mini-
mum maintenance operations and on picking the crop 
(see figures XII and XIII ) . 
This is particularly serious as labour is one of the main 
resources on which any structural adjustments would have 
to be based. The alternative use of available manpower in 
activities conducive to optimum total farm productivity 
should be the main objective in the efficient employment 
of this valuable resource, which is generally in ample 
supply in Sao Paulo. In view of the relatively high cost 
of items such as fertilizers and equipment and of capital 
for agricultural purposes, the rather intensive utilization 
of labour in solving the problems facing the industry is 
often preferred by the individual farmer. But the use of 
labour in this connexion would have to follow a new policy 
aimed specifically at utilizing technical improvements to 
raise productivity. 
In the course of the rapid agricultural and industrial 
development now taking place in Sao Paulo, the role of 
manpower in coffee production and the way in which it is 
used will have to be constantly revised in accordance with 
changing price and cost factors. Rigidity in growing tech-
niques would be a handicap. 
(b) Fertilizer use 
About 60 per cent of all coffee plantings received no 
fertilizer at all in 1958 (see figure X V ) . Fertilizer use 
therefore appears to be inadequate for maintaining reason-
able levels of soil fertility and this is naturally a principal 
factor affecting coffee yields. At the same time, a detai ed 
analysis of fertilization practices in 1958 leads to the 
conclusion that a greater use of chemical fertilizers would 
contribute more to net farm profits, under 1958 price and 
cost relationships, than an increase in any other farm in-
put in coffee growing. 
It was also found that the use of fertilizers during the 
formation period of the planting is exceptional and that 
heavier fertilization takes place once declines in yields 
caused by soil depletion on older plantings threaten to 
eliminate profits altogether. At that stage, however, the 
net effect of fertilization seems to be less than at earlier 
ages. Again, more fertilizer is being used on the relatively 
resistant loamy soils in eastern districts than on the sandy 
western lands, which are subject to rapid soil depletion 
and erosion. Even at present fertilizer is not always applied 
in ways which produce the maximum benefits for the State 
as a whole. 
Under present circumstances, a substantial increase is 
required in the use of fertilizers, with a certain preference 
for chemical materials. Though the latter represent a high 
outlay for farmers, flexibility and efficiency in their dis-
tribution and their possible adjustment to the specific re-
quirements of present plantings are factors in their favour. 
This is not intended to detract from the great value as 
fertilizers of locally available organic materials which are 
often by-products of coffee growing and of other profitable 
assopiated enterprises. But it is felt that most of the 
required expansion in fertilizer use will depend on chemi-
cal materials. 
(c) Combinations of advanced practices 
So far only a very small proportion of farmers (1 or 2 
per cent) adopt a combination of various advanced prac-
tices. The results show that commercial growing standards 
follow a rather rigid traditional pattern, with the sole 
exception of the shift to improved seeds in new plantings 
and of a moderate increase in fertilizer use, often un-
related to the introduction of improved varieties. 
In recent years the value of a considerable number of 
technical improvements in coffee growing has been proved 
by experiment; together they cou d bring about important 
changes in the Sao Paulo industry. The principal ones are 
the introduction of new varieties, more adequate spacing 
of trees, measures of soil conservation in the basic layout 
of the planting, and the rational use of fertilizers. 
The combined application of these practices, even on 
"old" soils, may in many cases triple present average 
yields in the State. A farm might therefore produce as 
much coffee as it does today on a much smaller land area 
utilizing the available resident manpower. Routine weed-
ings could be partly mechanized, or effected by the use 
of weed-killers and a considerable part of the land could 
be assigned to other remunerative enterprises. 
A change along these lines would put coffee growing 
on a technically advanced level, which also appears to be 
economically feasible. It would also ensure the more effi-
cient use of available resources without requiring great 
shifts in rural population. Much interest has therefore 
developed in technical circles in the large-scale adoption 
of suitable combinations of the modem farm practices 
mentioned. The low proportion of farmers actually using 
these methods proves, however, that it is difficult to secure 
their general adoption. The main factors involved appear 
to be financing problems and the need to give the farmer 
more ample technical instruction. 
The data show that at present the application of one 
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growing improvement is largely unrelated to that of an-
other. Though some 15 per cent of the existing trees are 
of various improved types, only a small portion of them 
is fertilized. Furthermore, little difference in tree-spacing 
and in the frequency of soil conservation practices is 
evident between the new plantings and the older ones. The 
latter fact is explained by the rather common use of the 
interplanting [dobraqao) system to replace the old plant-
ings: under this system, new trees are planted between 
the existing ones, and the layout of the planting remains 
substantially unchanged once the old trees are removed. 
Thus there is little indication of a systematic adoption 
of a "modern" cultivation system which differs substan-
tially from that traditionally followed in Sao Paulo. A 
small minority of farms is using one technical improve-
ment or the other with partially better results. The chang-
ing agricultural picture in the State would justify a much 
more dynamic process of production adjustment in line 
with that characterizing all rapidly developing areas. 
(d) Cost structure 
A result of this situation is the very high proportion of 
fixed costs characteristic of Sao Paulo coffee production. 
This constitutes, in its own right, a problem of inflexibility 
and resistance to the introduction of new technology, for 
it discourages farmers from shifting their factors of pro-
duction so as to obtain the best possible results under vary-
ing conditions. It also greatly hampers the rechannelling 
of resources from coffee production to other profitable 
and useful activities, wherever required by changes in 
demand. 
The factors already mentioned in the foregoing para-
graphs affect the present cost structure of coff'ee produc-
tion in several ways. The presence of many old plantings, 
which react less efficiently to increased fertilization and 
other improved practices, diminishes interest in breaking 
the vicious circle of inadequate cultivation, declining yield 
and soil erosion through the more efficient use of labour 
and other inputs. The spread of new varieties, which yield 
more even with the traditional cultivation"system, provides 
no major stimulus for further technical development of the 
industry through improved growing methods. Finally, un-
til soil erosion in the relatively new western areas has 
progressed much further, it seems unlikely that-farmers 
will make large-scale investment in the conservation of 
land resources. 
(e) Low yields 
The general indicator of the problems already mentioned 
is the low level of cofl^ ee yields obtained in Sao Paulo. 
Though yields of adult coffee plantings fluctuate between 
extremes of 100 kg and more than 3 000 kg per hectare, 
the State average in 1958 was about 450 kg per hectare, 
equivalent to 540 kg per 1 000 trees. This average level 
is low, not only in relation to what healthy and well-kept 
plantings may normally achiéve, but also compared with 
the results obtained in other important producing areas 
of the world. The most notable difference is that between 
Sao Paulo and Paraná. While both States seem to have 
very similar production techniques, in Paraná the industry 
has largely developed in the past two decades. Average 
coffee yie' Ids in Paraná, in years not affected by frost 
damage, appear to be about double those for Sao Paulo 
in 1958. 
The low-yield problem is one that afl'ects a large portion 
of existing plantings, as is shown by the following fre-
quency distribution of trees by yield classes (see also 
figure X V I I ) : 
Yield per 
1 000 trees 
(kg) 
Millions of trees Percentage 
(rounded figures) of trees 
Up to 200 210 16.2 
201- 300 170 13.2 
301- 420 280 21.4 
421- 540 150 11.4 
541- 660 165 12.8 
661- 780 90 7.0 
781- 900 75 5.9 
901-1200 85 6.7 
1201-1500 50 3.7 
1501-1800 13 1.0 
1801-2 300 7 0.5 
More than 2 300 3 0.2 
All adult trees in Sao Paulo 1300 100.0 
About one half of the existing adult trees had yields 
below 420 kg per thousand (equivalent to 7 bags of green 
coffee and to approximately 21 bags of vindo de roga cof-
FIGURE XVII 
DISTRIBUTION OF ADULT TREES BY YIELD 
CLASSES, 1958 
NATURAL SCALE 
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fee). The level of 420 kg is often considered the mini-
mum break-even point for coffee production in Sao Paulo 
though naturally such a point is never fixed at any given 
level of yield but fluctuates with the price structure. The 
magnitude of the problem is well illustrated by this im-
pressive proportion of apparently submarginal plantings, 
which comprises more than 600 million trees or over, half 
of all adult trees in the State. 
The proportion of trees in higher yield classes tends to 
diminish with each successive level of the table. Never-
theless it is seen that the upper tenth of the distribution 
had yields exceeding 1 000 kg per 1 000 trees. Between 
these extremes lie about 40 per cent of the trees with fair to 
good yields of between 400 and 1 000 kg per 1 000 trees. 
3. DEFECTS IN THE FARM STRUCTURE AS A WHOLE: 
EXCESSIVE SPECIALIZATION 
Despite certain improvements in the farm structure as a 
result of the recent growth of other activities, a large sec-
tion of the farms specialize excessively in coffee production 
to the neglect of profitable alternative activities. Activities 
associated with advanced types of coffee cultivation should 
be given first priority. 
It was already stated that there are important indica-
tions of the growth of non-coffee activities on coffee farms, 
both in association with and independent of coffee grow-
ing proper. But this movement towards diversification is 
far from having exhausted all available possibilities. At the 
present pace of economic development in the State, there 
is every prospect of creating a rapidly expanding market 
for locally-consumed food and other agricultural com-
modities including coffee, especially for those demanded 
on a rising scale as income levels increase, such as milk 
and other livestock products, fruits and vegetables. 
The traditionally high degree of specialization on coffee 
farms was no doubt economically justified in the earlier 
phases of coffee development in Sao Paulo, when there 
were unsatisfactory transport facilities, consequent high 
transport costs, a strong competitive position for Sao Paulo 
coffee, a relatively small domestic market for alternative 
farm commodities, and much greater profits in coffee pro-
duction than in other branches. 
However, these basic conditions have all changed radi-
cally, and there is every reason to suppose that a greater 
relative growth of non-coffee than of coffee production is 
justified in Sao Pauló under present and foreseeable fu-
ture conditions. This conclusion is supported by the current 
difficulties of the coffee surplus and by the possibility of 
using Sao Paulo's agricultural resources, not only for an 
expansion of the local food supply but also for boosting 
existing alternative export commodities and for providing 
certain new categories of exports. 
4 . INTERRELATIONS OF EXISTING PROBLEMS 
The preceding section dealt with ten major problems of 
a general nature, which affect the State's coffee industry 
as a whole. It is clear that all these problems are of a 
long-term nature and that they bear little or no relation 
to the present world market situation. However, the emerg-
ing phase of the coffee cycle of production and prices, 
which has already led to a clearer definition of compe-
titive conditions and to substantial losses in farm prices 
for coffee, is helping to bring these problems into much 
sharper focus than would otherwise have been the case. 
The level of yields in Sao Paulo is unsatisfactory on 
many farms. With the present price and cost structure and 
growing methods, there is no doubt that farmer's profits 
from the low yielding plantings are very small. In fact, if 
capital costs were properly taken into account, many farms 
would show a net loss. Such farms remáin in operation 
only by means of the gradual depreciation of existing in-
vestments and as long as cash outlays can be kept to a mi-
nimum. 
On the other hand, it may also be concluded from 
the survey data that better techniques, especially the more 
intensive application of chemical fertilizers, the closer 
spacing of trees and the planting of improved varieties, 
would result in greater net rewards to farmers, as the 
detailed analysis of survey data has proved. 
Yet it must be remebered that the main cause of the 
great difference in yields between Sao Paulo and Paraná 
can be traced to the fact that the latter State has a high 
proportion of young plantings and that growing takes place 
largely on recently deforested virgin lands. Consequently, 
in raising yields, Sao Paulo farmers are for the time being 
at a considerable disadvantage compared with their coun-
terparts in the neighbouring State. 
In Sao Paulo, higher yiel<£ can be obtained only through 
a considerable new investment in coffee plantings, which 
not only implies the availability of capital for these pur-
poses, but a so greater technical preparedness on the part 
of producers and a willingness to change long-established 
methods. Again, average production costs on improved 
plantings might well be higher still, in the end, than those 
incurred in Paraná under the exceptional conditions pre-
vailing there at present. Nevertheless, the individual farmer 
in Sao Paulo can greatly improve his position by the 
adjustments mentioned. 
It must be borne in mind that most of the defects dis-
cussed earlier are closely interrelated and that each is 
very difficult to eliminate. The continued operation of 
unprofitable plantings is, of course, explained by the fail-
ure of farmers to take account of fixed costs. The replace-
ment of poor flantings is therefore unlikely to result 
spontaneously on a scale which would radically change 
the present situation. 
A much smaller land area could produce the same vol-
ume of- coffee as now obtained, if better growing tech-
niques were adopted. On the other hand, the cost of oper-
ating a hectare of planting would climb steeply as a 
result. Assuming that the volume of coffee production on 
a farm remained the same after the introduction of ra-
tional practices, this situation would release additional 
land which could be earmarked for non-coffee activities. 
The difficulties of coffee production can therefore be 
resolved only by measures affecting the farm structure as 
á whole and by the general reallocation of available re-
sources, with a view to maximizing the profits obtainable 
under the new conditions. 
. Such a task is certainly forbidding and difficult to ac-
complish in a short time. Large capital investment would 
have to be made in this connexion, and technical assistance 
would have to be utilized fully in order to obtain satis-
factory results. One of the foremost requirements in plan-
ning such investment, both public and private, would be 
the careful establishment of priorities on a district basis 
with due regard to special local factors influencing farm 
production. 
78 
V. EVALUATION OF PROSPECTS 
1. THE CASE OF NO SPECIAL ACTION 
The preceding analysis of the basic structure of coffee 
growing in Sao Paulo makes it easier to hazard an evalua-
tion of what may happen to coffee growing in the fore-
seeable future. Owing to the relatively fixed character of 
coffee production and to special factors in Sao Paulo that 
contribute to this situation, many of the changes that are 
likely to occur in the next five years or so are limited to 
a certain extent by the current production structure. This 
is true notwithstanding the fact that Sao Paulo's total 
economy, as well as its agriculture, is at present in a state 
of considerable flux associated with rapid growth. Yet 
appreciable changes may occur within the industry, de-
pending on market forces and on Government plants affect-
ing coffee growing. 
Without special action of some kind, it seems next to 
impossible that the State will be able to solve the problems 
of low yields and productivity in a short period. The 
;)resent situation is not caused by the events of the last 
few years; it is the cumulative result of the growth of 
coffee production over more than a century. There is 
nothing in the present market situation nor in the position 
of farmers today to indicate that the industry is pro-
ceeding to remove the serious interrelated difficulties of 
soil exhaustion, low yields and old age of plantings with-
out a special impetus in this direction. 
The radical changes that would be required to lift the 
industry as a whole to a higher technical level weré al-
ready indicated in connexion with the present distribution 
of plantings by yields (see figure XVII ) . At current prices 
and costs, about half of the existing trees apparently fail 
to produce profits. In most cases little improvement could 
be brought about by changing the cultivation of these 
trees. The only adequate solution would therefore be their 
wholesale elimination and replacement by other agricul-
tural activies, or partly by modern coffee plantings com-
petitive with those of other areas. Such a complete trans-
formation would involve new investment of the order of 
30 000 to 40 000 million cruzeiros at 1958 prices, a figure 
about twice the value of the entire 1958 crop. 
During 1957 and 1958, when internal farm prices drop-
ped sharply from their previous levels (about 11 per cent 
from 1956 to 1957 and about 35 per cent from 1957 to 
1958), farmers stepped up considerably the elimination 
of low-yielding trees. Some 35 million trees were destroyed 
in each of these years, according to survey data. Never-
theless, at these rather high rates it would take fifteen to 
twenty years to remove all the trees which in 1958 could 
be classified as submarginal. It was also shown that the 
spontaneous introduction of modern farm practices has so 
far been very small, being limited to devices requiring 
little new investment and hardly any change in growing 
techniques. 
The large investment farmers would have to market in 
order to modify present techniques, not only through the 
elimination of low-yielding trees but also through the 
construction of terraces, adequate fertilization, etc., make 
the spontaneous adoption of the new experimental methods 
difficult under present conditions. In addition, farmers 
may simply not wish to adopt systems which differ sub-
stantially from those used traditionally and of which they 
have no personal experience. They may also be hesitant 
to introduce new and rather costly methods, which do 
not pay off for several years, at rates that may well be 
inferior to those obtained by alternative investments ven-
tures inside or outside agriculture and inside or outside 
the State of Sao Paulo. 
There are therefore serious reasons for doubting whether 
even the large-scale removal of low-productive plantings 
automatically result in a fundamental change in the pro-
ductivity level. Foreseeable elimination rates may affect the 
situation still less, Aough the disappearance of low-yield-
ing trees would be a positive contribution by itself. On 
the other hand, it may also be difficult for farmers to 
introduce the new practices on a large scale, indepen-
dently of the removal of their present unproductive plant-
ings. 
While the productivity structure is therefore unlikely to 
change much in the next five years, the same conclusion 
does not apply to the level of production. Total coffee 
production in the State may well riáfe considerably in the 
same period, unless important new events occur. The mat-
uring of the relatively large number of new trees established 
during the 1950's, the continued shift to higher-yielding 
varieties, and a continuation of the trend towards chemi-
cal fertilization, at least on a moderate scale are all factors 
contributing to an increase in output. The following table 
summarizes the possible affect of these forces on produc-
tion up to 1964/65, in the absence of significant new 
factors affecting coffee production and on the basis of 
three different sets of assumptions: 
ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION TREND ESTIMATES UP TO 1964/65 
Alternative conditions 




Low planting rate 1959-61 
High elimination 1959-64 
Small increase in fertilizer use 1959/64 . . . 
Low planting rate 1959-61 
Medium elimination 1959-64 
Considerable increase in fertilizer use 1959-64 . 
Relatively high planting rate 1959-61 . . . . 
No elimination 1959-64 
Considerable increase in fertilizer use 1959-64 
in production 1958/59 
to 1964/65 
- f l8.5 
-f32.0 
level 1964/65 










100 million trees in 3 years 
135 »» )> 5» 5) 
'in 
50 „ ,, „ „ „ 
25 per cent in 5 years 
50 per cent in 5 years 
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The three alternative projections ail cover what reason-
ably might happen on the assumptions described, and 
provide an estimate of the range of expectation. The 
postulated planting rates for the triennium 1959-61 would 
both be well below the comparable actual, figure for 
the preceding three years (196 million trees). The estim-
ates of elimination are within a relatively small margin 
of what farmers reported the situation to be in the year 
1957 and 1958 (35 million trees eliminated each year). 
The further adoption of chemical fertilization practices 
would raise the proportion fertilized to 16.5 per cent, or 
to 20 per cent of all existing trees (the 1958 proportion 
was 13.2 per cent). Further assumptions are: {a) that 
differences in weather conditions balance out over the 
period and would not therefore affect the trend as such; 
(b) that the incidence of frost would be relatively small 
in Sao Paulo, as it has been in most past years; (c) that 
yields of trees eliminated in the peiiod will be below the 
State average level of yields in 1958. 
What the real level of production will be by the mid-
sixties is, of course, still uncertain, even after the detailed 
consideration of each of the above factors. On the basis 
of the conditions prevailing up to the beginning of 1960, 
it would seem that the second alternative (B) might come 
closer to reality than the other two, or than any other 
combination of assumptions affecting production. In this 
case, the total output of coffee would rise at a composite 
rate of 4.8 per cent per year and might reach a volume 
of 15 million to 16 million bags by 1964/65. But this 
figure should in no case be regarded as a valid guide to the 
actual level of production in 1964, or in any intervening 
year; it is only an indication of the six-year trend 1958/59-
1964/65. 
Yet the conclusion is warranted that current conditions 
all point to a further substantial output increase in the 
next few years. It seems that more than half of this ex-
pected rise is due to the maturation of plantings already 
in existence in 1958. The other main factors, roughly of 
similar quantitative importance, making for higher pro-
duction are the shift to better varieties, the expected ex-
pansion in fertilizer use, and the maturation of plantings 
to be established in the period 1959-61. The reduction in 
yields of plantings passing the optimum age and the elimi-
nation of low-yielding trees will both have an effect in 
the opposite direction, but are unlikely to offset the 
positive effect of the factors mentioned earlier. 
In conclusion it would therefore appear that, in the 
absence of special programmes for the industry and of 
major unforeseen events, the productivity structure of 
coffee growing in SSo Paulo in the mid-sixties will not 
differ basically from that of today. On the other hand, 
total output is likely to show a sizable increase from the 
1958 level. 
2 . PRESENT PLANS 
In the past year, important new programmes have 
been drawn up by the Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC) 
to deal with coffee production problems. The Institute's 
programme is to be financed through agencies of the Ban-
co do Brasil; Cr. 1 000 million will be appropriated for 
this purpose. The programme may be supplemented by 
similar plans at the State level. 
Under these programmes, directed credit will be sup-
plied to farmers for the elimination of three low-yielding 
coffee trees and for replanting one new tree in accordance 
with modern technical principles, established by the State 
experimental and extension service. These objectives show 
that it is intended to boost productivity, while reducing 
the total number of coffee trees. 
The Institute's plans for the coffee industry are a new 
development, constituting a positive effort strike at the 
deeper roots of the coffee problem. It shows that the Bra-
zilian authorities are well aware of the need for changes 
' at the farm level as a result of the low productivity of 
many farms. 
The execution of the Institute's programme is now in 
its initial phase, and it is difficult to estimate its possible 
impact on the SSo Paulo industry in the coming years. 
But on the basis of the survey findings it is possible to 
compare the magnitude of the problem with that of the 
efforts described. 
If it is estimated that the total cost of eliminating three 
low-yielding coffee trees, of planting one new tree by 
modern methods and of maintaining it until maturity 
(three years) would be some Cr. 100 and that the number 
of low-yielding trees that would be affected on the basis of 
available funds, would be of the order of 25 million. As 
the total number of submarginal plantings may be esti-
mated at about 600 million trees, it is clear that the pro-
gramme could affect only a small portion of the deficient 
plantings. Further efforts would be required to ensure the 
success of such a productivity drive, but the programme 
represents a serious new start on industry-wide structural 
adjustments. A number of farmers not directly benefiting 
from the special credits might also be induced to follow 
suit on their own initiative because of profit incentives, as 
they became aware of the possibilities. 
The campaign mentioned would have relatively little 
effect on the production trend. The elimination of about 
25 million trees might result in a drop in output of little 
more than 100 000 bags, a figure which would probably 
be made up three or four years later by the new and 
high-yielding trees. While total production might therefore 
be slightly affected, by the programme, it is felt that this 
effect would be very small and transitory. The present 
campaign is therefore designed much more to show the 
possibility of raising productivity than to limit production. 
In order to affect the existing production trend substan-
tially it would be necessary to undertake much greater mod-
ernization efforts and to raise the ratio of trees eliminated 
to trees planted at least from three-to-one to four-to-one. As 
it is, each participating farmer may approximately main-
tain his present output of coffee, while improving culti-
vation techniques and considerably reducing the area in 
coffee. In fact, more than two thirds of the area used 
before the programme was put into effect would be freed 
for other purposes. 
In this connexion it may be noted that present plans 
are not apparently intended to control the use to which 
the freed land resources would be put after removal of the 
old coffee trees. In view of the favourable outlook of 
the demand for non-coffee farm products and of the vary-
ing adaptability of a given farm to one new activity or 
other, it would be of great practical value to extend the 
campaign to include credit for additional farm activities. 
Recent information shows that this idea has already been 
taken up by the Institute. In this way the entire farm 
structure could be strengthened through greater diversifica-
tion, and the State's economy would benefit more fully 
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from such a change. In view of the relatively small ex-
perience of farmers in activities other than coffee grow-
ing, they might encounter difficulties if they were left 
entirely to their own initiative in allocating the freed 
lands. 
To sum up, the plans recently formulated with respect 
to the Sao Paulo industry are an interesting new step 
towards solving the problems of low productivity and 
putting coffee growing on a sounder and more stable 
technical and economic basis. The oustanding problem 
is, however, of such magnitude that these plans may only 
affect a small minority of farms in the coming years. The 
level of production as a whole is not likely to be substan-
tially altered in the course of the various campaigns as 
scheduled at present. 
3. PROSPECTS FOR DIVERSIFYING THE COFFEE FARM 
The increased diversification of coffee farms more than 
any other single factor would assist the coffee industry in 
its present difficult phase. Farmers' would be much more 
willing to remove their inefficient plantings and to reduce 
the total number of trees, if profitable alternative uses 
could be found for the resources thus freed. It is therefore 
of special importance to summarize the conclusions of the 
survey on diversification prospects. 
In the previous paragraphs reference was made to the 
relatively low coffee yields, to the present degree of 
diversification on coffee farms, and to the fact that the 
rapid economic development of Sao Paulo creates a favour-
able environment for agricultural production for the dom-
estic market. The effect of the current situation on prices 
and on the productivity of various activities will be shown 
below. 
FIGURE XVIII 
SAO PAULO: DEFLATED FARM PRICE INDICES'» 
(1948-52 average = 100) 
NATURAL SCALE 
* Prices received by farmers, corrected for increases in the 
general price level. 
ing the profitability of producing coffee and other crops. 
These data take into account yields and prices, factors 
which greatly influence net productivity. 
Figure X X illustrates the situation in three different 
recent periods: before the post-war boom; the peak of the 
coffee cycle; and the period for which the most recent data 
(a) Price trends 
In the past decade price's of coffee and other agricul-
tural commodities have fluctuated sharply, not only as a 
result of the unstable coffee situation but also of the chang-
ing pace of inflation, which led to annual increases in the 
general price level ranging from 7 per cent (1948/49) to 
35 per cent (estimate for 1958/59). 
Yet price trends show quite clearly that the real price 
level of other commodities has been much more stable 
that of coffee, and that the relative position of coffee has 
deteriorated markedly since the post-war peak of 1954 
(see figures XVIII and XIX) . While most other products 
have roughly maintained real prices throughout the de-
cade, real coffee prices received by farmers were, at the 
end of 1959, little more than one third of those received 
in 1954 and about one half of those of the 1948-52 five-
year average. Even in comparison with 1948, the leist year 
before the post-war peak period, 1959 prices show a 
decline of more than 20 per cent. There is no doubt then 
that the relative position of coffee vis-a-vis other com-
modities has markedly worsened in recent years. 
(b) Productivity of agricultural activities 
In the absence of adequate data on production cost for 
different agricultural activities, trends in gross farm value 
produced per hectare provide partial indications regard-
riGURE X I X 
SAO PAULO: FARM PRICES RELATIVE TO COFFEE* 
(1948-52 average = 100) 
NATURAL SCALE 
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VALUE OF OUTPUT PER HECTARE IN SELECTED 
ENTERPRISES IN SAO PAULO 
NATURAL SCALE 
are available. In 1948-49, gross returns per hectare of 
coffee compared favourably with those of most other crops, 
margins of 65 to 200 per cent existing with respect to such 
major crops as cotton, maize, beans, groundnuts and castor 
beans. This margin was smaller with respect to rice (about 
10 per cent only), and sugar cane production gave 25 
to 30 per cent higher gross returns than did coffee grow-
ing. Many intensive crops such as potatoes, fruits, vege-
tables, tobacco (not show in the figures) naturally have 
always produced higher values per hectare than has coffee, 
but production costs are also much higher and each of 
these crops has limited possibilities. 
In 1954 coffee growing returns naturally greatly ex-
ceeded those of 1948/49. But the 1958/59 figures show 
not only that the 1954 bulge disappeared completely, but 
also that coffee's relative position deteriorated considerably 
with respect to 1948/49. Many of the important crops 
shown now surpass or equal coffee in gross value per 
hectare. Indications are that this tendency is still con-
tinuing, for 1960 coffee prices are again lower in real 
terms than those of 1959. 
The careful survey of several important production 
combinations such as coffee-sugar cane, coffee-rice and 
coffee-dairy products shows that, under 1958 average 
conditions, net returns per unit of expenditure were only 
slightly lower than those obtained, on the average, from 
coffee. It may be concluded from the available data that 
large sectors now exist where other farm activities can 
compete effectively with coffee growing for productive 
resources. The most competitive products, to each of which 
different circumstances apply, seem to be dairy and poul-
try products, cotton, beef cattle, sugar cane and rice, but 
this list is not exhaustive. Other interesting items are 
oranges, oilseeds and other fruits and vegetables, and 
eucalyptus trees on poor land. 
The general situation seems to be that all of these and 
several others are equally or more profitable than coffee 
growing in most cases where coffee yields are less than 
about 400 kg per hectare. Developments since 1958 are 
likely to have enhanced the position of other activities 
even further. This opens up vast prospects, for in 1958 
more than half of the existing coffee plantings had yields 
of less than 400 kg per hectare. 
Naturally there are other considerations to be taken 
into account, for instance, the fact that coffee growing 
is less risky and less complicated than other branches of 
agricultural production. Experience has shown that the 
price of coffee is likely to be supported at certain mini-
mum levels unlike that of other commodities. On the other 
hand, traditional coffee production is challenged not only 
by non-coffee activities but also by the more advanced 
coffee-growing techniques themselves. 
It is not possible to analyse fully diversification pros-
pects in Sao Paulo in a few pages. Neither has the present 
survey provided all the necéssary information on which 
to base a diversification campaign. It is essential to have 
data on each of the State's sub-regions, to indicate spe-
cifically which activity would be suitable in present and 
foreseeable circumstances. The existing structure gives, in 
many cases, some idea of the suitability of the various 
possible activities. Examples of this are the present con-
centration of dairy, fruit and vegetable production in the 
north-eastern part of the State and that of cotton and 
groundnuts in the west. 
But it may be affirmed that ample possibilities exist in 
Sao Paulo for expanding agricultural production for the 
domestic market on a basis competitive with coffee. This 
situation is only the natural result of the gradual trans-
formation of the State's economy from a primary com-
modity exporting area to a major industrial region. If 
these favourable basic conditions are taken advantage of 
in formulating agricultural policy, it is likely that sub-
stantial results will be obtained in a relatively short period. 
4. SUMMARY OF PROSPECTS 
The two aspects which are most likely to change sponta-
neously through the play of market forces are the total 
level of coffee production and the importance of com-
modities other than coffee on coffee farms. The volume of 
coffee output is likely to increase further in the next five 
years at an average rate of about five per cent per annum. 
Although the actual rate will also depend on conditions 
developing in the coming years, the existing structure 
already determines the probable approximate range of 
production increases as a result of the age distribution 
of plantings in 1958. 
Expanding domestic demand and the fact that coffee 
prices are declining in relation to non-coffee farm pro-
ducts are major factors which are likely to lead to a greater 
output of the latter. Much of this increase will take place 
on farms producing coffee, because of the predominant 
position of the latter in the State's agriculture, and the 
outcome will therefore be a greater diversification of the 
coffee farm structure. 
Despite the fact that there is a considerable fund of 
technical knowledge, which might substantially raise the 
productivity of coffee growing if applied on- a large scale, 
it is difficult to see how the adoption of these new methods 
could take 'place rapidly in the absence of large and well-
organized campaigns. This seems true despite the fact that 
farmers' profits could also be increased in this process. 
But there are many difficulties to be overcome, e.g. the fact 
that farmers might make larger profits investing in acti-
vities other than the modernization of coffee production 
and that there is no proper link between the experimentally 
proved results and the daily working conditions of most 
farmers. Only the most simple, most successful and least 
costly innovations are likely to be adopted spontaneously 
on a commercial scale. The introduction of improved 
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varieties generally meets these prerequisites, and conse-
quently the majority of fanners are now using them when 
establishing new plantings. 
One important new step is the recent formulation of 
special programmes to do away with the lowest-yielding 
plantings and to use modem techniques in setting up new 
ones. These programmes are being started by the Institute. 
The campaigns approved so far may deal with only a 
small part of the problem of low productivity, but they 
may profoundly change the situation of the participating 
farms. On the other hand, they are likely to have little 
effect on the total supply of coffee. 
Although the current situation of the Sao Paulo coffee 
industry is characterized by considerable rigidity in many 
aspects, it is also true that the rapid growth of the eco-
nomy and tested innovations in the technology of coffee 
growing provide a favourable environment for change. 
Efforts to remove the obstacles impeding the modernization 
of coffee production and greater diversification might 
therefore enjoy considerable success in the coming years. 
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